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The Open Secret about Confidential Computing
- lenerdenator 3y ago> If you read Security Engineering: A Guide to Building Dependable Distributed Systems - a highly recommended read in general - it is more blunt; saying that the ecosystem can be undermined by a single extracted attestation key, which has already been demonstrated (section 20.6, third edition). I'll have to read that, but in the meantime, how easy are these attacks on specific cloud instances to carry out, be it against this confidential computing's security, or against the various side-channel attack vulnerabilities? Data centers are huge and the processes scale up and down all the time. How do you see to it that you get the keys you want?
- mitjam 3y agoConfidential Computing is used when you want to protect data and processes against the platform. The platform owner has basically full control and visibility of what is happening around the Secure Enclave.
- otterley 3y agoOn Amazon EC2, Nitro Enclaves do not share physical CPU cores with their parent instances. See https://docs.aws.amazon.com/enclaves/latest/user/multiple-enclaves.html https://docs.aws.amazon.com/enclaves/latest/user/multiple-en... for details. (Disclaimer: I work for AWS; any opinions expressed are my own.)
- txutxu 3y ago> In short, the CPU is trusted and creates... Here it comes the main bug. If the data is so confidential, let's say for example "the military plans of a country, or ultra-secret technology" I don't know, I could not use a public network, or a provider that mixes it, in their infrastructure, and/or that has it's own employees. Recently, I got a laptop and saw an option in the BIOS about Intel SGX (enable/disable/auto). After a short research, was terrified: a source of security BUGS, deprecated for Intel Core (but continued for Xeon in the cloud). We don't need to talk about past and present hardware bugs (or software bugs and attacks), but let's put it in clear: If some kind of data shouldn't go out, do not put it out, in the first place. If the data should never go out, the network should be physically separated and isolated at physical level, from everything. Otherwise, I don't know... not working with such things, but I could use incompatible custom tech at least; no something so easy to get by an adversary, read, use, study, reverse, fuzz and attack without my knowledge. Cloud+Enclave "sounds" as secure as those "Third party VPN". Let's say your trust model is thrown to the bin, and start talking from there.
- rasengan 3y ago> If some kind of data shouldn't go out, do not put it out, in the first place. This is a really important message. Confidential Computing is still in development in the realm of our new-age technologies, but the 'secrecy' of the physical world is a proven primitive we can trust today.
- NegativeK 3y agoI don't think this tech is targeting TS/SCI data. > If the data should never go out, the network should be physically separated and isolated at physical level, from everything. Every company has that kind of data, though, and cybersecurity maximalism is how cybersecurity people get disinvited from architecture discussions. We can't tell users to not turn their computers on, since that invites breaches, and we can't tell IT to airgap the networks because that slows business to a crawl (and pisses of users, etc.) Cybersecurity is always about risk management. The risk of doing basically anything has to be balanced against the risk of not doing it at all. Often the cost of not doing it is too high, so the job is to use something like confidential computing (if it makes sense) and then try to mitigate attackers trying to get at it.
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- nonrandomstring 3y agoWe're still quite some way from practical homomorphic encryption [0] which would allow devolved trust to untrustworthy actors (like hardware owners at remote cloud sites). But don't hold your breath. Everything else along the way is a whack-a-mole because it depends on TPM/HSM enclaves. There are many reasons not to trust these now, including buffer overflows and compromised elliptic curve cryptography. Far better to design hybrid cloud and on-prem that keeps sensitive data where it belongs... on your own computer. [0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Homomorphic_encryption https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Homomorphic_encryption
- jonahbenton 3y agoSlight aside, I have been intrigued by the prospect of running enarx keeps provided by parties I would otherwise need to have a trust relationship with, locally on my data. The whole workflow of pulling them down, having them run and produce something "transparent" to me that can be used as a distillation of the relevant features of my data, for that party, without my providing my raw data to that party, does not yet exist, but it has promise.