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Other potential arguments against are (not necessarily strong ones, certainly looking at it in partial hindsight): - “We are not a party in this conflict” (sho

Other potential arguments against are (not necessarily strong ones, certainly looking at it in partial hindsight): - “We are not a party in this conflict” (should we aid every country “willing to spend lives, fighting a defensive war, against an aggressor that invaded their internationally-acknowledged territory”?) - “Why lose face supporting the loser in this conflict? It will only increase suffering and cost us” (If Zelensky had accepted the offer to be evacuated from Kyiv, I think this would have been a rapid Russian victory) - “we cannot afford or do not want to get in conflict with the aggressor” - “our rules of engagement do not allow us to do this” (for example, NATO’s goal explicitly is to resist armed attack of NATO members)

ethbr1 3y ago
Those are arguments that are made, but I don't think they're particularly strong. >> “We are not a party in this conflict” (should we aid every country “willing to spend lives, fighting a defensive war, against an aggressor that invaded their internationally-acknowledged territory”?) I think so, iff... (a) doing so does not increase the likelihood of conflict with the aggressor and (b) we have a reasonable assumption that the aggressor may be a future military opponent. To state it bluntly, fighting using someone else's lives is cheaper than using your own population. If the Ukrainians are willing to fight, why not let them use our material to do so? >> “Why lose face supporting the loser in this conflict? It will only increase suffering and cost us” (If Zelensky had accepted the offer to be evacuated from Kyiv, I think this would have been a rapid Russian victory) It would only be losing face if the battle were one-sided. Thus far, when provisioned, the Ukrainian military has proven capable of inflicting outsized casualties on the Russian military. To the article's point, if the rate of Russian aviation attrition continues, by the end of 2024 the entire Russian air force is going to be in a sorry state. With limited ability to recapitalize (economically and technologically). I'm aware the Russians have a historical military tradition of throwing as many corpses as it takes against the enemy to win, but one wouldn't exactly call that losing face. >> “we cannot afford or do not want to get in conflict with the aggressor” If we can afford to provision our own military for a conflict with Russia, we can afford to provision those who are actively fighting Russia, no? And the chances of conflict are zero, absent existential threat to Russia (read: Ukraine invades Russian territory). Russia has no interest in tangling with NATO, especially a re-armed NATO, because Putin's primary goals are (a) regime survival & (b) legacy. He hasn't fought battles he knows he will lose, and NATO is a very different opponent than Ukraine or Chechnya. >> “our rules of engagement do not allow us to do this” (for example, NATO’s goal explicitly is to resist armed attack of NATO members) This may be an argument for Germany or Japan, but I don't believe other states have political or constitutional qualms. And the Germans, well, their armaments industry still seemed find customers over the decades, despite their restrictions...
dragonwriter 3y ago
> “our rules of engagement do not allow us to do this” (for example, NATO’s goal explicitly is to resist armed attack of NATO members) This is, btw, simply factually false. NATO has a mutual defense clause, but mutual defense has never been its declared sole goal, and the absolute majority of its military combat operations have been to control regional security threats before there was a an actual or imminent attack on a NATO member. Further, outside of the context of NATO itself, all NATO members retain the right to act in collective self-defense with any other nations described in Article 51 of the UN Charter; the North Atlantic Treaty does not foreclose this.

ethbr1 3y ago

Those are arguments that are made, but I don't think they're particularly strong. >> “We are not a party in this conflict” (should we aid every country “willing to spend lives, fighting a defensive war, against an aggressor that invaded their internationally-acknowledged territory”?) I think so, iff... (a) doing so does not increase the likelihood of conflict with the aggressor and (b) we have a reasonable assumption that the aggressor may be a future military opponent. To state it bluntly, fighting using someone else's lives is cheaper than using your own population. If the Ukrainians are willing to fight, why not let them use our material to do so? >> “Why lose face supporting the loser in this conflict? It will only increase suffering and cost us” (If Zelensky had accepted the offer to be evacuated from Kyiv, I think this would have been a rapid Russian victory) It would only be losing face if the battle were one-sided. Thus far, when provisioned, the Ukrainian military has proven capable of inflicting outsized casualties on the Russian military. To the article's point, if the rate of Russian aviation attrition continues, by the end of 2024 the entire Russian air force is going to be in a sorry state. With limited ability to recapitalize (economically and technologically). I'm aware the Russians have a historical military tradition of throwing as many corpses as it takes against the enemy to win, but one wouldn't exactly call that losing face. >> “we cannot afford or do not want to get in conflict with the aggressor” If we can afford to provision our own military for a conflict with Russia, we can afford to provision those who are actively fighting Russia, no? And the chances of conflict are zero, absent existential threat to Russia (read: Ukraine invades Russian territory). Russia has no interest in tangling with NATO, especially a re-armed NATO, because Putin's primary goals are (a) regime survival & (b) legacy. He hasn't fought battles he knows he will lose, and NATO is a very different opponent than Ukraine or Chechnya. >> “our rules of engagement do not allow us to do this” (for example, NATO’s goal explicitly is to resist armed attack of NATO members) This may be an argument for Germany or Japan, but I don't believe other states have political or constitutional qualms. And the Germans, well, their armaments industry still seemed find customers over the decades, despite their restrictions...

dragonwriter 3y ago

> “our rules of engagement do not allow us to do this” (for example, NATO’s goal explicitly is to resist armed attack of NATO members) This is, btw, simply factually false. NATO has a mutual defense clause, but mutual defense has never been its declared sole goal, and the absolute majority of its military combat operations have been to control regional security threats before there was a an actual or imminent attack on a NATO member. Further, outside of the context of NATO itself, all NATO members retain the right to act in collective self-defense with any other nations described in Article 51 of the UN Charter; the North Atlantic Treaty does not foreclose this.