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Yes, but how many other things can you think of other than email which you would share your encryption public keys for? Honestly email would be at the bottom o

Yes, but how many other things can you think of other than email which you would share your encryption public keys for? Honestly email would be at the bottom of applications I would think of, even when registering keys with a key server. If you have a bunch for different use cases (or like, levels of security/secrecy/revoking-this-will-be-a-nightmare), which you've set your one email address as recipient for, which of those is "default"? The keyserver and protonmail also are entirely separate. I wouldn't expect the two entities to be communicating with each other if I hadn't opted in. It feels weird, like when private companies harvest your data without asking.

soraminazuki 3y ago
> Yes, but how many other things can you think of other than email which you would share your encryption public keys for? The only non-theoretical use of a PGP encryption key is email. > (different) levels of security/secrecy/revoking-this-will-be-a-nightmare Using multiple keys don't offer added security or secrecy. Also, keys.openpgp.org lets you delete keys as long as you have access to your email. > It feels weird, like when private companies harvest your data without asking This is nothing like data harvesting, which may be why you prefixed your statement with "it feels like." Nobody is obtaining private or even semi-private data that can be used against you. Also, > private companies keys.openpgp.org is a open source community project. It's not an evil for-profit data-hoarding entity that's implied by those two words. I'm curious, what do you think a PGP keyserver is for? You make it sound as if there are no legitimate use for downloading encryption keys from it. Which leads to another question, why upload the keys at all?
- kelnos 3y ago
  > The only non-theoretical use of a PGP encryption key is email. I use a backup application that encrypts my backups using PGP. Granted, that certainly doesn't require a published public key. But your assertion is incorrect.
  - soraminazuki 3y ago
    Right, I should've phrased it as PGP encryption keys obtained from a public keyserver.
    - lxgr 3y ago
      Backing up keys stored on a GnuPG card (e.g. on a Yubikey) does require that.
      - soraminazuki 3y ago
        It doesn't require that. You have the option of doing so. You can back up public keys and restore them just like any other file. I don't see why a public key file should require special treatment from any other file requiring backup.
        lxgr 3y ago
        And I don't see why publishing a public key file to a key server should trigger any special semantics regarding email encryption without an explicit "I currently have this key accessible, go ahead and encrypt email to me using it" flag.
        soraminazuki 3y ago
        Because that's what a public keyserver is for. It's not a private file syncing service. You can use it as one, but don't get mad at others when they use public keyservers as intended.
        lxgr 3y ago
        > Because that's what a public keyserver is for. Who defined that? > It's not a private file syncing service. No, it's a public file syncing service :)
        3y ago
- DeepSeaTortoise 3y ago
  > Using multiple keys don't offer added security or secrecy. Why wouldn't it? I've got a chinesium grade tablet with some very convenient features, but between self-reenabling background services, the completely bypassed permission system, the device crashing whenever adb is used, it still trying to access wifi networks after deleting them and "resetting" the system, ..., I'm pretty sceptical about the privacy of the data, you can encrypt after it gets synced to their cloud. I dont have any email accs I care about added to this device, but I can imagine some people wanting to read some emails on other lesser trusted devices. A simple solution would be giving lesser trusted devices only access to lower security keys.
  - soraminazuki 3y ago
    That's terrible operational security. You shouldn't be using the same email account in that scenario. Entering email credentials into an untrusted device will allow that device to send and receive emails, meaning it can read unencrypted emails. That's a major risk, considering that people might forget to encrypt them. Or they might simply follow other people's advice here and not use your advertised keys. Even granting untrusted devices access to encrypted emails pose a non-zero risk too because there are many ways it can go wrong.
  - lxgr 3y ago
    > A simple solution would be giving lesser trusted devices only access to lower security keys. That puts the burden of the decision of picking the right security level on the sender though, right? I don't see that ever becoming a thing.
- erinaceousjones 3y ago
  > The only non-theoretical use of a PGP encryption key [that would use keys published on a keyserver] is email. I use this on some repos https://github.com/AGWA/git-crypt https://github.com/AGWA/git-crypt And occasionally to encrypt files, or receive encrypted files. These are practical things which are non-theoretical. > Using multiple keys don't offer added security or secrecy. Depends on how careful you are or want to be, with your private key. My house key isn't the same as my car key isn't the same as my bike key. > This is nothing like data harvesting Alright fair, bad example. What I was grumbling about was more the lack of any clear communication that you've been auto-opted-in to a feature on protonmail, with no user interface signal indicating so, leading to confusion for a couple months like in TFA. I definitely wasn't casting shade on the opengpg keyserver, nor protonmail. It's the "hey! I didn't check a box for this, and it's not mentioned anywhere in the protonmail docs" hidden functionality which could do with some clarification. I'm a forgetful creature. If I intentionally put my key on a keyserver, because I'm playing around and learning about PGP, will I make the connection between it and protonmail a few months down the line if I move my email account to them? Unlikely. It's a nice automated feature. Protonmail-to-protonmail e2e encryption makes a lot of sense. I just think protonmail-to-non-protonmail e2e needs a tooltip in the UI, and the option to opt out, potentially with the ability to opt out for specific email addresses. I wouldn't at all assume it would be on by default even IF I've been actively using PGP in my email clients, because it's something you usually have to manually set up yourself, very explicitly. That, and 99.9% of emails are plaintext. Anyhoo, one thing I forgot which kind of negates the "what if I have multiple encryption keys tied to my email" is the fact that the opengpg keyserver does tie 1 email address to 1 key so you can't publish multiple encryption keys, fair enough. Git-crypt and file encryption, I set my associated email address to use +tags eg me+git@email.com, so as far as protonmail etc are concerned there's only one key per logical email address.
- lxgr 3y ago
  > The only non-theoretical use of a PGP encryption key is email. What an uninformed blanket statement. I use GPG many times per day, at work and otherwise, none of them for email: Commit signing, SSH key storage (in a GnuPG smart card), deb package verification are only the ones that come to mind.
  - soraminazuki 3y ago
    > Commit signing You use your encryption key for that? Which PGP implementation does that? I use my signing key. > SSH key storage Again, I use my authentication key for that. > deb package verification I use the published signing keys. Never had to use any other key type. > What an uninformed blanket statement. I'm sorry for my ignorance. Could you at least provide an example that's valid?
    - lxgr 3y ago
      Sorry, missed the "PGP encryption key". But still: - I used to use `pass`, a password manager based on GPG. That needed the encryption key. - Sharing of confidential data with coworkers at more than one job. - Future-proofing: Even though I might not be using an encryption key now, creating all three (encryption, signing, authentication) is a common flow when using GnuPG cards, and then I do want to sync all three to the key server for convenience (so that I can use them at a different machine, for example) without broadcasting to the world "hey, email me encrypted stuff to keyid 0xABCD1234!".
      - soraminazuki 3y ago
        None of those use cases should involve a public keyserver if you don't want people to email you encrypted stuff. Keyservers are literally there to "broadcast to the world 'hey, email me encrypted stuff to keyid 0xABCD1234!'."
        lxgr 3y ago
        Well, I use keyservers, and I don't intend to broadcast that fact. Maybe I'm using them wrong in your view, but I don't see why your view is somehow the canonical one, given all the non-email examples I and other people in this thread have provided.
lxgr 3y ago
Backing up my signed public keys, for example. GnuPG card doesn’t store anything other than the private key, so there’s a risk of losing access. I’m not sure if that protocol Protonmail is using would pick up such keys without email verification, though.
- soraminazuki 3y ago
  If you don't mean to publish your keys, you'd be better off backing them along with your other files rather than uploading it to a public keyserver.
  - lxgr 3y ago
    I don't mind publishing my keys at all, and in fact for some of my applications it makes GPG much more ergonomic to use. I do mind software or services taking that as an implicit statement of "go ahead, encrypt email to me using this" when it can clearly cause confusion and irrecoverable messages in many cases. That said, we don't actually know if Protonmail really does search all keyservers (including the "old-style" ones, i.e. the ones where anybody could publish anything in an unverified manner and the "web of trust" is used to figure out which key is in fact trusted), or only the new ones that perform email verification. If it's the latter, I think performing email verification could be considered a bit more of an opt-in statement to receiving encrypted mail.

soraminazuki 3y ago

> Yes, but how many other things can you think of other than email which you would share your encryption public keys for? The only non-theoretical use of a PGP encryption key is email. > (different) levels of security/secrecy/revoking-this-will-be-a-nightmare Using multiple keys don't offer added security or secrecy. Also, keys.openpgp.org lets you delete keys as long as you have access to your email. > It feels weird, like when private companies harvest your data without asking This is nothing like data harvesting, which may be why you prefixed your statement with "it feels like." Nobody is obtaining private or even semi-private data that can be used against you. Also, > private companies keys.openpgp.org is a open source community project. It's not an evil for-profit data-hoarding entity that's implied by those two words. I'm curious, what do you think a PGP keyserver is for? You make it sound as if there are no legitimate use for downloading encryption keys from it. Which leads to another question, why upload the keys at all?

kelnos 3y ago
> The only non-theoretical use of a PGP encryption key is email. I use a backup application that encrypts my backups using PGP. Granted, that certainly doesn't require a published public key. But your assertion is incorrect.
- soraminazuki 3y ago
  Right, I should've phrased it as PGP encryption keys obtained from a public keyserver.
  - lxgr 3y ago
    Backing up keys stored on a GnuPG card (e.g. on a Yubikey) does require that.
    - soraminazuki 3y ago
      It doesn't require that. You have the option of doing so. You can back up public keys and restore them just like any other file. I don't see why a public key file should require special treatment from any other file requiring backup.
      - lxgr 3y ago
        And I don't see why publishing a public key file to a key server should trigger any special semantics regarding email encryption without an explicit "I currently have this key accessible, go ahead and encrypt email to me using it" flag.
        soraminazuki 3y ago
        Because that's what a public keyserver is for. It's not a private file syncing service. You can use it as one, but don't get mad at others when they use public keyservers as intended.
        lxgr 3y ago
        > Because that's what a public keyserver is for. Who defined that? > It's not a private file syncing service. No, it's a public file syncing service :)
        3y ago
DeepSeaTortoise 3y ago
> Using multiple keys don't offer added security or secrecy. Why wouldn't it? I've got a chinesium grade tablet with some very convenient features, but between self-reenabling background services, the completely bypassed permission system, the device crashing whenever adb is used, it still trying to access wifi networks after deleting them and "resetting" the system, ..., I'm pretty sceptical about the privacy of the data, you can encrypt after it gets synced to their cloud. I dont have any email accs I care about added to this device, but I can imagine some people wanting to read some emails on other lesser trusted devices. A simple solution would be giving lesser trusted devices only access to lower security keys.
- soraminazuki 3y ago
  That's terrible operational security. You shouldn't be using the same email account in that scenario. Entering email credentials into an untrusted device will allow that device to send and receive emails, meaning it can read unencrypted emails. That's a major risk, considering that people might forget to encrypt them. Or they might simply follow other people's advice here and not use your advertised keys. Even granting untrusted devices access to encrypted emails pose a non-zero risk too because there are many ways it can go wrong.
- lxgr 3y ago
  > A simple solution would be giving lesser trusted devices only access to lower security keys. That puts the burden of the decision of picking the right security level on the sender though, right? I don't see that ever becoming a thing.
erinaceousjones 3y ago
> The only non-theoretical use of a PGP encryption key [that would use keys published on a keyserver] is email. I use this on some repos https://github.com/AGWA/git-crypt https://github.com/AGWA/git-crypt And occasionally to encrypt files, or receive encrypted files. These are practical things which are non-theoretical. > Using multiple keys don't offer added security or secrecy. Depends on how careful you are or want to be, with your private key. My house key isn't the same as my car key isn't the same as my bike key. > This is nothing like data harvesting Alright fair, bad example. What I was grumbling about was more the lack of any clear communication that you've been auto-opted-in to a feature on protonmail, with no user interface signal indicating so, leading to confusion for a couple months like in TFA. I definitely wasn't casting shade on the opengpg keyserver, nor protonmail. It's the "hey! I didn't check a box for this, and it's not mentioned anywhere in the protonmail docs" hidden functionality which could do with some clarification. I'm a forgetful creature. If I intentionally put my key on a keyserver, because I'm playing around and learning about PGP, will I make the connection between it and protonmail a few months down the line if I move my email account to them? Unlikely. It's a nice automated feature. Protonmail-to-protonmail e2e encryption makes a lot of sense. I just think protonmail-to-non-protonmail e2e needs a tooltip in the UI, and the option to opt out, potentially with the ability to opt out for specific email addresses. I wouldn't at all assume it would be on by default even IF I've been actively using PGP in my email clients, because it's something you usually have to manually set up yourself, very explicitly. That, and 99.9% of emails are plaintext. Anyhoo, one thing I forgot which kind of negates the "what if I have multiple encryption keys tied to my email" is the fact that the opengpg keyserver does tie 1 email address to 1 key so you can't publish multiple encryption keys, fair enough. Git-crypt and file encryption, I set my associated email address to use +tags eg me+git@email.com, so as far as protonmail etc are concerned there's only one key per logical email address.
lxgr 3y ago
> The only non-theoretical use of a PGP encryption key is email. What an uninformed blanket statement. I use GPG many times per day, at work and otherwise, none of them for email: Commit signing, SSH key storage (in a GnuPG smart card), deb package verification are only the ones that come to mind.
- soraminazuki 3y ago
  > Commit signing You use your encryption key for that? Which PGP implementation does that? I use my signing key. > SSH key storage Again, I use my authentication key for that. > deb package verification I use the published signing keys. Never had to use any other key type. > What an uninformed blanket statement. I'm sorry for my ignorance. Could you at least provide an example that's valid?
  - lxgr 3y ago
    Sorry, missed the "PGP encryption key". But still: - I used to use `pass`, a password manager based on GPG. That needed the encryption key. - Sharing of confidential data with coworkers at more than one job. - Future-proofing: Even though I might not be using an encryption key now, creating all three (encryption, signing, authentication) is a common flow when using GnuPG cards, and then I do want to sync all three to the key server for convenience (so that I can use them at a different machine, for example) without broadcasting to the world "hey, email me encrypted stuff to keyid 0xABCD1234!".
    - soraminazuki 3y ago
      None of those use cases should involve a public keyserver if you don't want people to email you encrypted stuff. Keyservers are literally there to "broadcast to the world 'hey, email me encrypted stuff to keyid 0xABCD1234!'."
      - lxgr 3y ago
        Well, I use keyservers, and I don't intend to broadcast that fact. Maybe I'm using them wrong in your view, but I don't see why your view is somehow the canonical one, given all the non-email examples I and other people in this thread have provided.

lxgr 3y ago

Backing up my signed public keys, for example. GnuPG card doesn’t store anything other than the private key, so there’s a risk of losing access. I’m not sure if that protocol Protonmail is using would pick up such keys without email verification, though.

soraminazuki 3y ago
If you don't mean to publish your keys, you'd be better off backing them along with your other files rather than uploading it to a public keyserver.
- lxgr 3y ago
  I don't mind publishing my keys at all, and in fact for some of my applications it makes GPG much more ergonomic to use. I do mind software or services taking that as an implicit statement of "go ahead, encrypt email to me using this" when it can clearly cause confusion and irrecoverable messages in many cases. That said, we don't actually know if Protonmail really does search all keyservers (including the "old-style" ones, i.e. the ones where anybody could publish anything in an unverified manner and the "web of trust" is used to figure out which key is in fact trusted), or only the new ones that perform email verification. If it's the latter, I think performing email verification could be considered a bit more of an opt-in statement to receiving encrypted mail.