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In Qubes, the networking can be disabled in the hypervisor. This will turn the VM into an air gapped machine. There is also split GPG, to transfer encrypted d
by aborsy 3y ago
In Qubes, the networking can be disabled in the hypervisor. This will turn the VM into an air gapped machine.
There is also split GPG, to transfer encrypted data to a VM containing Gpg keys.
But the ease of use could also mean that the user turns on and off the networking, bringing an air gapped VM sometimes online.
There is a need for a permanent one way VM.
- karma_pharmer 3y agoIn Qubes, the networking can be disabled in the hypervisor. This will turn the VM into an air gapped machine. That is not an air gap.
- fsflover 3y agohttps://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=39952128 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=39952128
- gavinsyancey 3y ago> the networking can be disabled in the hypervisor The hypervisor is software. Software has bugs. I'm sure the NSA has some hypervisor escape zero-days...
- fsflover 3y agoQubes relies on hardware-assisted virtualization, which is virtually impossible to break.
- tucnak 3y ago>virtually impossible >NSA I have a bridge to sell.
- fsflover 3y agoI'm not aware of any escape since Blue Pill in 2006, found by the Qubes founder herself.
- tucnak 3y agoWhich is indicative of... squat. They could introduce an RSA-authenticated backdoor at any time, not unlike the one we had seen in xz, & no researcher would ever find out. In fact, chances are it's already there but even if it's not, Qubes is locking you into Xen platform regardless. The only viable means of gaining security against the NSA is full-source bootstrap from commodity FPGAs. Yes, you'll be stuck at 50 MHz for the time being but at least you know a backdoor-in-synthesis is so much more intractable. The physical surface area to protect is much smaller, too.
- greggsy 3y agoThe complexity involved in targeting distributed, temporal backend systems like the ones being discussed here is sufficiently unreliable and risky that it’s easier and cheaper to just go straight for the people, or simply find another avenue.
- Veserv 3y agoReally? I typed “Xen VM Escape” into Google and this is the first hit mentioning at least 4 critical escapes between 2015 and 2017. https://www.csoonline.com/article/561467/xen-hypervisor-faces-third-highly-critical-vm-escape-bug-in-10-months.html https://www.csoonline.com/article/561467/xen-hypervisor-face... You did not even try to confirm if what you said is true.
- fsflover 3y agoSince release 4.0, Qubes is not just Xen. It relies on VT-d, which is hardware-assisted virtualization. The escapes you mentioned were the main reason to do it. More info: https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/master/QSBs/qsb-030-2017.txt https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/master/QSBs/qs...
- 1oooqooq 3y ago"virtually impossible" there's a reason security test of malicious code is done on fully software emulated qemu without kvm anywhere.
- fsflover 3y agoQubes doesn't rely on kvm. See also: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=39951519 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=39951519
- 112233 3y agoWhere can I read how Qubes protects itself from any possible interference from Intel ME, which would be a low bar for a level of security users of Qubes aim for?
- fsflover 3y agoIt can't protect from IME. But you can install Qubes on a machine with disabled and neutralized IME, e.g. Librem 15. Also I don't see how it's a low bar. AFAIK there were no known remote exploits of IME.
- 112233 3y agoWell, sorry, I mean, reading comments here and reading advice on QubesOS — they speak about airgapped systems, evil maid attacks, government vans that remotely snoop any computer etc. You don't need QubesOS to protect from known exploits, it was my understanding that people use QubesOS to protect from (real or imagined) state-level adversary.
- fsflover 3y agoYou can use Qubes OS for various kinds of threat model. Depending on the latter, your configuration will be wildly different. > You don't need QubesOS to protect from known exploits Qubes would protect you sensitive files from, e.g., XZ attack. Nothing else would AFAIK.
- croes 3y agoI'm sure NSA has tools to attack air gap computers too.
- tucnak 3y agoThat's why you want to invest in chassis security, hire ex-EMINT peeps from rival intelligence agencies to work on it. I reckon a startup could do it.
- darkclouds 3y agoSomeone who worked for the British Military told me back in the early 00's the US military (but could be any part of the US govt) had the ability to bowl up outside a building and "tune" into any of the pc they could detect. It didnt matter what floor of an office block they were on, how far away from a window they were, they had a special suitcase for remote accessing any and all pc's they wanted. Dont know how true it was or is, but I've seen some of these devices now advertised online. I'd provide a link if only Google & Bing would deliver the results, and were also psychologically engaged in warfare on the population.
- didntcheck 3y agoSee https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Van_Eck_phreaking https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Van_Eck_phreaking https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tempest_(codename) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tempest_(codename) Though for a second I thought you were going to talk about the mythical TV licensing detector vans :)