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> You are reading things into his writing that he is not saying I linked a video where he says it in full HD with audio: "The latter exists and the former does

by _akhe 2y ago

> You are reading things into his writing that he is not saying I linked a video where he says it in full HD with audio: "The latter exists and the former doesn't" - did you watch it? Not like it's the only time he's said it either, the downplaying of consciousness and the denial of a rich inner experience are things Dennett is known for. > he says that the activity of the neurons is your conscious experience Finally you said something that reflects reality. Yes he does say that. And more than one interviewer (don't make me find them, but I think they are Louis Godbout and Robert Lawrence Kuhn, or maybe Donald Hoffman) have asked for clarification in asking something like: But the activity of the neurons are not identical with the redness of red, the aroma of coffee, the taste of chocolate, the blueness of the door in Godbout's example. The activity of the neurons are the activity of the neurons, little electro-chemical excitations. That's not, for example, the aroma of coffee. To which Dennett will explain away that experience - it doesn't exist - often conflating raw experience with self/identity (different things) in doing so. It's a kind of rigid, ultra physicalist stance that you apparently really dig, but it's ultimately wrong because as Chalmers says it denies the datum of experience - we know there's an experience happening because we observe it ourselves (even though the self is illusory, the experience isn't). Empiricism means to be based on observational evidence - in this case it's your direct first-person observation or "experience". I've gotten off track - the reason I'm arguing with you is because you grossly misrepresent the late, great Dan Dennett and I'm trying to figure out A) Why you think this or B) If you're just a hobbyist arguer. > At this point I am wondering whether you are a physicalist or not. If you are, you should be agreeing with Dennett It's not that simple.

pdonis 2y ago
> I linked a video I've already rebutted your claims about this video multiple times. Your response has been to repeat the same assertions without even bothering to address my rebuttals. > the reason I'm arguing with you is because you grossly misrepresent the late, great Dan Dennett Apparently we're never going to agree on who is misrepresenting Dennett. But I'm curious: how much Dennett have you actually read? > I'm trying to figure out A) Why you think this Because, as I've already told you, I have read every book Dennett ever published on consciousness and free will, and a fair portion of his papers on those topics that never got put into one of his books, and based on all of that reading, I think you are misrepresenting Dennett's position. What's more, the counter arguments I see you giving are the same ones Dennett responded to for several decades. I see nothing new whatever in anything you've posted that would change my mind about who is misrepresenting what.
pdonis 2y ago
> as Chalmers says it denies the datum of experience Chalmers is a particularly ill-chosen example for this, because Chalmers also claims that his zombie twin--an atom-by-atom duplicate of him that is indistinguishable in all its physical properties and actions but lacks consciousness--is a coherent concept. But by his own definition, since Chalmers says his conscious experience is a direct "datum", so would zombie-Chalmers. And since zombie-Chalmers is an atom-by-atom duplicate of Chalmers, on what basis would Chalmers say that he is right when he makes this claim, but somehow zombie-Chalmers is wrong? If physicalism is true, this is simply false reasoning: zombie-Chalmers, since he is physically identical to Chalmers, must also be identical with respect to consciousness. So either Chalmers is simply denying physicalism--he has some mysterious non-physical property, in principle unexplainable in terms of the physical state of him, that zombie-Chalmers lacks--or he is simply failing to think clearly about his own position, and therefore believes that the concept of zombie-Chalmers as he defines it is coherent, when in fact it isn't. Similar remarks could be made about other concepts that are trotted out by Dennett's critics, such as "qualia", but Chalmers makes the incoherence of such positions particularly obvious.
- foldr 2y ago
  >And since zombie-Chalmers is an atom-by-atom duplicate of Chalmers, on what basis would Chalmers say that he is right when he makes this claim, but somehow zombie-Chalmers is wrong? This isn't quite the right question to get at the issue. Zombie Chalmers is wrong by definition as he's a hypothetical creature defined not to have any conscious experience. Real Chalmers is right iff he has conscious experiences. I think what you're getting at here is Chalmers' epiphenominalism about consciousness and its possible implications for whether or not Chalmers' belief that he has conscious experiences can be justified according to his own lights. Chalmers is well aware of this issue. It is rather a subtle one, as it is not so obvious on further examination that the belief that one has conscious experiences must necessarily be caused by conscious experiences in order to be justified. Thus, even though zombie Chalmers' belief has the same cause as real Chalmers' belief, it is conceivable that one belief may be justified while the other is not. It all depends on one's theory of justification – and it's probably an understatement to say that there are a lot of those to choose from. There is some summary of Chalmers' and others' takes on this here: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epiphenomenalism/#SelStu https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epiphenomenalism/#SelStu More broadly, I would say that if you are willing to indulge Dennett in some of his more counterintuitive speculations, you could stand to be a little more generous to Chalmers here, who is certainly no fool.

by _akhe 2y ago

pdonis 2y ago

> I linked a video I've already rebutted your claims about this video multiple times. Your response has been to repeat the same assertions without even bothering to address my rebuttals. > the reason I'm arguing with you is because you grossly misrepresent the late, great Dan Dennett Apparently we're never going to agree on who is misrepresenting Dennett. But I'm curious: how much Dennett have you actually read? > I'm trying to figure out A) Why you think this Because, as I've already told you, I have read every book Dennett ever published on consciousness and free will, and a fair portion of his papers on those topics that never got put into one of his books, and based on all of that reading, I think you are misrepresenting Dennett's position. What's more, the counter arguments I see you giving are the same ones Dennett responded to for several decades. I see nothing new whatever in anything you've posted that would change my mind about who is misrepresenting what.

pdonis 2y ago

> as Chalmers says it denies the datum of experience Chalmers is a particularly ill-chosen example for this, because Chalmers also claims that his zombie twin--an atom-by-atom duplicate of him that is indistinguishable in all its physical properties and actions but lacks consciousness--is a coherent concept. But by his own definition, since Chalmers says his conscious experience is a direct "datum", so would zombie-Chalmers. And since zombie-Chalmers is an atom-by-atom duplicate of Chalmers, on what basis would Chalmers say that he is right when he makes this claim, but somehow zombie-Chalmers is wrong? If physicalism is true, this is simply false reasoning: zombie-Chalmers, since he is physically identical to Chalmers, must also be identical with respect to consciousness. So either Chalmers is simply denying physicalism--he has some mysterious non-physical property, in principle unexplainable in terms of the physical state of him, that zombie-Chalmers lacks--or he is simply failing to think clearly about his own position, and therefore believes that the concept of zombie-Chalmers as he defines it is coherent, when in fact it isn't. Similar remarks could be made about other concepts that are trotted out by Dennett's critics, such as "qualia", but Chalmers makes the incoherence of such positions particularly obvious.

foldr 2y ago
>And since zombie-Chalmers is an atom-by-atom duplicate of Chalmers, on what basis would Chalmers say that he is right when he makes this claim, but somehow zombie-Chalmers is wrong? This isn't quite the right question to get at the issue. Zombie Chalmers is wrong by definition as he's a hypothetical creature defined not to have any conscious experience. Real Chalmers is right iff he has conscious experiences. I think what you're getting at here is Chalmers' epiphenominalism about consciousness and its possible implications for whether or not Chalmers' belief that he has conscious experiences can be justified according to his own lights. Chalmers is well aware of this issue. It is rather a subtle one, as it is not so obvious on further examination that the belief that one has conscious experiences must necessarily be caused by conscious experiences in order to be justified. Thus, even though zombie Chalmers' belief has the same cause as real Chalmers' belief, it is conceivable that one belief may be justified while the other is not. It all depends on one's theory of justification – and it's probably an understatement to say that there are a lot of those to choose from. There is some summary of Chalmers' and others' takes on this here: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epiphenomenalism/#SelStu https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epiphenomenalism/#SelStu More broadly, I would say that if you are willing to indulge Dennett in some of his more counterintuitive speculations, you could stand to be a little more generous to Chalmers here, who is certainly no fool.