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> Zombie Chalmers is wrong by definition Only if you accept that Chalmers's definition of Zombie-Chalmers is consistent. But if you are a physicalist, it is no

by pdonis 3y ago

> Zombie Chalmers is wrong by definition Only if you accept that Chalmers's definition of Zombie-Chalmers is consistent. But if you are a physicalist, it is not consistent, and any claims based on it are simply invalid. See further comments below. > Chalmers' epiphenominalism about consciousness Yes, that's part of the issue, but not the only part. It is true that I personally have never been able to make sense of epiphenomenalism about consciousness: the idea that my consciousness has literally nothing to do with any of my physical behavior (and remember that this doesn't just include easily observable things like the sounds I utter or the movements my body makes, but things like what can be detected in my brain in an fMRI scanner) to me seems daft. Furthermore, it doesn't make sense from an evolutionary perspective: why would organisms evolve consciousness if it had no effect on anything else? However, over and above all of that, there is the issue that, as i said above, Chalmers's definition of Zombie-Chalmers is simply inconsistent with physicalism. If physicalism is true, then the idea of a physical duplicate of you, who are conscious, that is not conscious is a contradiction in terms. As I said in an earlier post, physically identical necessarily implies identical in everything, including consciousness, if physicalism is true. > if you are willing to indulge Dennett in some of his more counterintuitive speculations, you could stand to be a little more generous to Chalmers here Nothing I have said in support of Dennett anywhere in this discussion is "indulging" him in "counterintuitive speculations". I am simply describing the basic implications of Dennett's physicalism about consciousness. For example, I have not said anything about the "Multiple Drafts" model that he propounded in Consciousness Explained, which he himself said was speculation, but I think he expected it to get more traction than it has apparently gotten. I have tried to limit myself to just the basic things that have to be the case if physicalism is true at all.

foldr 3y ago
Certainly Zombie-Chalmers is inconsistent with physicalism. Chalmers is not a physicalist, and the logical/metaphysical possibility of zombies forms part of his argument against physicalism. If you want, you can just stamp your foot down and insist on physicalism (and thereby dismiss whole swathes of the philosophical literature on consciousness), but from Chalmers' point of view you'd just be begging the important questions. My point regarding Dennett is that his overall picture of consciousness also contains highly counterintuitive elements (such as e.g. his denial of any form of privileged access [1], which is not just an ad-hoc speculation tacked on to his main theory but a necessary consequence of it). I agree that Chalmers' epiphenominalism is counterintuitive too. I don't think anyone has succeeded in arriving at an overall philosophical account of consciousness that is entirely satisfying and free of implausible or counterintuitive elements. I think it's important to have a certain amount of empathy here and understand that people genuinely differ in their plausibility judgments in this domain. For example, I personally find epiphenomenalism, though implausible, to be less implausible than the denial of privileged access; I suspect you have the inverse judgment. It is unclear how to weigh these sorts of considerations against each other. [1] > I see no other way to force this issue into the open than to defend an admittedly counterintuitive theory and await enlightenment on what, exactly, I have left out. The view that I wish to defend is that our privileged access extends to no images, sensations, impressions, raw feels, or phenomenal properties at all. There are indeed all sorts of interesting things going on in our heads that have characteristics or play roles that might tempt us to call them images or sensations or impressions, but our access to these events is not only not privileged; it is highly indirect, inferential and uncertain. https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-94-009-9479-9_6 https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-94-009-9479-9_...
- pdonis 3y ago
  > Certainly Zombie-Chalmers is inconsistent with physicalism. Ok, good, we agree on that. > his denial of any form of privileged access Not of any form, no. Dennett was fine with the notion that we have privileged access to what it is like to be us (to use Thomas Nagel's phrase--Dennett's often-used term was "heterophenomenological world"). We have a direct experience of what it is like to be us, and that experience is real. Dennett just insisted that that, in itself, tells us nothing about how accurate our "what it is like to be us" is as a representation of the underlying processes going on in our brains. There are indeed images, sensations, raw feels, phenomenal properties in our "what it is like to be us"--in Dennett's terms, those are indeed intentional objects in our heterophenomenological worlds. But that, in itself, does not mean that, for example, if we say we have a mental image, there must actually be an image somewhere in our brains. There are real underlying processes going on, but we can't infer from our direct experience of having a mental image that any of those underlying processes involve images. > I think it's important to have a certain amount of empathy here It's not a matter of empathy; it's a matter of being consistent about the implications of one's views. I'm a physicalist, just as Dennett was. You agree that, for example, Zombie-Chalmers is inconsistent with physicalism. No amount of "empathy" can overcome that contradiction. I have to pick one or the other. I pick physicalism, not because of any lack of "empathy" for Chalmers or anyone else, but because, all things considered, that's what I pick. And having picked physicalism, I have to deny that Zombie-Chalmers is a valid concept, in order to be consistent. Just as Chalmers, to be consistent with his belief that Zombie-Chalmers is a valid concept, has to deny physicalism.
  - foldr 3y ago
    Pretty much everyone agrees that the existence of a distinction between zombie and non-zombie Chalmers is inconsistent with strong physicalism. That is the whole point. Regarding empathy, I'm saying that you appear not to understand why physicalism might not be the non-negotiable ur-assumption for someone else that it is for you. Chalmers is arguing against physicalism, so to point out that his position is inconsistent with it is not a very interesting response. You're certainly free to make your own judgment about the centrality of physicalism to your belief system; it just doesn't work as a rejoinder to Chalmers' arguments. We could have an extended discussion of exactly which aspects of privileged access Dennett denies, but the broader point here is that he himself acknowledges the counterintuitive nature of his position on it. > [Physicalism] is everybody's default assumption when dealing with anything that matters in practical terms. No, it isn't. People assume that things which they take to be physical objects (such as cars) will obey physical laws. They can perfectly well do this without the additional assumption that the contents of the universe are exhausted by physical entities. Indeed, when dealing with people (who surely matter in practical terms!) it is probably a minority of the world's population who assume them to be wholly physical. The idea that non-physicalists must be worried about their cars exhibiting ghostly non-physical behavior is just silly. It is like saying that someone who does not believe that everything in the universe is made of wood must be worried that their wooden table might actually be made of chocolate. Believing in the existence of non-wooden things doesn't preclude treating wooden things as instances thereof. Almost everyone believes that there exist wholly physical objects governed wholly by physical laws, even if they don't think that all objects fall under this category.

by pdonis 3y ago

foldr 3y ago

Certainly Zombie-Chalmers is inconsistent with physicalism. Chalmers is not a physicalist, and the logical/metaphysical possibility of zombies forms part of his argument against physicalism. If you want, you can just stamp your foot down and insist on physicalism (and thereby dismiss whole swathes of the philosophical literature on consciousness), but from Chalmers' point of view you'd just be begging the important questions. My point regarding Dennett is that his overall picture of consciousness also contains highly counterintuitive elements (such as e.g. his denial of any form of privileged access [1], which is not just an ad-hoc speculation tacked on to his main theory but a necessary consequence of it). I agree that Chalmers' epiphenominalism is counterintuitive too. I don't think anyone has succeeded in arriving at an overall philosophical account of consciousness that is entirely satisfying and free of implausible or counterintuitive elements. I think it's important to have a certain amount of empathy here and understand that people genuinely differ in their plausibility judgments in this domain. For example, I personally find epiphenomenalism, though implausible, to be less implausible than the denial of privileged access; I suspect you have the inverse judgment. It is unclear how to weigh these sorts of considerations against each other. [1] > I see no other way to force this issue into the open than to defend an admittedly counterintuitive theory and await enlightenment on what, exactly, I have left out. The view that I wish to defend is that our privileged access extends to no images, sensations, impressions, raw feels, or phenomenal properties at all. There are indeed all sorts of interesting things going on in our heads that have characteristics or play roles that might tempt us to call them images or sensations or impressions, but our access to these events is not only not privileged; it is highly indirect, inferential and uncertain. https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-94-009-9479-9_6 https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-94-009-9479-9_...

pdonis 3y ago
> Certainly Zombie-Chalmers is inconsistent with physicalism. Ok, good, we agree on that. > his denial of any form of privileged access Not of any form, no. Dennett was fine with the notion that we have privileged access to what it is like to be us (to use Thomas Nagel's phrase--Dennett's often-used term was "heterophenomenological world"). We have a direct experience of what it is like to be us, and that experience is real. Dennett just insisted that that, in itself, tells us nothing about how accurate our "what it is like to be us" is as a representation of the underlying processes going on in our brains. There are indeed images, sensations, raw feels, phenomenal properties in our "what it is like to be us"--in Dennett's terms, those are indeed intentional objects in our heterophenomenological worlds. But that, in itself, does not mean that, for example, if we say we have a mental image, there must actually be an image somewhere in our brains. There are real underlying processes going on, but we can't infer from our direct experience of having a mental image that any of those underlying processes involve images. > I think it's important to have a certain amount of empathy here It's not a matter of empathy; it's a matter of being consistent about the implications of one's views. I'm a physicalist, just as Dennett was. You agree that, for example, Zombie-Chalmers is inconsistent with physicalism. No amount of "empathy" can overcome that contradiction. I have to pick one or the other. I pick physicalism, not because of any lack of "empathy" for Chalmers or anyone else, but because, all things considered, that's what I pick. And having picked physicalism, I have to deny that Zombie-Chalmers is a valid concept, in order to be consistent. Just as Chalmers, to be consistent with his belief that Zombie-Chalmers is a valid concept, has to deny physicalism.
- foldr 3y ago
  Pretty much everyone agrees that the existence of a distinction between zombie and non-zombie Chalmers is inconsistent with strong physicalism. That is the whole point. Regarding empathy, I'm saying that you appear not to understand why physicalism might not be the non-negotiable ur-assumption for someone else that it is for you. Chalmers is arguing against physicalism, so to point out that his position is inconsistent with it is not a very interesting response. You're certainly free to make your own judgment about the centrality of physicalism to your belief system; it just doesn't work as a rejoinder to Chalmers' arguments. We could have an extended discussion of exactly which aspects of privileged access Dennett denies, but the broader point here is that he himself acknowledges the counterintuitive nature of his position on it. > [Physicalism] is everybody's default assumption when dealing with anything that matters in practical terms. No, it isn't. People assume that things which they take to be physical objects (such as cars) will obey physical laws. They can perfectly well do this without the additional assumption that the contents of the universe are exhausted by physical entities. Indeed, when dealing with people (who surely matter in practical terms!) it is probably a minority of the world's population who assume them to be wholly physical. The idea that non-physicalists must be worried about their cars exhibiting ghostly non-physical behavior is just silly. It is like saying that someone who does not believe that everything in the universe is made of wood must be worried that their wooden table might actually be made of chocolate. Believing in the existence of non-wooden things doesn't preclude treating wooden things as instances thereof. Almost everyone believes that there exist wholly physical objects governed wholly by physical laws, even if they don't think that all objects fall under this category.