> it is so manifestly obvious that pizza has none of the properties that we typically associate with consciousness that the theory is merely eliminativism in di

> it is so manifestly obvious that pizza has none of the properties that we typically associate with consciousness that the theory is merely eliminativism in disguise The problem with this, other than the obvious point that "extremely complicated physical processes inside the brains and bodies of humans, which we are only beginning to work out the details of" is very different from "pizza", is that no physical process can possibly have "the properties that we typically associate with consciousness", at least if "we" means Strawson and those who take his side in the debate. The only way for something to exist that has all of the properties that Strawson et al insist on is for that something to be non-physical, to violate physical laws. Is this non-physicalism logically impossible? Of course not. That's why, as I said, nobody is going to resolve this debate with arguments. But lots of things are logically possible: Russell's teapot, Sagan's undetectable dragon in the garage, etc. That doesn't mean everything that is logically possible should be taken seriously. The non-physicalist argument for taking them seriously with regard to consciousness boils down to a simple assertion without argument: it is just obvious to them that no amount of physical processes could ever produce the conscious experiences we all have. But this isn't science. It's just throwing up your hands and refusing to look any further. That is what Dennett and those on his side of the debate refuse to accept. There is a lot of science to be done in this area, and only a small part of it has yet been done. Let's do it and see where we end up. Is it logically possible that we will end up just where Strawson et al are now? Yes. But is that the way to bet? Dennett didn't think so, nor do many others, and nor do I. As I've already said, we'll see.