5 ms·

As a follow-up to my previous response, here is a fairly recent (2018) article on this issue: https://tufts.app.box.com/s/7vo5d1wo8ur7f1wxoipeffok5as7kgmj http

by pdonis 3y ago

As a follow-up to my previous response, here is a fairly recent (2018) article on this issue: https://tufts.app.box.com/s/7vo5d1wo8ur7f1wxoipeffok5as7kgmj https://tufts.app.box.com/s/7vo5d1wo8ur7f1wxoipeffok5as7kgmj Note in particular item (ii) on p. 2, which speaks directly to the distinction drawn in the video. And note that Dennett has no problem at all in the article with referring to "experiences" as real things, for example in item (iii) on p. 2: "All the comprehension, appreciation, delight, revulsion, recognition, amusement, etc. that human beings experience must be somehow composed by the activities of billions of neurons that are myopic in the extreme, cloistered in their networks of interacting brethren, oblivious to the larger perspective they are helping to create." He does not say that all those experiences aren't real--indeed they must be real in order to be "composed by the activities of billions of neurons". Note also this comment on p. 1, describing a position with which Dennett did not agree: "The hard problem, they surmised, will only be addressed by a return to some form of dualism, or panpsychism, or some yet to be articulated overthrow of what might be considered normal science." This is the kind of viewpoint I was referring to by the word "magic" in my previous response. Btw, I found the above article on this page which gives a fairly comprehensive list of Dennett's published papers and articles: https://sites.tufts.edu/cogstud/dan-dennett-recent-work/ https://sites.tufts.edu/cogstud/dan-dennett-recent-work/

_akhe 3y ago
> He does not say that all those experiences aren't real Yes he does, and has said it a lot, it's one of the main things he's known for, second to atheism. In the video I linked he literally says phenomenal states "don't exist". I've also seen numerous other interviews where he's said that. You're the only person I've ever come across who describes Dennett as someone believing in rich conscious experiences. > indeed they must be real in order to be "composed by the activities of billions of neurons" No that's the distinction - he says only the activity of the neurons are real that there is not an additional "mental state" or what he calls "double transduction". He simply dismisses that it happens. people convince themselves that there is a special sort of late transduction event occurring in the brain, a transduction event which is consciousness -Dennett (https://dl.tufts.edu/downloads/ht24ww75v?filename=v118rs17v.pdf https://dl.tufts.edu/downloads/ht24ww75v?filename=v118rs17v....) More from it: Figure 7.1 shows a conscious observer seeing a red light and letting us know that he's seen it by saying "Red light!" Some people think that consciousness is a fundamental division in nature, which divides things that are conscious from things that are unconscious. The things that are conscious (sentient) engage in this very special sort of transduction. Of course, just saying "Red light!" under this condition does not guarantee that a person is conscious. After all, we might have an experimental subject who stands all day saying "Red light, red light, red light, red light." The fact that after someone flashes a red light in the subject's eyes, the subject says "Red light!" is no indication that the subject is conscious of the red light. ... If you are tempted to think that way (and if you are not, I think you are a very rare individual) you are making a fundamental mistake, the mistake I call Cartesian Materialism. This idea is that there is a second transduction somewhere in the brain (that is why this is a form of materialism). The idea is that a privileged medium exists in the brain where and when the consciousness happens, a place in which all the various features of a conscious experience become "bound" - and then, most importantly, are appreciated. He very clearly does not believe in the phenomenon of consciousness. At times he even conflates experience with self/identity (2 different things) at which point people usually ask him to clarify, and often he will confirm his stance by outright denying that mental experience happens. That's Dan Dennett. He should have loved panpsychism, since it would coincide with his idea that there is no second transduction - that there's not a fundamental difference between the conscious and the unconscious - however, because he is an eliminative materialist he sticks with physicalism.
- pdonis 3y ago
  > Yes he does, and has said it a lot I'm sorry, but I strongly disagree. You are reading things into his writing that he is not saying. > he says only the activity of the neurons are real No, he says that the activity of the neurons is your conscious experience--that the real conscious experience you have is the activity of the neurons--or, if you like, the conscious experience is "made of" the activity of neurons. That's not the same thing as saying your conscious experience isn't real. It's just saying your conscious experience is not "made of" what many people think it's made of. It's not made of magic "consciousness stuff" or "mind stuff" or "soul stuff". > that there is not an additional "mental state" or what he calls "double transduction". He simply dismisses that it happens No, he looks at the actual evidence from cognitive science about what actually goes on in the brain, and concludes from that evidence that there is no such "double transduction"--because there is no evidence for any such thing. In other words, "double transduction" is a testable hypothesis about how our minds work, and we've tested it, and found it to be false. > He very clearly does not believe in the phenomenon of consciousness. Nonsense. I gave an explicit quote from a paper of his that describes various kinds of conscious experience. He believed all those things were real. What he didn't believe is that they were magic. > He should have loved panpsychism No, he shouldn't have, because he is, as you say, a physicalist. > he is an eliminative materialist he sticks with physicalism. Physicalism is not the same thing as "eliminative materialism" about everything. You are simply misrepresenting Dennett's actual position. At this point I am wondering whether you are a physicalist or not. If you are, you should be agreeing with Dennett, because his views about consciousness are the only viable option if you are a physicalist. If you are not a physicalist, on the other hand, then of course you will disagree with Dennett, but you should be clear about what you are disagreeing with him about. You are not disagreeing with him about whether consciousness exists. You are disagreeing with him about what kind of thing consciousness is. His position was that consciousness, really existing consciousness, is a physical process that goes on in (at least) human brains. Your position, if you are not a physicalist, is that consciousness, really existing consciousness, is some kind of non-physical thing. But his critics were simply unwilling (or perhaps unable) to frame their disagreement in these simple terms, so instead they misrepresented his position.
  - 3y ago

by pdonis 3y ago

_akhe 3y ago

> He does not say that all those experiences aren't real Yes he does, and has said it a lot, it's one of the main things he's known for, second to atheism. In the video I linked he literally says phenomenal states "don't exist". I've also seen numerous other interviews where he's said that. You're the only person I've ever come across who describes Dennett as someone believing in rich conscious experiences. > indeed they must be real in order to be "composed by the activities of billions of neurons" No that's the distinction - he says only the activity of the neurons are real that there is not an additional "mental state" or what he calls "double transduction". He simply dismisses that it happens. people convince themselves that there is a special sort of late transduction event occurring in the brain, a transduction event which is consciousness -Dennett (https://dl.tufts.edu/downloads/ht24ww75v?filename=v118rs17v.pdf https://dl.tufts.edu/downloads/ht24ww75v?filename=v118rs17v....) More from it: Figure 7.1 shows a conscious observer seeing a red light and letting us know that he's seen it by saying "Red light!" Some people think that consciousness is a fundamental division in nature, which divides things that are conscious from things that are unconscious. The things that are conscious (sentient) engage in this very special sort of transduction. Of course, just saying "Red light!" under this condition does not guarantee that a person is conscious. After all, we might have an experimental subject who stands all day saying "Red light, red light, red light, red light." The fact that after someone flashes a red light in the subject's eyes, the subject says "Red light!" is no indication that the subject is conscious of the red light. ... If you are tempted to think that way (and if you are not, I think you are a very rare individual) you are making a fundamental mistake, the mistake I call Cartesian Materialism. This idea is that there is a second transduction somewhere in the brain (that is why this is a form of materialism). The idea is that a privileged medium exists in the brain where and when the consciousness happens, a place in which all the various features of a conscious experience become "bound" - and then, most importantly, are appreciated. He very clearly does not believe in the phenomenon of consciousness. At times he even conflates experience with self/identity (2 different things) at which point people usually ask him to clarify, and often he will confirm his stance by outright denying that mental experience happens. That's Dan Dennett. He should have loved panpsychism, since it would coincide with his idea that there is no second transduction - that there's not a fundamental difference between the conscious and the unconscious - however, because he is an eliminative materialist he sticks with physicalism.

pdonis 3y ago
> Yes he does, and has said it a lot I'm sorry, but I strongly disagree. You are reading things into his writing that he is not saying. > he says only the activity of the neurons are real No, he says that the activity of the neurons is your conscious experience--that the real conscious experience you have is the activity of the neurons--or, if you like, the conscious experience is "made of" the activity of neurons. That's not the same thing as saying your conscious experience isn't real. It's just saying your conscious experience is not "made of" what many people think it's made of. It's not made of magic "consciousness stuff" or "mind stuff" or "soul stuff". > that there is not an additional "mental state" or what he calls "double transduction". He simply dismisses that it happens No, he looks at the actual evidence from cognitive science about what actually goes on in the brain, and concludes from that evidence that there is no such "double transduction"--because there is no evidence for any such thing. In other words, "double transduction" is a testable hypothesis about how our minds work, and we've tested it, and found it to be false. > He very clearly does not believe in the phenomenon of consciousness. Nonsense. I gave an explicit quote from a paper of his that describes various kinds of conscious experience. He believed all those things were real. What he didn't believe is that they were magic. > He should have loved panpsychism No, he shouldn't have, because he is, as you say, a physicalist. > he is an eliminative materialist he sticks with physicalism. Physicalism is not the same thing as "eliminative materialism" about everything. You are simply misrepresenting Dennett's actual position. At this point I am wondering whether you are a physicalist or not. If you are, you should be agreeing with Dennett, because his views about consciousness are the only viable option if you are a physicalist. If you are not a physicalist, on the other hand, then of course you will disagree with Dennett, but you should be clear about what you are disagreeing with him about. You are not disagreeing with him about whether consciousness exists. You are disagreeing with him about what kind of thing consciousness is. His position was that consciousness, really existing consciousness, is a physical process that goes on in (at least) human brains. Your position, if you are not a physicalist, is that consciousness, really existing consciousness, is some kind of non-physical thing. But his critics were simply unwilling (or perhaps unable) to frame their disagreement in these simple terms, so instead they misrepresented his position.
- 3y ago