3 ms·
Air-gapped, the only way to go. https://www.welivesecurity.com/2021/12/01/jumping-air-gap-15-years-nation-state-effort/ https://www.welivesecurity.com/2021/12/
by instagib 2y ago
Air-gapped, the only way to go.
https://www.welivesecurity.com/2021/12/01/jumping-air-gap-15-years-nation-state-effort/ https://www.welivesecurity.com/2021/12/01/jumping-air-gap-15...
There are still several vectors even with the top security clearance procedures. They routinely miss things at security checkpoints.
“Even a perfect air gap will be vulnerable to a variety of different attack vectors, including (but not limited to) the following:
Physical compromise: An adversary bypasses physical security and gains access directly to the air-gapped network devices. Physical access is by far the most effective and obvious technique.
Insider threats: Someone who is part of an organization and has access to air-gapped secure systems intentionally or unintentionally compromises a system.
Supply chain compromise: A vendor with legitimate access to air-gapped systems unwittingly is compromised and brings infected devices into a network.
Misconfiguration: Misconfiguration of access controls or permissions allows an attacker to access the air-gapped system through a separate device on the network.
Social engineering (media drop): If an attacker was able to successfully conduct a malicious USB/media drop and an employee was to use that media within the air-gapped system, the network could be compromised.
Other advanced tactics: Thermal manipulation, covert surface vibrations, LEDs, ultrasonic transmissions, radio signals, and magnetic fields are among a range of advanced tactics documented and demonstrated by researchers at Ben Gurion University. “
https://darktrace.com/blog/why-the-air-gap-is-not-enough https://darktrace.com/blog/why-the-air-gap-is-not-enough
- c_o_n_v_e_x 2y ago>Other advanced tactics: Thermal manipulation, covert surface vibrations, LEDs, ultrasonic transmissions, radio signals, There's a pretty good video of a guy who drove a GPIO pin off of a microcontroller and successfully sent data via LoRA without a dedicated radio chipset or antenna. https://github.com/cnlohr/lolra https://github.com/cnlohr/lolra