6 ms·
ECDSA strikes again. Bad nonce generation (here: generating a 521 bit nonce by calculating a 512 bit number and then taking that modulo 2^521, which means the t
by formerly_proven 3y ago
ECDSA strikes again. Bad nonce generation (here: generating a 521 bit nonce by calculating a 512 bit number and then taking that modulo 2^521, which means the top bits of the nonce are always zero) leading to private key compromise. Classic.
- JamesCoyne 3y agoDetails in the excellent commit message https://git.tartarus.org/?p=simon/putty.git;a=commitdiff;h=c193fe9848f50a88a4089aac647fecc31ae96d27 https://git.tartarus.org/?p=simon/putty.git;a=commitdiff;h=c...
- rainsford 3y agoYes, although this is the rare ECDSA private key recovery issue where deterministic nonce generation was the cause of rather than the solution to the problem.