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OK, I'd like nothing better than for you to show me that there's no such area. Since we're talking about contingency... I'll just lay out a version of the arg

OK, I'd like nothing better than for you to show me that there's no such area. Since we're talking about contingency... I'll just lay out a version of the argument from contingency: 1. A contingent being (a being such that if it exists, it could have not-existed) exists. 2. All contingent beings have a sufficient cause of or fully adequate explanation for their existence. 3. The sufficient cause of or fully adequate explanation for the existence of contingent beings is something other than the contingent being itself. 4. The sufficient cause of or fully adequate explanation for the existence of contingent beings must either be solely other contingent beings or include a non-contingent (necessary) being. 5. Contingent beings alone cannot provide a sufficient cause of or fully adequate explanation for the existence of contingent beings. 6. Therefore, what sufficiently causes or fully adequately explains the existence of contingent beings must include a non-contingent (necessary) being. 7. Therefore, a necessary being (a being such that if it exists, it cannot not-exist) exists. 8. The universe, which is composed of only contingent beings, is contingent. 9. Therefore, the necessary being is something other than the universe. I'd like you to tell me what premise you deny, and why you deny this premise on purely scientific grounds.

lisper 2y ago
You could have saved yourself a lot of typing by just saying that you are citing the ontological argument for God as your example. But OK... I will start by asking you to define what you mean by "exist". But before you do that you should read this: https://blog.rongarret.info/2015/02/31-flavors-of-ontology.html https://blog.rongarret.info/2015/02/31-flavors-of-ontology.h... But I will also happily concede that something other than the universe exists. Quantum fields exist and they are not part of the universe. (However, I do not concede that quantum fields are non-contingent. They may or may not be, we simply don't know. There could be an infinite hierarchy of causation.)
- knightoffaith 2y ago
  For one, this isn't an ontological argument, this is a version of the cosmological argument. I mean, I'm not even concerned about the truth or falsity of the conclusion of this argument. I posed this argument to you, and right away, we've started talking about ontological categories and what it means for something to exist. Have we not already started doing philosophy? Wasn't this supposed to be a purely scientific discussion?
  - lisper 2y ago
    > For one, this isn't an ontological argument, this is a version of the cosmological argument. Potato, potahto. > Have we not already started doing philosophy? No. Establishing the meanings of words is part of science. You should read chapter 7 of David Deutsch's "The Fabric of Reality" and pay particular attention to the part where he says, "Languages are theories."
    - knightoffaith 2y ago
      I mean, talking about what things exist, and what things don't, and what it means for something to exist are things that philosophers do as part of philosophy (specifically ontology). I suppose there's nothing wrong with Deutsch's characterization, I guess we can just call the philosophers who, in doing philosophy, discuss the meanings of words (like what it means to exist or, as Dennett and many other philosophers have, what it means to have free will, or all kinds of other terms) scientists who are actually doing science. If we use the terms this way, the academic discipline of philosophy seems perfectly justified since it's actually secretly scientific (they just don't know it themselves!). But maybe more seriously (and hopefully more fruitfully), I should ask, according to Deutsch's/your characterization, what would count as doing philosophy as opposed to doing science? I would normally say "the things that academic philosophers do as part of their discipline", but it looks like that definition isn't going to stand.

lisper 2y ago

You could have saved yourself a lot of typing by just saying that you are citing the ontological argument for God as your example. But OK... I will start by asking you to define what you mean by "exist". But before you do that you should read this: https://blog.rongarret.info/2015/02/31-flavors-of-ontology.html https://blog.rongarret.info/2015/02/31-flavors-of-ontology.h... But I will also happily concede that something other than the universe exists. Quantum fields exist and they are not part of the universe. (However, I do not concede that quantum fields are non-contingent. They may or may not be, we simply don't know. There could be an infinite hierarchy of causation.)

knightoffaith 2y ago
For one, this isn't an ontological argument, this is a version of the cosmological argument. I mean, I'm not even concerned about the truth or falsity of the conclusion of this argument. I posed this argument to you, and right away, we've started talking about ontological categories and what it means for something to exist. Have we not already started doing philosophy? Wasn't this supposed to be a purely scientific discussion?
- lisper 2y ago
  > For one, this isn't an ontological argument, this is a version of the cosmological argument. Potato, potahto. > Have we not already started doing philosophy? No. Establishing the meanings of words is part of science. You should read chapter 7 of David Deutsch's "The Fabric of Reality" and pay particular attention to the part where he says, "Languages are theories."
  - knightoffaith 2y ago
    I mean, talking about what things exist, and what things don't, and what it means for something to exist are things that philosophers do as part of philosophy (specifically ontology). I suppose there's nothing wrong with Deutsch's characterization, I guess we can just call the philosophers who, in doing philosophy, discuss the meanings of words (like what it means to exist or, as Dennett and many other philosophers have, what it means to have free will, or all kinds of other terms) scientists who are actually doing science. If we use the terms this way, the academic discipline of philosophy seems perfectly justified since it's actually secretly scientific (they just don't know it themselves!). But maybe more seriously (and hopefully more fruitfully), I should ask, according to Deutsch's/your characterization, what would count as doing philosophy as opposed to doing science? I would normally say "the things that academic philosophers do as part of their discipline", but it looks like that definition isn't going to stand.