Before this goes off the rails: > The declaration focuses on the most basic kind of consciousness, known as phenomenal consciousness. Roughly put, if a creatur

Before this goes off the rails: > The declaration focuses on the most basic kind of consciousness, known as phenomenal consciousness. Roughly put, if a creature has phenomenal consciousness, then it is “like something” to be that creature. In other words, a) there is a clear definition of consciousness (as subjective experience, however minimal), b) the claim of subjective experience is backed up by evidence that the animals in question feel pain, play, and exhibit "intentional behaviours" (do things which look like they planned it, rather than just 'reacting to their environment'). Obviously all of the above are debatable (is that really what consciousness is? Do cuttlefish actually feel pain? Is feeling pain a measure of consciousness?) but there's no point claiming that they don't have a definition of consciousness or that they don't have a scientific basis for their claims, because they have both.