6 ms·

I agree with the general idea of tagging content to help classify. I'd given this some thought via MIME and ended up with a kind of BioNFT.. so named bc it use

I agree with the general idea of tagging content to help classify. I'd given this some thought via MIME and ended up with a kind of BioNFT.. so named bc it uses NFTs piecewise, but tracking the creation events and agents types (bio, ai, etc) as part of the content lifecycle https://twitter.com/PMayrgundter/status/1638016474483683328 https://twitter.com/PMayrgundter/status/1638016474483683328 Highlight.. What if: - devices sign source creations with a biosignature - editing tools sign input - media types include that, effectively saying: ai_edited(human_created(photo)) and do this under the experimental namespace in MIME: image/x.bio(pablo@example.com/photo123).html image/x.adobe.photoai(http://x.bio(pablo@example.com/photo123)).html

Retr0id 3y ago
What you're describing here is basically what C2PA is
- xeyownt 3y ago
  This C2PA looks flawed from the start. It just helps making the untrustworthy looks more trustworthy.
- zerojames 3y ago
  Reference, for context: https://c2pa.org/ https://c2pa.org/ And: the BBC just started using C2PA across some content. The BBC's R&D team talking about it: https://www.bbc.co.uk/rd/blog/2024-03-c2pa-verification-news-journalism-credentials https://www.bbc.co.uk/rd/blog/2024-03-c2pa-verification-news...
  - rentnorove 3y ago
    Related critique of the BBC's use of C2PA, and C2PA in general: https://www.hackerfactor.com/blog/index.php?/archives/1024-IEEE,-BBC,-and-C2PA.html https://www.hackerfactor.com/blog/index.php?/archives/1024-I...
    - dns_snek 3y ago
      That was an interesting rabbit hole of articles, thanks. From an earlier article: [1] > At FotoForensics, I'm already seeing known fraud groups developing test pictures with C2PA metadata. (If C2PA was more widely adopted, I'm certain that some of these groups would deploy their forgeries right now.) > To reiterate: > * Without C2PA: Analysis tools can often identify forgeries, including altered metadata. > * With C2PA: Identifying forgeries becomes much harder. You have to convince the audience that valid, verifiable, tamper-evident 'authentication and provenance' that uses a cryptographic signature, and was created with the backing of big tech companies like Adobe, Microsoft, Intel, etc., is wrong. > Rather than eliminating or identifying fraud, C2PA enables a new type of fraud: forgeries that are authenticated by trust and associated with some of the biggest names on the tech landscape. [1] https://www.hackerfactor.com/blog/index.php?/archives/1013-C2PAs-Worst-Case-Scenario.html https://www.hackerfactor.com/blog/index.php?/archives/1013-C...
- pmayrgundter 3y ago
  Thanks for the ref! Checking it out
  - yieldcrv 3y ago
    C2PA would be better onchain so maybe you could do a proof of concept implementation of that
WJW 3y ago
Perhaps I am being too cynical, but how do you protect this scheme against hostile actors? Bits don't have color after all (see https://ansuz.sooke.bc.ca/entry/23 https://ansuz.sooke.bc.ca/entry/23 if you don't get this reference) and it would be fairly trivial to manually alter such media types to anything you want. For example if someone posts a `ai_edited(human_created(photo))` online, it would be straightforward to take the pixels of the photo and re-publish them as a "new" image with only the `human_created(photo)` tags. You could also randomly start adding `ai_edited` tags to things you want discredited, etc.
- pmayrgundter 3y ago
  Ah no problem. Just a sketch.. Looking at C2PA, I'd now use "claim" to describe those tags. They're short and human readable but not self-contained. They'd have to be authenticated with tool signing to be very useful. As it also emphasizes, it's about establishing trust for a domain, eg can Samsung photo signing be trusted? Eg for a normal photo, your device could sign it with.. and OTP coordinated with the manufacturer? Then include the signing metadata in the EXIF tags of the image. To validate, you send the image+signed_claims to manufacturer and they know the OTPs (?) and can verify the signing Doesn't make it unforgeable, bc you could intercept the hardware otp/signing protocol.. but would raise the cost quite a bit. Maybe with frequent key resets you can raise this further Something like that sounding more useful?
  - p1necone 3y ago
    The analogue hole makes this all pointless. Ultimately at some point down the chain there's regular camera sensors that can be replaced with anything you want.
    - dns_snek 3y ago
      Exactly. This won't stop any determined bad actor, if anything, it's just going to boost their credibility when they inevitably come up with a bypass that allows them to sign any piece of media as "authentic" (in a few days or weeks after a device implementing such a scheme is released). What then? 99.9% of honest actors are paying with their privacy[1] and usability again, while remaining 0.1% of dishonest actors are using a bypass - which sounds a lot like piracy and various DRM schemes. We've been here before, and it never works. [1] While this might not be an immediate goal, I think it's pretty obvious any such scheme would eventually be corrupted to encode a traceable device ID into every photo and video taken with the device - to protect the children and stop CSAM, of course!
ctrw 3y ago
Trying to parse recursive urls seems like it will break everything everywhere.

Retr0id 3y ago

What you're describing here is basically what C2PA is

xeyownt 3y ago
This C2PA looks flawed from the start. It just helps making the untrustworthy looks more trustworthy.
zerojames 3y ago
Reference, for context: https://c2pa.org/ https://c2pa.org/ And: the BBC just started using C2PA across some content. The BBC's R&D team talking about it: https://www.bbc.co.uk/rd/blog/2024-03-c2pa-verification-news-journalism-credentials https://www.bbc.co.uk/rd/blog/2024-03-c2pa-verification-news...
- rentnorove 3y ago
  Related critique of the BBC's use of C2PA, and C2PA in general: https://www.hackerfactor.com/blog/index.php?/archives/1024-IEEE,-BBC,-and-C2PA.html https://www.hackerfactor.com/blog/index.php?/archives/1024-I...
  - dns_snek 3y ago
    That was an interesting rabbit hole of articles, thanks. From an earlier article: [1] > At FotoForensics, I'm already seeing known fraud groups developing test pictures with C2PA metadata. (If C2PA was more widely adopted, I'm certain that some of these groups would deploy their forgeries right now.) > To reiterate: > * Without C2PA: Analysis tools can often identify forgeries, including altered metadata. > * With C2PA: Identifying forgeries becomes much harder. You have to convince the audience that valid, verifiable, tamper-evident 'authentication and provenance' that uses a cryptographic signature, and was created with the backing of big tech companies like Adobe, Microsoft, Intel, etc., is wrong. > Rather than eliminating or identifying fraud, C2PA enables a new type of fraud: forgeries that are authenticated by trust and associated with some of the biggest names on the tech landscape. [1] https://www.hackerfactor.com/blog/index.php?/archives/1013-C2PAs-Worst-Case-Scenario.html https://www.hackerfactor.com/blog/index.php?/archives/1013-C...
pmayrgundter 3y ago
Thanks for the ref! Checking it out
- yieldcrv 3y ago
  C2PA would be better onchain so maybe you could do a proof of concept implementation of that

WJW 3y ago

Perhaps I am being too cynical, but how do you protect this scheme against hostile actors? Bits don't have color after all (see https://ansuz.sooke.bc.ca/entry/23 https://ansuz.sooke.bc.ca/entry/23 if you don't get this reference) and it would be fairly trivial to manually alter such media types to anything you want. For example if someone posts a `ai_edited(human_created(photo))` online, it would be straightforward to take the pixels of the photo and re-publish them as a "new" image with only the `human_created(photo)` tags. You could also randomly start adding `ai_edited` tags to things you want discredited, etc.

pmayrgundter 3y ago
Ah no problem. Just a sketch.. Looking at C2PA, I'd now use "claim" to describe those tags. They're short and human readable but not self-contained. They'd have to be authenticated with tool signing to be very useful. As it also emphasizes, it's about establishing trust for a domain, eg can Samsung photo signing be trusted? Eg for a normal photo, your device could sign it with.. and OTP coordinated with the manufacturer? Then include the signing metadata in the EXIF tags of the image. To validate, you send the image+signed_claims to manufacturer and they know the OTPs (?) and can verify the signing Doesn't make it unforgeable, bc you could intercept the hardware otp/signing protocol.. but would raise the cost quite a bit. Maybe with frequent key resets you can raise this further Something like that sounding more useful?
- p1necone 3y ago
  The analogue hole makes this all pointless. Ultimately at some point down the chain there's regular camera sensors that can be replaced with anything you want.
  - dns_snek 3y ago
    Exactly. This won't stop any determined bad actor, if anything, it's just going to boost their credibility when they inevitably come up with a bypass that allows them to sign any piece of media as "authentic" (in a few days or weeks after a device implementing such a scheme is released). What then? 99.9% of honest actors are paying with their privacy[1] and usability again, while remaining 0.1% of dishonest actors are using a bypass - which sounds a lot like piracy and various DRM schemes. We've been here before, and it never works. [1] While this might not be an immediate goal, I think it's pretty obvious any such scheme would eventually be corrupted to encode a traceable device ID into every photo and video taken with the device - to protect the children and stop CSAM, of course!

ctrw 3y ago

Trying to parse recursive urls seems like it will break everything everywhere.