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Any data privacy experts here? Could someone explain how data encryption and decryption work here? https://www.limitless.ai/#privacy https://www.limitless.ai/#

Any data privacy experts here? Could someone explain how data encryption and decryption work here? https://www.limitless.ai/#privacy https://www.limitless.ai/#privacy

nihaals 3y ago
They don't really give any specifics and I'm not sure if they give you the keys or explain how the keys are derived (which I assume must be based on your login if they don't make you enter it otherwise they must be able to decrypt it whenever they want) but they mention they worked with Latacora[1]. Also curious if anyone else has any ideas on how they prevent themselves from being able to decrypt user data while implying they're not using E2EE[1]. [1]: https://help.limitless.ai/en/articles/9130680-privacy-with-limitless https://help.limitless.ai/en/articles/9130680-privacy-with-l... Edit: I just tried it. They don't give you encryption keys you need to enter when signing in and the server literally sends you your transcripts with no encryption. Maybe they're including a key somehow derived when signing in with Google/a magic link in the request, but I don't think anything would stop them from just logging API responses even if that was the case. They're definitely not using E2EE. They might just be encrypting at rest and storing their keys in AWS KMS which sounds like false advertising.
- georgehill 3y ago
  I was going to buy it, but this lack of privacy explanation scares me.
  - nihaals 3y ago
    Just added some additional context from trying it which might make you glad you checked.
    - georgehill 3y ago
      Thanks!
- Oras 3y ago
  It would be impossible to do E2E encryption unless the transcription happens on the device (I assume you mean the wearable). Even with that, you will only access the transcript and still need an AI model to get meaningful info. This device wouldn't be suitable for anyone with little privacy concerns.
dsiroker 3y ago
Confidential Cloud is similar to end-to-end encryption, but with the added benefit of letting your personalized AI work for you even when you aren’t using the app. You control who can decrypt your data Your employer, we as software providers, and the government cannot decrypt your data without your permission, even with a subpoena to do so. Your data is anonymized There is an initial mapping from your application request to an anonymous ID, but after that, even we don't know whose encrypted data is whose. Your data will never be sold Not only do we pledge never to sell your data, but we couldn't even if we wanted to because we can't decrypt it without your permission. Envelope encryption with unique secret keys Data keys are used to encrypt your data and are themselves encrypted under a secret key. No one, including us, can export the secret keys. Tamperproof hardware Decrypted data is only ever stored in memory (source: <https://docs.aws.amazon.com/kms/latest/cryptographic-details/intro.html https://docs.aws.amazon.com/kms/latest/cryptographic-details...>), which is protected from tampering by a multi-chip standalone hardware cryptographic appliance (source: <https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/cryptographic-module-validation-program/certificate/4523 https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/cryptographic-module-validati...>). Protected from 3rd party AI providers Data sent to 3rd party AI providers for transcription and summarization is anonymized, not used for training, and deleted after 30 days. Protected from cloud provider and subpoena AWS KMS (source: <https://aws.amazon.com/kms/ https://aws.amazon.com/kms/>) uses FIPS 140-2 (source: <https://csrc.nist.gov/CSRC/media/projects/cryptographic-module-validation-program/documents/security-policies/140sp4523.pdf https://csrc.nist.gov/CSRC/media/projects/cryptographic-modu...>) validated hardware security modules (HSMs) to ensure no one, including AWS employees, can retrieve your plaintext KMS keys.
- ooterness 3y ago
  Sorry, but what? How do you do any of the AI training or inference without decrypting the data in the cloud? I seriously doubt it's all running locally on the pendant.
- MacsHeadroom 3y ago
  There is no way to anonymize transcripts where I and others refer to me by name and reference uniquely identifiable information. What happens when the AI provider is served with a warrant or subpoena for transcripts mentioning MacsHeadroom in the 30 day window? Your "anonymization" does nothing. You have major egg on your face right now. The only remotely anonymous version of a service like this involves a private LLM endpoint. I have Mixtral 8x22B and CommandR+ running on my home LLM sever. How can I use Limitless without handing my "anonymized" (but NOT actually anonymized in any way shape or form) PII over to a third party who retains it for at least 30 days (or longer if someone with a badge or gavel asks)?

Any data privacy experts here? Could someone explain how data encryption and decryption work here? https://www.limitless.ai/#privacy https://www.limitless.ai/#privacy

nihaals 3y ago

They don't really give any specifics and I'm not sure if they give you the keys or explain how the keys are derived (which I assume must be based on your login if they don't make you enter it otherwise they must be able to decrypt it whenever they want) but they mention they worked with Latacora[1]. Also curious if anyone else has any ideas on how they prevent themselves from being able to decrypt user data while implying they're not using E2EE[1]. [1]: https://help.limitless.ai/en/articles/9130680-privacy-with-limitless https://help.limitless.ai/en/articles/9130680-privacy-with-l... Edit: I just tried it. They don't give you encryption keys you need to enter when signing in and the server literally sends you your transcripts with no encryption. Maybe they're including a key somehow derived when signing in with Google/a magic link in the request, but I don't think anything would stop them from just logging API responses even if that was the case. They're definitely not using E2EE. They might just be encrypting at rest and storing their keys in AWS KMS which sounds like false advertising.

georgehill 3y ago
I was going to buy it, but this lack of privacy explanation scares me.
- nihaals 3y ago
  Just added some additional context from trying it which might make you glad you checked.
  - georgehill 3y ago
    Thanks!
Oras 3y ago
It would be impossible to do E2E encryption unless the transcription happens on the device (I assume you mean the wearable). Even with that, you will only access the transcript and still need an AI model to get meaningful info. This device wouldn't be suitable for anyone with little privacy concerns.

dsiroker 3y ago

Confidential Cloud is similar to end-to-end encryption, but with the added benefit of letting your personalized AI work for you even when you aren’t using the app. You control who can decrypt your data Your employer, we as software providers, and the government cannot decrypt your data without your permission, even with a subpoena to do so. Your data is anonymized There is an initial mapping from your application request to an anonymous ID, but after that, even we don't know whose encrypted data is whose. Your data will never be sold Not only do we pledge never to sell your data, but we couldn't even if we wanted to because we can't decrypt it without your permission. Envelope encryption with unique secret keys Data keys are used to encrypt your data and are themselves encrypted under a secret key. No one, including us, can export the secret keys. Tamperproof hardware Decrypted data is only ever stored in memory (source: <https://docs.aws.amazon.com/kms/latest/cryptographic-details/intro.html https://docs.aws.amazon.com/kms/latest/cryptographic-details...>), which is protected from tampering by a multi-chip standalone hardware cryptographic appliance (source: <https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/cryptographic-module-validation-program/certificate/4523 https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/cryptographic-module-validati...>). Protected from 3rd party AI providers Data sent to 3rd party AI providers for transcription and summarization is anonymized, not used for training, and deleted after 30 days. Protected from cloud provider and subpoena AWS KMS (source: <https://aws.amazon.com/kms/ https://aws.amazon.com/kms/>) uses FIPS 140-2 (source: <https://csrc.nist.gov/CSRC/media/projects/cryptographic-module-validation-program/documents/security-policies/140sp4523.pdf https://csrc.nist.gov/CSRC/media/projects/cryptographic-modu...>) validated hardware security modules (HSMs) to ensure no one, including AWS employees, can retrieve your plaintext KMS keys.

ooterness 3y ago
Sorry, but what? How do you do any of the AI training or inference without decrypting the data in the cloud? I seriously doubt it's all running locally on the pendant.
MacsHeadroom 3y ago
There is no way to anonymize transcripts where I and others refer to me by name and reference uniquely identifiable information. What happens when the AI provider is served with a warrant or subpoena for transcripts mentioning MacsHeadroom in the 30 day window? Your "anonymization" does nothing. You have major egg on your face right now. The only remotely anonymous version of a service like this involves a private LLM endpoint. I have Mixtral 8x22B and CommandR+ running on my home LLM sever. How can I use Limitless without handing my "anonymized" (but NOT actually anonymized in any way shape or form) PII over to a third party who retains it for at least 30 days (or longer if someone with a badge or gavel asks)?