3 ms·
Agreed. More than that, there's not much of a way to preven these kinds of attacks, period, whether in software or otherwise, if the perpetrator is some intelli
by TeMPOraL 3y ago
Agreed. More than that, there's not much of a way to preven these kinds of attacks, period, whether in software or otherwise, if the perpetrator is some intelligence agency or such.
For threats lesser than a black op, the standard way of mitigating supply chain attacks in the civilized world is through contracts, courts, and law enforcement. I could, in theory, get a job at a local food manufacturer, and over the course of year or two, reach the point I could start adding poison to the products. But you're relatively confident that this won't happen, because should it ever did, the manufacturer will be smeared and sued and they'll be very quick to find me and hand me over to the police. That's how it works for pretty much everything; that's how trust is established at scale.
Two key components of that: having responsibility over quality/fitness for use of your product, and being able to pass the blame up to your suppliers, should you be the victim too. In other words: warranty and being an easily identifiable legal entity. Exactly the two components that Open Source development does away with. Software made by a random mix of potentially pseudoanonymous people, offered with zero warranties. This is, of course, also the reason OSS is so successful. Rapid, unstructured evolution. Can't have one without the other.
Or in short: the only way I see to properly mitigate these kinds of threats is to ditch OSS and make all software commercial again (and legally force vendors to stop with the "no warranty" clause in licensing). That doesn't seem like a worthwhile trade-off to me, though.
- coretx 3y agoCode is law. As such, the "standard way" you mention is appropriate for people with zero strategic foresight. There is no absolute need to depend on third parties to solve your problems and the possibility to limit and disperse trust to mostly yourself is real. Sure, glowies can always get to you but they can't get to you everywhere nor all the time. Security/Assurance models and both proprietary and free software architecture are already adapting to such facts.
- pixl97 3y ago>the only way I see to properly mitigate these kinds of threats is to ditch OSS and make all software commercial again (and legally force vendors to stop with the "no warranty" clause in licensing). Which just pushes the problem to commercial companies getting a 'friendly' national security letter they can't talk about to anyone stating they should add REDACTED to the library they provide.
- TeMPOraL 3y agoCorrect. Hence the disclaimer in my first paragraph, which could also be stated as the threat duality principle, per James Mickens[0]: "Basically, you’re either dealing with Mossad or not-Mossad. If your adversary is not-Mossad, then you’ll probably be fine if you pick a good password and don’t respond to emails from ChEaPestPAiNPi11s@virus-basket.biz.ru. If your adversary is the Mossad, YOU’RE GONNA DIE AND THERE’S NOTHING THAT YOU CAN DO ABOUT IT." -- [0] - https://www.usenix.org/system/files/1401_08-12_mickens.pdf https://www.usenix.org/system/files/1401_08-12_mickens.pdf