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The problem is not a technologic one, it's societal. It doesn't matter if you give a piece of the key to the ACLU, one to the EFF or whatever other entities on

The problem is not a technologic one, it's societal. It doesn't matter if you give a piece of the key to the ACLU, one to the EFF or whatever other entities one might think as "impartial" or "without conflict of interest". As long as there is a law that allows the governnent to send Men With Guns® to these entities, they can and will be coerced. FISA is the prime example. You can have all the laws you want, but as long as "they" have things like NSLs which prevent you from even having a lawyer without clearance to defend yourself, you are royally fscked. (This case is in Australia so they might not have FISA or similar, but the point is the same)

endgame 2y ago
https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/03/31/encryption-debate-in-australia-2021-update-pub-84237 https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/03/31/encryption-debate-i... > In 2018, the heads of Australia’s law enforcement and intelligence agencies were given broad powers by the Telecommunications and Other Legislation Amendment (Assistance and Access) Act 2018,1 or TOLA Act, to gain access to encrypted communications. > ... > The most controversial section of the TOLA Act amended the Telecommunications Act 1997 to create “frameworks for voluntary and mandatory [communications] industry assistance to law enforcement and intelligence agencies.” > ... > Three kinds of notices or requests sit at the core the TOLA Act framework: > * Technical Assistance Requests (TARs), which are “voluntary” requests for a “designated communication provider” to use a decryption or other data access capability they already have; > * Technical Assistance Notices (TANs), which are compulsory notices for a designated communication provider to use a capability they already have; and > * Technical Capability Notices (TCNs), which are compulsory notices for a designated communication provider to build a new capability, so that it can fulfil subsequent Technical Assistance Notices and Requests. > The definition of “designated communication provider” runs for three pages, and includes everyone from the major telecommunications carriers down to an entity that “provides an electronic service that has one or more end-users in Australia,” anyone who “develops, supplies or updates software used, for use, or likely to be used, in connection with” such a service, and “manufactures or supplies components for use, or likely to be used, in the manufacture of customer equipment for use, or likely to be used, in Australia.”

endgame 2y ago

https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/03/31/encryption-debate-in-australia-2021-update-pub-84237 https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/03/31/encryption-debate-i... > In 2018, the heads of Australia’s law enforcement and intelligence agencies were given broad powers by the Telecommunications and Other Legislation Amendment (Assistance and Access) Act 2018,1 or TOLA Act, to gain access to encrypted communications. > ... > The most controversial section of the TOLA Act amended the Telecommunications Act 1997 to create “frameworks for voluntary and mandatory [communications] industry assistance to law enforcement and intelligence agencies.” > ... > Three kinds of notices or requests sit at the core the TOLA Act framework: > * Technical Assistance Requests (TARs), which are “voluntary” requests for a “designated communication provider” to use a decryption or other data access capability they already have; > * Technical Assistance Notices (TANs), which are compulsory notices for a designated communication provider to use a capability they already have; and > * Technical Capability Notices (TCNs), which are compulsory notices for a designated communication provider to build a new capability, so that it can fulfil subsequent Technical Assistance Notices and Requests. > The definition of “designated communication provider” runs for three pages, and includes everyone from the major telecommunications carriers down to an entity that “provides an electronic service that has one or more end-users in Australia,” anyone who “develops, supplies or updates software used, for use, or likely to be used, in connection with” such a service, and “manufactures or supplies components for use, or likely to be used, in the manufacture of customer equipment for use, or likely to be used, in Australia.”