It seems like the JaiTan incident was either the first time a playbook of this nature was caught, or a new proving out of the method by a less experienced set o

It seems like the JaiTan incident was either the first time a playbook of this nature was caught, or a new proving out of the method by a less experienced set of operators. This can happen when an attack like this is successful enough times by a high skilled adversary that it becomes essentially a theoretically mapped attack path for lesser skilled operator teams to attempt to create a working playbook for. Look for many more of these attacks to come as the playbooks are refined and less skilled operators are able to pull off these sorts of attacks better. Think of how the ransomware industry evolved from viruses to botnets to the wannacry event. That vertical stack of both attack chain knowledge and post attack operational capability combined put most contenders out of the game until the post exploit portion of the attack was turned into an affiliate system. I envision a future where it's easier than ever for even just a burned out software developer to simply use a service that creates a one time use highly obfuscated performance and memory safety tested back door based on public key encryption exactly like the JaiTan proof of concept showed. The end result will need to be heavy focus on reproducible testing of signed source code, perhaps with even more cryptographic insurances than git currently provides. I imagine my entire workflow as being cryptographicly signed from commit to runner state changes to unit testing and fuzzing, with some form of multi factor signing system like multisig. The future is bleak but it's not like we can't do things about it and be proactive.