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Two things: - Non code files were counted for both sudo and systemd. That's because I'm lazy, not because I think it influences the result one way or the othe

• jchw 3y ago
  > Separate binaries are not separate logical entities. They're separate programs, sometimes essentially completely independent, sometimes sharing almost no code at all. For example, systemd-init does not have dependencies on all of the other programs, or vice versa. You can use the systemd-boot bootloader without using systemd's init daemon. You can use the systemd init daemon without using the systemd-boot bootloader. Having separate release tarballs isn't some special distinction that makes things more "logically separate". Besides, isn't this a goalpost shift of epic proportions? > That is a bit rich coming from the author of systemd, which must be in the running for one of the largest bodies of code that must run as root The point in indicting the size of systemd was the code that runs as root, but the wc line count is counting tons of stuff that not only doesn't all run as root, but some of it doesn't even run under Linux. > those things didn't protect openssh being hit with the XZ Utils hack via systemd A lot has already been said about this before, but the systemd library that they included in the Debian and Fedora patches to OpenSSH is by far one of the smallest surface areas of any of the runtime dependencies. A bit ago, when I ran libtree on sshd, I got this: $ libtree `which sshd` /run/current-system/sw/bin/sshd ├── libgssapi_krb5.so.2 [runpath] │ ├── libkrb5.so.3 [runpath] │ │ ├── libk5crypto.so.3 [runpath] │ │ │ ├── libkrb5support.so.0 [runpath] │ │ │ │ ├── libkeyutils.so.1 [runpath] │ │ │ │ └── libresolv.so.2 [runpath] │ │ │ ├── libkeyutils.so.1 [runpath] │ │ │ └── libresolv.so.2 [runpath] │ │ ├── libcom_err.so.3 [runpath] │ │ │ ├── libkrb5support.so.0 [runpath] │ │ │ ├── libkeyutils.so.1 [runpath] │ │ │ └── libresolv.so.2 [runpath] │ │ ├── libkrb5support.so.0 [runpath] │ │ ├── libkeyutils.so.1 [runpath] │ │ └── libresolv.so.2 [runpath] │ ├── libk5crypto.so.3 [runpath] │ ├── libcom_err.so.3 [runpath] │ ├── libkrb5support.so.0 [runpath] │ ├── libkeyutils.so.1 [runpath] │ └── libresolv.so.2 [runpath] ├── libkrb5.so.3 [runpath] ├── libcom_err.so.3 [runpath] ├── libk5crypto.so.3 [runpath] ├── libz.so.1 [runpath] ├── libcrypto.so.3 [runpath] │ └── libpthread.so.0 [runpath] ├── libldns.so.3 [runpath] │ ├── libssl.so.3 [runpath] │ │ ├── libcrypto.so.3 [runpath] │ │ └── libpthread.so.0 [runpath] │ └── libcrypto.so.3 [runpath] └── libpam.so.0 [runpath] └── libaudit.so.1 [runpath] And that's just what you can see by looking at the shared objects, there might be more at runtime. You would have to ignore mountains of rationality in order to come to the conclusion that systemd was remotely reasonably "at fault" for what happened with the xz incident. Not only that, even prior to the xz incident, systemd had already fixed the problem that lead to the xz exploit, it just wasn't shipping in Debian or Fedora yet; that's most likely why the xz backdoor had to be rushed into the next releases in the first place, because the window of opportunity was closing.
  • wokwokwok 3y ago
    [flagged]
    • jchw 3y ago
      > There are system-d haters, sure. > ...but system-d apologists are also a thing. Why do you feel the need to insert this personal insult into an otherwise impersonal argument? This infuriates me. I'm not sitting here inflamed with passion to argue about systemd because I think it is great. I'm sitting here arguing about systemd because I feel someone was wrong on the Internet. https://xkcd.com/386/ https://xkcd.com/386/ If you want to ascribe me as some "systemd apologist" because I am willing to "defend" systemd when I feel it is justified, then so be it, but it's wildly inaccurate, and framing it this way is biased in and of itself. It implies some kind of personal identification with things like init systems that I don't have. I have strong opinions, but I have those about everything. > There's a fairly comprehensive thread about this (1), and my take away from it was not 'this had nothing to do with systemd'. That's an enormous thread, if it really has a substantive bit can you please at least point to it? There's no chance I'm reading another thread about the xz incident. > You can argue where blame lies for it, Which is what I did do > but that it involved system-d, and would not have been possible without system-d is not in dispute. FWIW it would have been possible to backdoor Linux via liblzma5 without sshd linking to it. The actual thing that makes the sshd backdoor so incredibly stealthy is a combination of the fact that it is done in such a roundabout way (through an unexpected dependency), in a way that it would only be activated by downstream patches in distros and not upstream code. That last part is really nifty for avoiding detection. There are still plenty of places where liblzma5 is used, with root privileges even. For example, many package managers use liblzma5. It certainly would've been possible to install a backdoor into sshd through that vector. People are reading a bit much into the systemd link, but even if you won't accept that backdooring Linux would've been completely doable through liblzma5 without systemd, I would still contend that linking to liblzma5 is honestly a completely reasonable thing for a system library to do; heck, sshd itself already links to zlib. While 0 unused dependencies are better than 1, the picture people paint is that systemd recklessly linked in a bunch of libraries which is the only possible way a compromise of the xz project could've backdoored Linux, but the reality is a lot more nuanced than that. > You're stepping from 'lets argue about system-d being big and clunky' into 'nothing is ever wrong with system-d we cannot tolerate critique!' here. That's neither where this argument started nor where it is. Nothing in my single reply in this thread even remotely suggests the latter. It is a direct confrontation of two specific points. > ...but, come on. We're arguing about the minute (irrelevant) details of a much larger point being made here. > System-d is a big complex system; it is kind of funny that something that is big and complex sigh. Now we're all the way back to square one. systemd is not a monolithic piece of software, it is a suite of programs. > and part (undenyably) of a major recent security scare is part of the plan to replace sudo to be more secure and less complex. I don't see this as funny at all considering that you don't need a bunch of roundabout logic to find security issues in sudo, they happen fairly regularly. https://www.sudo.ws/security/advisories/ https://www.sudo.ws/security/advisories/ > I believe the intent is good, and the result will probably be better than the mess that sudo is now; but that's because sudo is a mess (or I personally think so anyway), not because system-d is simple, or easy, or somehow fundamentally more secure. > If you can't see the irony here, you are dancing around with your hands over you ears. Well, trust me when I say this, but I can tell you right now that I am witnessing a lot of irony.
• rixed 3y ago
  > But complex interconnected systems achilles heel is security, and that's definitely true here. And portability. Sudo, being a truly independent binary, has been ported in many OSes. Run0? The issue with systemd ecosystem is not primarily technical, it's the isolationism.