3 ms·
A secure system should not allow any single credential access to the entire system. A secure system should be designed with the assumption of compromise. No s
by WalterBright 3y ago
A secure system should not allow any single credential access to the entire system.
A secure system should be designed with the assumption of compromise.
No single person should have access to the whole system. No single entry point should have access to everything.
And so on.
- purpleteam81 3y agoWell said...a secure system is treated as an information system where all subsystems should have minimally at least three complimentary controls. It just isn't that hard. A secure system facing the internet should have the default ports changed...then should someone with a zero day and the exploit posted on Git...casual scanning for the known port will fail.
- 01HNNWZ0MV43FF 3y agoSomeone has to build the lock that requires two people to open. Then, because the company doesn't have the culture to hire three trustworthy people, and because nobody is in a position to enforce quality at any level, the lock gets outsourced and disassembled Ran into this problem at one company. Boss wanted a secure system. Nobody knew about security but me. Couldn't lock myself out of a system that I had to hold the keys to
- SV_BubbleTime 3y agoTry explaining that to a SMB CFO, I swear if you have met one you have met them all. The MBA-ification of the world seems to have created an archetypical believer among its other many evils.
- WalterBright 3y agoIt's the same principle that spy agencies rely on. A spy agency cannot survive one compromised spy rolling up the entire spy network. One could reasonably posit that Germany lost WW2 because they used Enigma for important stuff, and when Enigma was compromised, their operations were compromised thru the end of the war. For example, Enigma was the cause of Rommel's defeat in Afrika.