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Yes, the biggest problem with this mere mechanistic picture is why anything should move at all. The csci view is essentially a divine command one: the machine r

Yes, the biggest problem with this mere mechanistic picture is why anything should move at all. The csci view is essentially a divine command one: the machine runs because of it's 'program' which is somehow external to the machine. But this is a metaphor/illusion for programmable devices like electronic computers, which breaks down for the actual universe. The universe must be inherently dynamical, ie., not mere discrete states that change by rules, but properties whose nature is to interact with the world... This is why the abstract mathematical conception of "computer" cannot describe anything physical: mathematical objects do not have temporal properties; they do not change. This leads to the illusion, for electric devices, that the change is extrinsic to the physics of the system since we can specify the algorithm (somewhat) abstractly. But it isnt.. your pieces of meat, are in the end, the causal power which moves the liquid crystal, electric field, etc.

fellowmartian 3y ago
I think this a caricature or at least a shallow view of computationalism. Nobody is claiming that the universe is a computer of the same kind as the ones we have. Instead, I think, it claims that the universe has to necessarily be computational in order to be real - everything has to be computational to be real, otherwise how can it ever be implemented. On your "divine command" bit: I don't think any theory has a good claim on the ultimate ontology of reality, so I don't see how one view is better than another. It's all some kind of divine command at the moment. Computationalism at least constrains the necessary properties the divine must have.
- titzer 3y ago
  > everything has to be computational to be real But that's just circular logic. It begs the question as to what is "computational" and what is "mathematical". E.g. Tegmark has good points in the "Mathematical Universe" that describe possible interpretations of what it means to be mathematical. But how is computation different than math? I'd argue that computation is primarily stateful, logical, and (mostly) deterministic with a clear flow of time, whereas mathematical models are often time-reversible (as most, if not of QM is), stateless, and not necessarily "logical" in the sense of relating finite symbolic quantities. Rather mathematical models happily relate infinite series, manifolds, surfaces, high-dimensional spaces, they talk about fields and operate on functions, etc.

fellowmartian 3y ago

I think this a caricature or at least a shallow view of computationalism. Nobody is claiming that the universe is a computer of the same kind as the ones we have. Instead, I think, it claims that the universe has to necessarily be computational in order to be real - everything has to be computational to be real, otherwise how can it ever be implemented. On your "divine command" bit: I don't think any theory has a good claim on the ultimate ontology of reality, so I don't see how one view is better than another. It's all some kind of divine command at the moment. Computationalism at least constrains the necessary properties the divine must have.

titzer 3y ago
> everything has to be computational to be real But that's just circular logic. It begs the question as to what is "computational" and what is "mathematical". E.g. Tegmark has good points in the "Mathematical Universe" that describe possible interpretations of what it means to be mathematical. But how is computation different than math? I'd argue that computation is primarily stateful, logical, and (mostly) deterministic with a clear flow of time, whereas mathematical models are often time-reversible (as most, if not of QM is), stateless, and not necessarily "logical" in the sense of relating finite symbolic quantities. Rather mathematical models happily relate infinite series, manifolds, surfaces, high-dimensional spaces, they talk about fields and operate on functions, etc.