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> you appear not to understand why physicalism might not be the non-negotiable ur-assumption for someone else that it is for you Oh, I understand that just fin

by pdonis 3y ago

> you appear not to understand why physicalism might not be the non-negotiable ur-assumption for someone else that it is for you Oh, I understand that just fine. I just don't agree with non-physicalists. I could equally well say that non-physicalists who claim that Dennett denied the reality of consciousness do not understand why their implicit assumption that consciousness must be something non-physical is not the non-negotiable ur-assumption for Dennett (and me) that it is for them. They simply fail to understand that physicalists like Dennett and me are not saying that consciousness doesn't exist. We're just saying that it's a physical process. Real consciousness--real feelings of pain, suffering, joy, and everything else that phenomenalists wax poetic about--is a physical process. It is no answer at all to say that, gee, I can't imagine how that could possibly be true, so I'm going to assume you actually mean that all those things don't exist. But that's basically what Dennett's critics have said for decades. You talk about empathy: I think that line of criticism shows an astounding lack of empathy. > People assume that things which they take to be physical objects (such as cars) will obey physical laws. No, they don't. Most people have no idea what the actual applicable physical laws are. People assume that things they are familiar with will show the regularities they are familiar with them having. Those regularities, to a physicalist, are all grounded ultimately in underlying physical laws, but the connection is very complex, even for objects much simpler than cars. Scientists still don't completely understand how molecules work in terms of the underlying laws of physics of atoms and elementary particles. That doesn't stop them from being able to build accurate models of molecules using higher-level regularities. The physicalist program for consciousness is simply applying to it the same methods we already apply successfully to all sorts of complex systems.

foldr 3y ago
Galen Strawson has a good line about the "pizza theory of consciousness". Pizza theorists accept that consciousness is real but believe that it is pizza. Technically, this is not an eliminativist theory: pizza exists. But it is so manifestly obvious that pizza has none of the properties that we typically associate with consciousness that the theory is merely eliminativism in disguise. Perhaps those of us who reject the pizza theory simply lack the imagination to understand it. Or maybe the pizza theory is just obviously wrong. >No, they don't. I could have written that sentence more clearly, but I just meant to say that people will assume such objects to obey the typical regularities and constraints exhibited by physical objects (and not expect them to have weird ghostly properties). Which you seem to agree with.
- pdonis 3y ago
  > Galen Strawson Has had plenty of exchanges in the literature with Dennett. I have read most of them. I don't buy his counterarguments, although I admit has does have some good turns of phrase.
- pdonis 3y ago
  For a good example of an exchange between Dennett and Strawson, see this article, which I already referenced upthread in response to another poster: https://tufts.app.box.com/s/vvlgzbozt821qe9s3l3o8yxxzbr447kv https://tufts.app.box.com/s/vvlgzbozt821qe9s3l3o8yxxzbr447kv Of course neither one convinces the other, but I think this article describes the opposing viewpoints pretty well.
- pdonis 3y ago
  > it is so manifestly obvious that pizza has none of the properties that we typically associate with consciousness that the theory is merely eliminativism in disguise The problem with this, other than the obvious point that "extremely complicated physical processes inside the brains and bodies of humans, which we are only beginning to work out the details of" is very different from "pizza", is that no physical process can possibly have "the properties that we typically associate with consciousness", at least if "we" means Strawson and those who take his side in the debate. The only way for something to exist that has all of the properties that Strawson et al insist on is for that something to be non-physical, to violate physical laws. Is this non-physicalism logically impossible? Of course not. That's why, as I said, nobody is going to resolve this debate with arguments. But lots of things are logically possible: Russell's teapot, Sagan's undetectable dragon in the garage, etc. That doesn't mean everything that is logically possible should be taken seriously. The non-physicalist argument for taking them seriously with regard to consciousness boils down to a simple assertion without argument: it is just obvious to them that no amount of physical processes could ever produce the conscious experiences we all have. But this isn't science. It's just throwing up your hands and refusing to look any further. That is what Dennett and those on his side of the debate refuse to accept. There is a lot of science to be done in this area, and only a small part of it has yet been done. Let's do it and see where we end up. Is it logically possible that we will end up just where Strawson et al are now? Yes. But is that the way to bet? Dennett didn't think so, nor do many others, and nor do I. As I've already said, we'll see.

by pdonis 3y ago

foldr 3y ago

Galen Strawson has a good line about the "pizza theory of consciousness". Pizza theorists accept that consciousness is real but believe that it is pizza. Technically, this is not an eliminativist theory: pizza exists. But it is so manifestly obvious that pizza has none of the properties that we typically associate with consciousness that the theory is merely eliminativism in disguise. Perhaps those of us who reject the pizza theory simply lack the imagination to understand it. Or maybe the pizza theory is just obviously wrong. >No, they don't. I could have written that sentence more clearly, but I just meant to say that people will assume such objects to obey the typical regularities and constraints exhibited by physical objects (and not expect them to have weird ghostly properties). Which you seem to agree with.

pdonis 3y ago
> Galen Strawson Has had plenty of exchanges in the literature with Dennett. I have read most of them. I don't buy his counterarguments, although I admit has does have some good turns of phrase.
pdonis 3y ago
For a good example of an exchange between Dennett and Strawson, see this article, which I already referenced upthread in response to another poster: https://tufts.app.box.com/s/vvlgzbozt821qe9s3l3o8yxxzbr447kv https://tufts.app.box.com/s/vvlgzbozt821qe9s3l3o8yxxzbr447kv Of course neither one convinces the other, but I think this article describes the opposing viewpoints pretty well.
pdonis 3y ago
> it is so manifestly obvious that pizza has none of the properties that we typically associate with consciousness that the theory is merely eliminativism in disguise The problem with this, other than the obvious point that "extremely complicated physical processes inside the brains and bodies of humans, which we are only beginning to work out the details of" is very different from "pizza", is that no physical process can possibly have "the properties that we typically associate with consciousness", at least if "we" means Strawson and those who take his side in the debate. The only way for something to exist that has all of the properties that Strawson et al insist on is for that something to be non-physical, to violate physical laws. Is this non-physicalism logically impossible? Of course not. That's why, as I said, nobody is going to resolve this debate with arguments. But lots of things are logically possible: Russell's teapot, Sagan's undetectable dragon in the garage, etc. That doesn't mean everything that is logically possible should be taken seriously. The non-physicalist argument for taking them seriously with regard to consciousness boils down to a simple assertion without argument: it is just obvious to them that no amount of physical processes could ever produce the conscious experiences we all have. But this isn't science. It's just throwing up your hands and refusing to look any further. That is what Dennett and those on his side of the debate refuse to accept. There is a lot of science to be done in this area, and only a small part of it has yet been done. Let's do it and see where we end up. Is it logically possible that we will end up just where Strawson et al are now? Yes. But is that the way to bet? Dennett didn't think so, nor do many others, and nor do I. As I've already said, we'll see.