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Why CISA Is Warning CISOs About a Breach at Sisense
- dboreham 3y agoThis sounds nuts. Are people still entrusting bearer tokens to third parties? I haven't seen that done in at least 10 years. Surely it's prohibited by the ToS of the first party providers?
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- dudus 3y agoOuch """ Earlier today, a public relations firm working with Sisense reached out to learn if KrebsOnSecurity planned to publish any further updates on their breach (KrebsOnSecurity posted a screenshot of the CISO’s customer email to both LinkedIn and Mastodon on Wednesday evening). The PR rep said Sisense wanted to make sure they had an opportunity to comment before the story ran. But when confronted with the details shared by my sources, Sisense apparently changed its mind. “After consulting with Sisense, they have told me that they don’t wish to respond,” the PR rep said in an emailed reply. """
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- mulmen 3y agoThey wanted an opportunity to comment. That implies no obligation to comment.
- ethbr1 3y agoIt does say something that they were interested enough to want the opportunity, but specifically chose not to exercise it. Thought it was a nice addition to the piece.
- mulmen 3y agoWhat does it say? I think adding the comment that they “changed their mind” was unreasonable because they didn’t change their mind. They wanted an opportunity which they got but didn’t exercise. They didn’t say “don’t contact us for comment in the future.” Which would be “changing their mind”. Their comment was simply “no comment”. This seems completely reasonable to me.
- ethbr1 3y agoThat they weren't even prepared enough to say "We at Sisense take security very seriously. Highest priority. Industry standards. Etc. Etc."
- mulmen 3y agoThat seems like a leap. I’m not sure what value can be gained from such an assumption.
- ethbr1 3y agoIncompetence.
- mulmen 3y ago“No comment” doesn’t seem like an incompetent comment. Why do you assign more value to unsubstantive PR speak?
- ethbr1 3y agoBecause "no comment" is less of a plan than even mindless PR pablum, that a PR agency should have been able to churn out without thinking. Unless Sisense (a) had no prepared PR plan for this scenario and/or (b) has no idea what actually happened, so are still terrified to legally expose themselves by putting any words to paper. E.g. They still haven't put out a press release: https://www.sisense.com/newsroom/ https://www.sisense.com/newsroom/ Aside from, you know, their piece on how properly isolated multi-tenant is a secure architecture pattern: https://www.sisense.com/blog/benefits-of-next-generation-multi-tenancy-to-embedded-analytics/ https://www.sisense.com/blog/benefits-of-next-generation-mul...
- SuperNinKenDo 3y ago[flagged]
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- iamcisu 3y agoWhat do CISUs think about this?
- Cyphase 3y agoCISI don't know, I won't speculate.
- mrbuttons454 3y agoCISOU
- dhosek 3y agoIt’s both a clever headline and also one that was inscrutable until I looked at the article (I suppose I should know CISA and CISO but I’ve reached the stage in life where I really don’t want to keep learning the damn acronyms all the time).
- reaperducer 3y ago"Certain information" Check! "We take this seriously" Check! "Abundance of caution" Check! Cloud buckets... Check! Declined to comment... Check! It's like playing Modern IT Security Bingo.
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- koolba 3y ago> Those sources said the breach appears to have started when the attackers somehow gained access to the company’s Gitlab code repository, and in that repository was a token or credential that gave the bad guys access to Sisense’s Amazon S3 buckets in the cloud. So plaintext AWS credentials checked into source control. > Both sources said the attackers used the S3 access to copy and exfiltrate several terabytes worth of Sisense customer data, which apparently included millions of access tokens, email account passwords, and even SSL certificates. And those credentials can access tons of other credentials, also stored in plaintext. Even if the security policies didn’t pick this up, didn’t they at least having billing alerts for the terabytes of AWS bandwidth?
- EdwardDiego 3y agoThis feels... ...ridiculous in this day and age.
- doctorpangloss 3y agoOn the other hand, once they had source code access, does it matter? People play make believe about this stuff. “The practice I feel strongly about, it’s secure. And the other guy is a moron.” The XZ crisis shows how little credential isolation matters. Maybe even at Google, you could work there and feel very strongly about their security practices, and then governments have access to everything anyway, at the front end proxies or whatever. It’s important to pay attention to security, but I think programmer resources should focus on “cheating,” not “security.”
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- mdekkers 3y agoYou must be trolling, right? Right?! Programmer resources should not focus on security? Credential isolation doesn’t matter?
- EdwardDiego 3y ago
- darkerside 3y ago> If they are telling people to reset credentials, that means it was not encrypted. I'm not sure that follows. If I leaked customer information, even encrypted, I believe it would still be responsible to tell people and give them the option to react. Encryption is not foolproof technology. Vulnerable to cracking, or perhaps the key could simply be leaked as well.
- SoftTalker 3y agoPossibly the credentials were encrypted, but the attackers got the encryption keys as well?
- wiredfool 3y agoIt was probably an encrypted bucket, and the AWS keys had access to read/decrypt. Encryption is easy. Meaningful key management is hard.
- karmajunkie 3y agoYeah, this caught my eye: > “If they are hosting customer data on a third-party system like Amazon, it better damn well be encrypted,” Weaver said. “If they are telling people to rest credentials, that means it was not encrypted. So mistake number one is leaving Amazon credentials in your Git archive. Mistake number two is using S3 without using encryption on top of it. The former is bad but forgivable, but the latter given their business is unforgivable.” I've got all our buckets encrypted-at-rest with a CMK, but if someone compromised a key, the role that key is connected to would necessarily have to have permission to decrypt the data as well. at-rest encryption just means nobody's going to buy a used hard drive and suddenly have access to gigabytes of healthcare or financial data or passwords. Or am I missing some nuance or implication of the conversation?
- wiredfool 3y agoThat's basically it. Encryption is a little like 2 factor auth in that way, if you really only have one control to reading the data, the encryption isn't a solution for that particular risk. The way I see it -- what I want to protect against is an attacker being able to slurp up all of my online, potentially accessible protected data, while at the same time, I generally want to access it for legitimate purposes. And that's difficult -- so what we wind up doing is making it expensive/time consuming/audited to access the protected data.
- OneOfTheMicahs 3y agoAll I see is ssssss ssss ss sss ssss ss
- binkHN 3y ago> ...a company entrusted with so many sensitive logins should absolutely be encrypting that information. > “If they are hosting customer data on a third-party system like Amazon, it better damn well be encrypted,” Weaver said. “If they are telling people to reset credentials, that means it was not encrypted. So mistake number one is leaving Amazon credentials in your Git archive. Mistake number two is using S3 without using encryption on top of it. The former is bad but forgivable, but the latter given their business is unforgivable.” The penalties for gross negligence are not high enough. These guys should be sued into oblivion; I hope their insurance limits are high enough.
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- wiredfool 3y agoIt probably was, but Amazon's bucket checkbox encryption doesn't protect against an authorized user reading the data. It's trivially easy to encrypt things on AWS, but the attack you're protecting against is someone walking off with the HD, which is not really the important threat. Well, that and making sure that the auditor can check off 'encrypted at rest' on the sheet.