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Rough going so far, as Spinoza is both precise and uses words in the senses they had in Scholastic times. I think I understand how Spinoza is not a pantheist,

Rough going so far, as Spinoza is both precise and uses words in the senses they had in Scholastic times. I think I understand how Spinoza is not a pantheist, though: God determines Creation, in that the Creation is the maximal object that could be created from God, and the Creation determines God, in that God is the minimal object that could create the Creation, so they're two very distinct things, but in a 1:1 relationship. (examples: intension/extension in logic, cones/gamut in vision, grammar/language in informatics) I'm not sure how easy the distinction between his viewpoint and pantheism would have been to explain to someone with a XVII background, but Aquinas defo would've been unhappy with the "the deity can create any universe he wants, as long as it's black" part. (hmm. if our universe only uses up two attributes, 'thought' for all the abstracts and 'extent' for all the concretes, are there any other universes lurking in the remaining infinity of attributes? this also opens the question of whether we're dealing with a countable infinity of attributes, or a higher cardinal...)

082349872349872 3y ago
this looks useful; a modern formalisation: https://eprints.illc.uva.nl/id/eprint/1537/1/MoL-2017-02.text.pdf https://eprints.illc.uva.nl/id/eprint/1537/1/MoL-2017-02.tex...
- 082349872349872 3y ago
  starting to get a little clearer; was Gödel's proof inspired by Spinoza's? They both use many of the same mathematical tools...
  - knightoffaith 3y ago
    They are both ontological proofs, yep. Though Godel is using modal logic, which won't be invented for centuries until after Spinoza's time.
    - 082349872349872 3y ago
      oops, I was reading the "contingent things must be dependent upon necessary things" as implying modality, but you're right that if it's there it's only implicit.
      - knightoffaith 3y ago
        right, there is something modal going on here, but in terms of the formal mathematical tool of modal logic, Spinoza isn't using them, though I think you understood that from the start.
knightoffaith 3y ago
>Creation is the maximal object that could be created from God Well, just the only one, but I suppose the maximal element of a set with one element is just that element, so yeah. >Creation determines God, in that God is the minimal object that could create the Creation Well, the only thing that could create Creation, but I suppose the minimal element of a set with one element is just that element, so yeah. >Aquinas defo would've been unhappy with the "the deity can create any universe he wants, as long as it's black" part. Hmm, I don't know what you mean by this. Spinoza isn't saying this, Spinoza is saying that God must have created only this universe, and everything that God does is necessary---there's nothing else he can do. >if our universe only uses up two attributes OK, so it's not that our universe is only uses two attributes, it's that we can only perceive things with respect to two attributes. There's only one possible universe, which is this one, and it's necessarily this one.
- 082349872349872 3y ago
  Yes, I was purposely playing with the trivial definitions of maximal and minimal (max{x} = min{x} = x) to draw out an analogy with the modern concept of Galois Connections. > there's nothing else he can do. Right, and I thought Aquinas' take was that he must be capable of doing otherwise, but doesn't. > we can only perceive things with respect to two attributes Aha, so this universe uses all (are they countable?) attributes, but we imperfect finite creatures only perceive thought and extension; angels might perceive three, or a dozen, or all the attributes? (which would make sense: Samuel Johnson can both think of a rock and perceive its extension of mass in space, but the rock, while it might "perceive" the extension of Johnson's foot in space does not think of Johnson. So a creature beyond us as we are beyond the rock might have metathought? "be not afraid" indeed!)
  - knightoffaith 3y ago
    >Right, and I thought Aquinas' take was that he must be capable of doing otherwise, but doesn't. Yep, that's right. >are they countable? Spinoza doesn't specify. But yep, in principle other attributes could be perceived---they are perceived, for example, by God for Spinoza.

082349872349872 3y ago

this looks useful; a modern formalisation: https://eprints.illc.uva.nl/id/eprint/1537/1/MoL-2017-02.text.pdf https://eprints.illc.uva.nl/id/eprint/1537/1/MoL-2017-02.tex...

082349872349872 3y ago
starting to get a little clearer; was Gödel's proof inspired by Spinoza's? They both use many of the same mathematical tools...
- knightoffaith 3y ago
  They are both ontological proofs, yep. Though Godel is using modal logic, which won't be invented for centuries until after Spinoza's time.
  - 082349872349872 3y ago
    oops, I was reading the "contingent things must be dependent upon necessary things" as implying modality, but you're right that if it's there it's only implicit.
    - knightoffaith 3y ago
      right, there is something modal going on here, but in terms of the formal mathematical tool of modal logic, Spinoza isn't using them, though I think you understood that from the start.

knightoffaith 3y ago

>Creation is the maximal object that could be created from God Well, just the only one, but I suppose the maximal element of a set with one element is just that element, so yeah. >Creation determines God, in that God is the minimal object that could create the Creation Well, the only thing that could create Creation, but I suppose the minimal element of a set with one element is just that element, so yeah. >Aquinas defo would've been unhappy with the "the deity can create any universe he wants, as long as it's black" part. Hmm, I don't know what you mean by this. Spinoza isn't saying this, Spinoza is saying that God must have created only this universe, and everything that God does is necessary---there's nothing else he can do. >if our universe only uses up two attributes OK, so it's not that our universe is only uses two attributes, it's that we can only perceive things with respect to two attributes. There's only one possible universe, which is this one, and it's necessarily this one.

082349872349872 3y ago
Yes, I was purposely playing with the trivial definitions of maximal and minimal (max{x} = min{x} = x) to draw out an analogy with the modern concept of Galois Connections. > there's nothing else he can do. Right, and I thought Aquinas' take was that he must be capable of doing otherwise, but doesn't. > we can only perceive things with respect to two attributes Aha, so this universe uses all (are they countable?) attributes, but we imperfect finite creatures only perceive thought and extension; angels might perceive three, or a dozen, or all the attributes? (which would make sense: Samuel Johnson can both think of a rock and perceive its extension of mass in space, but the rock, while it might "perceive" the extension of Johnson's foot in space does not think of Johnson. So a creature beyond us as we are beyond the rock might have metathought? "be not afraid" indeed!)
- knightoffaith 3y ago
  >Right, and I thought Aquinas' take was that he must be capable of doing otherwise, but doesn't. Yep, that's right. >are they countable? Spinoza doesn't specify. But yep, in principle other attributes could be perceived---they are perceived, for example, by God for Spinoza.