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> Dennett is denying the existence of qualia altogether Not quite. Dennett's thesis is that qualia are illusions, not that they don't exist. Illusions exist,

by lisper 3y ago

> Dennett is denying the existence of qualia altogether Not quite. Dennett's thesis is that qualia are illusions, not that they don't exist. Illusions exist, they are just sensory perceptions that don't reflect any actual underlying physical reality. > The idea of a necessary explanation is that the answer to the question of "why?" is that it must be that way Yes, I know that's the idea. But you can't get past the anthropic principle. Even if that is not the ultimate explanation, the fact that it could be, and the fact that there is overwhelming evidence that humans are not privileged in any way, means that even if there is a better answer, we can never find it because we can never rule out the anthropic principle. We have to make our peace with that, just as we have to make our peace with the Second Law and the halting problem. > Well, the discipline of philosophy also includes people pointing out reasons why such arguments don't work, which seems worthwhile, just like science includes reasons why arguments for the flatness of the earth are untenable and reasons why the roundness of the earth is a far better explanation for the data. Actually, scientists don't spend a lot of time debunking flat-earthers. They just write them off as crackpots who are not worth the bother. You're not going to get an NSF grant to study whether or not the earth is round.

knightoffaith 3y ago
>Not quite I just mean to say that Dennett denies that there is anything that is "ineffable, intrinsic, private, [and] directly or immediately apprehensible in consciousness". But my point is that this is a particular philosophical term whose existence and nature is being disputed, and that this is being done on philosophical grounds. >Yes, I know that's the idea. But you can't get past the anthropic principle. Well, the anthropic principle is more relevant for fine-tuning arguments, the question here is more whether or not there can be brute facts, but that aside, my contention is just that this dispute is not one that science adjudicates. >Actually, scientists don't spend a lot of time debunking flat-earthers. I mean, sure, because the scientific arguments for the roundness of the earth have been laid out and there's not much more left to say, but cases don't generally get so neatly closed in philosophy. All of this is really just to say that there are areas of discussion where it's philosophy rather than science that has to be our instrument for adjudicating disputes. Maybe this area of discussion isn't interesting to you, but that's fine, not every subject in academia has to be interesting to you.
- lisper 3y ago
  > the question here is more whether or not there can be brute facts That depends on what you mean by "brute fact". Can you give me an example of one? > there are areas of discussion where it's philosophy rather than science that has to be our instrument for adjudicating disputes And I dispute that, and I believe I can support my position by refuting that very claim with science. If it is true that there exist "areas of discussion where it's philosophy rather than science that has to be our instrument for adjudicating disputes" then you should be able to give an example of such an area of discussion, and I predict that you can't. BTW, I would like nothing better than for you to actually prove me wrong about this. But I've thought about this for a very long time and posed this challenge to a lot of people. If you succeed, you will be the first.
  - knightoffaith 3y ago
    OK, I'd like nothing better than for you to show me that there's no such area. Since we're talking about contingency... I'll just lay out a version of the argument from contingency: 1. A contingent being (a being such that if it exists, it could have not-existed) exists. 2. All contingent beings have a sufficient cause of or fully adequate explanation for their existence. 3. The sufficient cause of or fully adequate explanation for the existence of contingent beings is something other than the contingent being itself. 4. The sufficient cause of or fully adequate explanation for the existence of contingent beings must either be solely other contingent beings or include a non-contingent (necessary) being. 5. Contingent beings alone cannot provide a sufficient cause of or fully adequate explanation for the existence of contingent beings. 6. Therefore, what sufficiently causes or fully adequately explains the existence of contingent beings must include a non-contingent (necessary) being. 7. Therefore, a necessary being (a being such that if it exists, it cannot not-exist) exists. 8. The universe, which is composed of only contingent beings, is contingent. 9. Therefore, the necessary being is something other than the universe. I'd like you to tell me what premise you deny, and why you deny this premise on purely scientific grounds.
    - lisper 3y ago
      You could have saved yourself a lot of typing by just saying that you are citing the ontological argument for God as your example. But OK... I will start by asking you to define what you mean by "exist". But before you do that you should read this: https://blog.rongarret.info/2015/02/31-flavors-of-ontology.html https://blog.rongarret.info/2015/02/31-flavors-of-ontology.h... But I will also happily concede that something other than the universe exists. Quantum fields exist and they are not part of the universe. (However, I do not concede that quantum fields are non-contingent. They may or may not be, we simply don't know. There could be an infinite hierarchy of causation.)

by lisper 3y ago

knightoffaith 3y ago

>Not quite I just mean to say that Dennett denies that there is anything that is "ineffable, intrinsic, private, [and] directly or immediately apprehensible in consciousness". But my point is that this is a particular philosophical term whose existence and nature is being disputed, and that this is being done on philosophical grounds. >Yes, I know that's the idea. But you can't get past the anthropic principle. Well, the anthropic principle is more relevant for fine-tuning arguments, the question here is more whether or not there can be brute facts, but that aside, my contention is just that this dispute is not one that science adjudicates. >Actually, scientists don't spend a lot of time debunking flat-earthers. I mean, sure, because the scientific arguments for the roundness of the earth have been laid out and there's not much more left to say, but cases don't generally get so neatly closed in philosophy. All of this is really just to say that there are areas of discussion where it's philosophy rather than science that has to be our instrument for adjudicating disputes. Maybe this area of discussion isn't interesting to you, but that's fine, not every subject in academia has to be interesting to you.

lisper 3y ago
> the question here is more whether or not there can be brute facts That depends on what you mean by "brute fact". Can you give me an example of one? > there are areas of discussion where it's philosophy rather than science that has to be our instrument for adjudicating disputes And I dispute that, and I believe I can support my position by refuting that very claim with science. If it is true that there exist "areas of discussion where it's philosophy rather than science that has to be our instrument for adjudicating disputes" then you should be able to give an example of such an area of discussion, and I predict that you can't. BTW, I would like nothing better than for you to actually prove me wrong about this. But I've thought about this for a very long time and posed this challenge to a lot of people. If you succeed, you will be the first.
- knightoffaith 3y ago
  OK, I'd like nothing better than for you to show me that there's no such area. Since we're talking about contingency... I'll just lay out a version of the argument from contingency: 1. A contingent being (a being such that if it exists, it could have not-existed) exists. 2. All contingent beings have a sufficient cause of or fully adequate explanation for their existence. 3. The sufficient cause of or fully adequate explanation for the existence of contingent beings is something other than the contingent being itself. 4. The sufficient cause of or fully adequate explanation for the existence of contingent beings must either be solely other contingent beings or include a non-contingent (necessary) being. 5. Contingent beings alone cannot provide a sufficient cause of or fully adequate explanation for the existence of contingent beings. 6. Therefore, what sufficiently causes or fully adequately explains the existence of contingent beings must include a non-contingent (necessary) being. 7. Therefore, a necessary being (a being such that if it exists, it cannot not-exist) exists. 8. The universe, which is composed of only contingent beings, is contingent. 9. Therefore, the necessary being is something other than the universe. I'd like you to tell me what premise you deny, and why you deny this premise on purely scientific grounds.
  - lisper 3y ago
    You could have saved yourself a lot of typing by just saying that you are citing the ontological argument for God as your example. But OK... I will start by asking you to define what you mean by "exist". But before you do that you should read this: https://blog.rongarret.info/2015/02/31-flavors-of-ontology.html https://blog.rongarret.info/2015/02/31-flavors-of-ontology.h... But I will also happily concede that something other than the universe exists. Quantum fields exist and they are not part of the universe. (However, I do not concede that quantum fields are non-contingent. They may or may not be, we simply don't know. There could be an infinite hierarchy of causation.)