https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/03/31/encryption-debate-in-australia-2021-update-pub-84237 https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/03/31/encryption-debate-i... >

https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/03/31/encryption-debate-in-australia-2021-update-pub-84237 https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/03/31/encryption-debate-i... > In 2018, the heads of Australia’s law enforcement and intelligence agencies were given broad powers by the Telecommunications and Other Legislation Amendment (Assistance and Access) Act 2018,1 or TOLA Act, to gain access to encrypted communications. > ... > The most controversial section of the TOLA Act amended the Telecommunications Act 1997 to create “frameworks for voluntary and mandatory [communications] industry assistance to law enforcement and intelligence agencies.” > ... > Three kinds of notices or requests sit at the core the TOLA Act framework: > * Technical Assistance Requests (TARs), which are “voluntary” requests for a “designated communication provider” to use a decryption or other data access capability they already have; > * Technical Assistance Notices (TANs), which are compulsory notices for a designated communication provider to use a capability they already have; and > * Technical Capability Notices (TCNs), which are compulsory notices for a designated communication provider to build a new capability, so that it can fulfil subsequent Technical Assistance Notices and Requests. > The definition of “designated communication provider” runs for three pages, and includes everyone from the major telecommunications carriers down to an entity that “provides an electronic service that has one or more end-users in Australia,” anyone who “develops, supplies or updates software used, for use, or likely to be used, in connection with” such a service, and “manufactures or supplies components for use, or likely to be used, in the manufacture of customer equipment for use, or likely to be used, in Australia.”