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There's nothing eyebrow-raising about the feature itself. It's off by default, lets you control which kinds of data you share if you choose to share data at all
by FreakLegion 3y ago
There's nothing eyebrow-raising about the feature itself. It's off by default, lets you control which kinds of data you share if you choose to share data at all, and is mainly used for basic operations (e.g. tracking CPU load, concurrent sessions, and other relevant metrics over time).
- spudlyo 3y agoI'm not entirely comfortable with a security device streaming telemetry to a third party. The kind of metrics that you're thinking of have historically been made available on management interfaces via SNMP OIDs assigned to the manufacturer. Personally I'd much prefer to poll the device myself and keep those metrics in-house. This may seem like an antiquated way of managing network devices, but SNMP is a well understood, interoperable, standards-based protocol without vendor lock-in. Futhermore, as we've seen, features like these expose a larger attack surface on the device. My primary worry would have been around it being used somehow in a data exfiltration scheme, but a root-level compromise of the device is the worst possible outcome.
- FreakLegion 3y agoIt does literally everything you're asking for though? The data is also kept on-device. SNMP is there. Log aggregators and log forwarding are there. Rolling up to a centralized controller is there. The vendor data lake is just one more option. To be clear, this is a VPN interface that has to handle incoming connection requests and traffic. Exploits are super common here. The command injection happens to only work when telemetry is also enabled, for reasons I haven't seen explained yet, but it could just as easily have been SNMP.