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> There is a tiny minority of philosophers who are actually scientists pushing very hard on the boundaries of human knowledge. It sounds like you've already s

by abeppu 3y ago

> There is a tiny minority of philosophers who are actually scientists pushing very hard on the boundaries of human knowledge. It sounds like you've already started with the assumption that the only way to expand human knowledge is by "science" and the people doing it are "scientists"? Maybe that's an assumption worth investigating. How would you know if that was true? What experiment or empirical observation would one need to conduct to know that the only way to extend human knowledge is by "science"? I feel like you're trying to do a complement to some philosophers by saying that the good ones are honorary scientists, but perhaps there's more to know than objective truths about our specific material world.

lisper 3y ago
> you've already started with the assumption that the only way to expand human knowledge is by "science" No. I'm not assuming anything. I am making the empirical observation that the most effective method for expanding human knowledge is science. The people who understand this and consequently put effort into studying science I call scientists, and I don't intend that to be an honorary title but a genuine show of deep respect. (And I say this as someone with a Ph.D. in a STEM field.) > perhaps there's more to know than objective truths about our specific material world Like what?
- abeppu 3y ago
  > I am making the empirical observation that the most effective method for expanding human knowledge is science. I think you're still basically begging the question here. Is it directly observable whether a belief is "knowledge", such that the efficacy of a method can be known by "empirical observation"? How would one know? > Like what? I think ethics are pretty important, but aren't about something that's objectively true in the world. One can know some of the characteristics of preference utilitarianism as an ethical model, for example. But in this conversation, perhaps the most important gap is epistemology. You feel confident you know what knowledge is and isn't and how one can arrive at it -- did you arrive at that understanding by directly observing what is and is not knowledge in an objective external universe? What does it mean to know, or even for a belief to be "justified"? Since you brought up Kant, and then re-canted (rimshot), Kant had the analytic vs synthetic distinction on propositions, where synthetic propositions are those which depend on how their meaning relates to the world -- i.e. can be true or false depending on what's true about the world. Math, logic, etc are analytic truths; we don't validate that e.g. arithmetic works the way we know it does by doing "experiments" and "empirical observations" of operations with large cardinality sets of physical objects.
  - lisper 3y ago
    > Is it directly observable whether a belief is "knowledge", such that the efficacy of a method can be known by "empirical observation"? Yes. > How would one know? Just look around you. You have computers, GPS, mRNA vaccines, etc. etc. etc. Those things were not produced by philosophers. > I think ethics are pretty important, I agree. > but aren't about something that's objectively true in the world. What can I say? You are simply wrong about that. Ethics are instincts produced by evolution. Like all instincts, they exist because they have survival value: genes that build brains with instincts about ethics reproduce better (in certain environmental niches) than genes that don't. Ethics are every bit as amenable to scientific inquiry as any other natural phenomenon. > we don't validate that e.g. arithmetic works the way we know it does by doing "experiments" and "empirical observations" of operations with large cardinality sets of physical objects Of course we do, because there are different ways of doing arithmetic. Some of them are better models of the world than others, and so those are the ones that we tend to think of as "the way" of doing arithmetic. But the only thing that makes standard arithmetic special is that it corresponds to the way that (parts of) the world work.
    - abeppu 3y ago
      > Just look around you. You have computers, GPS, mRNA vaccines, etc. etc. etc. Those things were not produced by philosophers. You're clearly not getting this. Yes, you can see the products of scientific progress. That's not the same as seeing the absence of knowledge produced by anyone else. And one would expect that truths revealed about the physical world we live in should of course be the ones that give rise to physical artifacts you can point at. > Ethics are instincts produced by evolution. ... and yet, our ethical beliefs are not biologically determined, but change as a function of culture, and at least in part through the work of philosophers. Our beliefs about the importance of freedom, equality, fairness (or what those mean) change dramatically over decades, far too quick for genetics to have any contribution to the change. Re arithmetic, "the integers are closed under addition" is still something one can know without making any observations of the world, even if standard addition were somehow not useful in making predictions about the physical world. Further, by arguing that the importance of mathematical knowledge is only its relationship to making predictions about physical reality, you are once again begging the question.
- card_zero 3y ago
  Well, The demarcation problem is distinguishing science from non-science. Karl Popper theorizes that falsifiability is what makes the difference. But there's nothing falsifiable about that theory! What would you test? If you accept that there are meaningful theories outside of science, this works out fine. If you don't, you'll struggle to say what science is.
  - mannykannot 3y ago
    Definitions are hardly a problem just for science (if they are a problem - science seems to doing OK regardless), and I feel they are particularly difficult for those with a strong commitment to the view that ethics must somehow be grounded in something irrefutably true. In fact, I vaguely suspect that Wittgenstein's later position with respect to the rule-following paradox was that seeking such grounding is a doomed pursuit, and he somewhat famously contended that philosophy was not concerned with problems, only linguistic puzzles. Perhaps rather paradoxically (at least if you see Popper as a champion of science over philosophy), Popper (who, in addition to his work on the philosophy of science, also wrote "The Open Society and its Enemies") felt that Wittgenstein was utterly wrong to deny that there are real philosophical problems. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/wittgenstein/#RuleFollPrivLang https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/wittgenstein/#RuleFollPri... https://ditext.com/wordpress/2019/06/26/puzzles-vs-problems-in-philosophy-karl-popper-and-the-poker-of-ludwig-wittgenstein/ https://ditext.com/wordpress/2019/06/26/puzzles-vs-problems-...
    - card_zero 3y ago
      Thank you, I knew there would be relevant Popper quotes about philosophy being meaningful, and I was trying the keyword "transempirical" without success. I forgot it was the underlying beef in the poker incident. :)
- samatman 3y ago
  We're lucky that science just burst full-formed out of Zeus's forehead then. Or we might need a philosopher or two to help us invent it. So, if we all get mind-wiped and have to start over without this gift of the Gods, let's call the man who gets us back on track Francis Bacon, Jr. Why? no particular reason
- mcguire 3y ago
  Unfortunately, there are questions that cannot be empirically answered. Some of those questions are important.
  - lisper 3y ago
    Like what?
    - mistermann 3y ago
      Here's one: what causes even smart people to hallucinate when practising epistemology, non-binary logic, and set theory (or not, as the case may be), as well demonstrated throughout this thread? Here's my guess: the same thing that causes them to not be able to juggle: a lack of practice (and in the case of philosophy: a teacher who isn't also hallucinating). As for why I consider such things important: I believe they are intimately related to why humans are continuously involved in wars and various other sub-optimal activities, which are easily[1] explained away with stories. As for teachers, Graham Priest seems to be quite sharp: https://youtu.be/ZGOMmGK4eeY?si=t0fmGJ3sA3iGN47T https://youtu.be/ZGOMmGK4eeY?si=t0fmGJ3sA3iGN47T https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Graham_Priest https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Graham_Priest [1] Like taking candy from babies.
      - lisper 3y ago
        You really believe that the question of human fallibility is beyond the scope of scientific inquiry? I guess we'll just have to agree to disagree about that.
        mistermann 3y ago
        It isn't that science cannot, it is that they do not. Science practices a watered down version of epistemology (which is fine for the domain they are in as far as I'm concerned: speed matters, and errors can usually be corrected later), the dangerous part is that people think science is the gold standard of reasoning, truth discovery, etc. Just read the thread. And the fan base seems often unable to even wonder what is true, let alone discern it.

by abeppu 3y ago

lisper 3y ago

> you've already started with the assumption that the only way to expand human knowledge is by "science" No. I'm not assuming anything. I am making the empirical observation that the most effective method for expanding human knowledge is science. The people who understand this and consequently put effort into studying science I call scientists, and I don't intend that to be an honorary title but a genuine show of deep respect. (And I say this as someone with a Ph.D. in a STEM field.) > perhaps there's more to know than objective truths about our specific material world Like what?

abeppu 3y ago
> I am making the empirical observation that the most effective method for expanding human knowledge is science. I think you're still basically begging the question here. Is it directly observable whether a belief is "knowledge", such that the efficacy of a method can be known by "empirical observation"? How would one know? > Like what? I think ethics are pretty important, but aren't about something that's objectively true in the world. One can know some of the characteristics of preference utilitarianism as an ethical model, for example. But in this conversation, perhaps the most important gap is epistemology. You feel confident you know what knowledge is and isn't and how one can arrive at it -- did you arrive at that understanding by directly observing what is and is not knowledge in an objective external universe? What does it mean to know, or even for a belief to be "justified"? Since you brought up Kant, and then re-canted (rimshot), Kant had the analytic vs synthetic distinction on propositions, where synthetic propositions are those which depend on how their meaning relates to the world -- i.e. can be true or false depending on what's true about the world. Math, logic, etc are analytic truths; we don't validate that e.g. arithmetic works the way we know it does by doing "experiments" and "empirical observations" of operations with large cardinality sets of physical objects.
- lisper 3y ago
  > Is it directly observable whether a belief is "knowledge", such that the efficacy of a method can be known by "empirical observation"? Yes. > How would one know? Just look around you. You have computers, GPS, mRNA vaccines, etc. etc. etc. Those things were not produced by philosophers. > I think ethics are pretty important, I agree. > but aren't about something that's objectively true in the world. What can I say? You are simply wrong about that. Ethics are instincts produced by evolution. Like all instincts, they exist because they have survival value: genes that build brains with instincts about ethics reproduce better (in certain environmental niches) than genes that don't. Ethics are every bit as amenable to scientific inquiry as any other natural phenomenon. > we don't validate that e.g. arithmetic works the way we know it does by doing "experiments" and "empirical observations" of operations with large cardinality sets of physical objects Of course we do, because there are different ways of doing arithmetic. Some of them are better models of the world than others, and so those are the ones that we tend to think of as "the way" of doing arithmetic. But the only thing that makes standard arithmetic special is that it corresponds to the way that (parts of) the world work.
  - abeppu 3y ago
    > Just look around you. You have computers, GPS, mRNA vaccines, etc. etc. etc. Those things were not produced by philosophers. You're clearly not getting this. Yes, you can see the products of scientific progress. That's not the same as seeing the absence of knowledge produced by anyone else. And one would expect that truths revealed about the physical world we live in should of course be the ones that give rise to physical artifacts you can point at. > Ethics are instincts produced by evolution. ... and yet, our ethical beliefs are not biologically determined, but change as a function of culture, and at least in part through the work of philosophers. Our beliefs about the importance of freedom, equality, fairness (or what those mean) change dramatically over decades, far too quick for genetics to have any contribution to the change. Re arithmetic, "the integers are closed under addition" is still something one can know without making any observations of the world, even if standard addition were somehow not useful in making predictions about the physical world. Further, by arguing that the importance of mathematical knowledge is only its relationship to making predictions about physical reality, you are once again begging the question.
card_zero 3y ago
Well, The demarcation problem is distinguishing science from non-science. Karl Popper theorizes that falsifiability is what makes the difference. But there's nothing falsifiable about that theory! What would you test? If you accept that there are meaningful theories outside of science, this works out fine. If you don't, you'll struggle to say what science is.
- mannykannot 3y ago
  Definitions are hardly a problem just for science (if they are a problem - science seems to doing OK regardless), and I feel they are particularly difficult for those with a strong commitment to the view that ethics must somehow be grounded in something irrefutably true. In fact, I vaguely suspect that Wittgenstein's later position with respect to the rule-following paradox was that seeking such grounding is a doomed pursuit, and he somewhat famously contended that philosophy was not concerned with problems, only linguistic puzzles. Perhaps rather paradoxically (at least if you see Popper as a champion of science over philosophy), Popper (who, in addition to his work on the philosophy of science, also wrote "The Open Society and its Enemies") felt that Wittgenstein was utterly wrong to deny that there are real philosophical problems. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/wittgenstein/#RuleFollPrivLang https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/wittgenstein/#RuleFollPri... https://ditext.com/wordpress/2019/06/26/puzzles-vs-problems-in-philosophy-karl-popper-and-the-poker-of-ludwig-wittgenstein/ https://ditext.com/wordpress/2019/06/26/puzzles-vs-problems-...
  - card_zero 3y ago
    Thank you, I knew there would be relevant Popper quotes about philosophy being meaningful, and I was trying the keyword "transempirical" without success. I forgot it was the underlying beef in the poker incident. :)
samatman 3y ago
We're lucky that science just burst full-formed out of Zeus's forehead then. Or we might need a philosopher or two to help us invent it. So, if we all get mind-wiped and have to start over without this gift of the Gods, let's call the man who gets us back on track Francis Bacon, Jr. Why? no particular reason
mcguire 3y ago
Unfortunately, there are questions that cannot be empirically answered. Some of those questions are important.
- lisper 3y ago
  Like what?
  - mistermann 3y ago
    Here's one: what causes even smart people to hallucinate when practising epistemology, non-binary logic, and set theory (or not, as the case may be), as well demonstrated throughout this thread? Here's my guess: the same thing that causes them to not be able to juggle: a lack of practice (and in the case of philosophy: a teacher who isn't also hallucinating). As for why I consider such things important: I believe they are intimately related to why humans are continuously involved in wars and various other sub-optimal activities, which are easily[1] explained away with stories. As for teachers, Graham Priest seems to be quite sharp: https://youtu.be/ZGOMmGK4eeY?si=t0fmGJ3sA3iGN47T https://youtu.be/ZGOMmGK4eeY?si=t0fmGJ3sA3iGN47T https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Graham_Priest https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Graham_Priest [1] Like taking candy from babies.
    - lisper 3y ago
      You really believe that the question of human fallibility is beyond the scope of scientific inquiry? I guess we'll just have to agree to disagree about that.
      - mistermann 3y ago
        It isn't that science cannot, it is that they do not. Science practices a watered down version of epistemology (which is fine for the domain they are in as far as I'm concerned: speed matters, and errors can usually be corrected later), the dangerous part is that people think science is the gold standard of reasoning, truth discovery, etc. Just read the thread. And the fan base seems often unable to even wonder what is true, let alone discern it.