5 ms·
The Decouple podcast recently had three-part series on Vogtle: * https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bGySq7QBRiY https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bGySq7QBRiY * htt
by throw0101d 3y ago
The Decouple podcast recently had three-part series on Vogtle:
* https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bGySq7QBRiY https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bGySq7QBRiY
* https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CfkoMUmmUCI https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CfkoMUmmUCI
* https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rbKf_TbI000 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rbKf_TbI000
It mentions a few 'macro' issues with Vogtle: the first being the choice of using an AP-1000 design (Westinghouse Toshiba). Not because it is/was necessarily 'inherently' a bad design (the guest, James Krellenstein, describes himself as an "AP-100 fanboy"), but rather because it was (at the time) never built before. That, combined with the fact that the US had little/no institutional knowledge of building nuclear plants means that a whole lot of learning needed to be done.
Contrast this with another available (at the time) option, the ABWR, which GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy had building been for over a decade in Japan. Between ABWR build beginning and commercial operations it took about 4-5 years on average:
* https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_commercial_nuclear_reactors#Japan https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_commercial_nuclear_rea...
They had a ready-to-go supply chain, with plenty of experience.
Tied into the fact that the AP1000 was a new design, they decided to start building before 'detailed' drawings were only ~40% done. So they had the high-level view design done, but the drawings for machinists and pipe fitters needed were not ready, and so that added to delays, as they had to first create them, and then there was all sorts of back-and-forth to refine them. These issues were called out in the article:
> When Vogtle’s Units 3 and 4 were approved by Georgia regulators in 2009, the reactor model, known as an AP1000, had never before been built. (It was Westinghouse’s flagship model, combining massive generation capacity with new “passive safety” features, which allow reactors to remain cooled and safe without human intervention, external power, or emergency generators in the case of an accident.) It later emerged that the reactor’s developer, Westinghouse, had not even fully completed the design before starting construction, causing a significant share of the project’s costly setbacks. While that was bad news for Georgians, it could mean a smoother path ahead for future reactors.
> “In the course of building Vogtle,” Kozeracki told Grist, “we have now addressed three of the biggest challenges: the incomplete design, the immature supply chain, and the untrained workforce.”
Somewhere in the podcast they also go over some interesting 'bureaucratic minutiae': the plant was originally approved under a part of the regulations where everything is submitted 'all at once' and approved 'all at once', but any later changes to the design may take longer. As opposed another part where the design is submitted in parts, which may have been better as it would have allowed for gradual refine of the plants and submission when they were 'actually' finalized.
It also doesn't help that the US has so many 'one-off' nuclear plants, so that experience in one cannot be directly transferred between them. Contrast that with France, which has a fairly cookie-cutter fleet, or even (closer to home) the province of Ontario which has CANDUs everywhere (which were generally constructed in pairs and were often ordered in four- and eight-packs).
Some CANDUs are currently undergoing refurbishment, and the project is on-/under-budget and ahead of schedule. Interview with the fellow in charge of the refurb program:
> Gary Rose, VP New Nuclear Growth at Ontario Power Generation, walks us through the CANDU refurbishment program whose stunning successes have laid the foundation for deployment of the west’s 1st grid scale SMR, the GE Hitachi BWRX-300.
* https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LHTtthahwjs https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LHTtthahwjs
Of course now that the AP1000 has been built twice (Vogtle Units 3 and 4), plans exist and there's experience. The question is whether any new plants that are going to be built will use that experience, or choose yet another design.
- dhc02 3y agoI find it fascinating that you forgot to type the same word twice: build (different conjugations, but still). "...which GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy had been [building] for over a decade in Japan." "Of course now that the AP1000 has been [built] twice..." I would not comment just to "catch" you making a typo. I really think it's interesting that your brain slipped over the same idea twice in such a short span.
- epistasis 3y agoIMHO this podcast is way too biased in favor of nuclear, and exemplifies the entire problem with the nuclear industry: too much magical thinking and not enough hard retrospective self-criticism. Are we going to be able to construct nuclear in the future? Probably? Maybe? But if folks like this are in charge of the efforts, then my answer is a firm "never." Take for example when Jigar Shah went on their podcast. Shah is a huuuge nuclear fan, and IMHO is way too optimistic too (for example the DoE's LPO Liftoff report on nuclear gave it a 30%-50% cost advantage out of nowhere in order to make it look the least bit plausible). But for all of Shah's blind spots on nuclear, at least he tried to give the Decouple podcast a small shower of reality: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HwN1MCtBkVk https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HwN1MCtBkVk (BTW, Shah has said on recent podcasts that there will be more announcements of new AP1000s soon, and since he's giving out so much money to get them built, we should probably believe that. IMHO, I'd bet 10:1 that it will be wasted money that would be better spent on batteries and solar, but when it comes to subsidies and government spending, money is not actually fungible, so I support more shots on goal, even if they are very very long shots)
- Manuel_D 3y agoNuclear power, despite its larger costs, is the only form of non-intermittent green energy production other than geographically limited options like dams and geothermal. Once wind and solar start saturating energy markets during peak hours of production, each new wind and solar plant has diminishing returns. While the plants themselves are expensive, producing wind and solar power at large scale and offsetting intermittency incurs costs in the form of increased transmission capacity and storage requirements. People really often don't comprehend just how titanic the storage requirements are just to provision half a day's worth of energy to offset daily solar fluctuations. The globe currently uses 60 TWh of electricity per day. That's 30,000 GWh for 12 hours of storage. Keep in mind, electricity is only about half our total energy use, heating and transportation also need to be electrified which will drive this number up. And lastly, diurnal storage isn't the only storage we'll need. We'll also need seasonal storage to offset weather fluctuations. When we stop asking "what's the most cost-efficient way to reduce CO2 emissions by a percent or two?" and start asking "how will we build a 100% carbon-free grid?" nuclear becomes a much more attractive option.