3 ms·
It's worth pointing out that we got lucky with a savvy tester stumbling on the backdoor in the dark. It wasn't anyone's job to find this backdoor, and arguably
by unethical_ban 3y ago
It's worth pointing out that we got lucky with a savvy tester stumbling on the backdoor in the dark. It wasn't anyone's job to find this backdoor, and arguably if it had been designed just a little better, no one would have noticed.
I wouldn't have gov't be maintainers of the main repos, but either be assigned to vetting critical repos, or mirroring them and co-maintaining copies endorsed for security (if I agreed gov't should be involved).
The ultimate questions is, are our critical systems (kernel, systemd, core userland) safe *enough* against future similar attacks, that we are okay trusting the global economy to another lucky valgrind test?
You incorrectly implied that a national security risk is "the potential of negative consequences in any sphere of human life". If we didn't get lucky, this could have been an economic and human catastrophe. That's not an inconvenience.
- Gormo 3y ago> It's worth pointing out that we got lucky with a savvy tester stumbling on the backdoor in the dark. I believe in Bayesian probability a lot more than I believe in luck. The fact that a random sysadmin investigating performance issues was able to rapidly unravel this whole thing is at least a minimal indicator that either (a) this particular attack was largely incompetent, and any of the many "savvy testers" in the community would have uncovered it within short order, but more sophisticated attacks might remain undetected, or (b) this was a sophisticated attack, and the community is generally resilient to this form of infiltration.