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The author argues that "computing device", like the Antikythera mechanism, which allow specific formulaic calculations have existed for thousands of years, thes

The author argues that "computing device", like the Antikythera mechanism, which allow specific formulaic calculations have existed for thousands of years, these devices were purpose made and allowed certain predetermined calculations to be performed automatically. This clearly applies to the Antikythera mechanism. The author then argues that this categorization is unhelpful as it obscures the line between a purpose made computing device and a general computing device. The arrival of such devices he places at the end of the 1930s with the Z1, which was not made to perform a specific algorithm, but which instead allowed for programmability. Very soon after rapid advances happened, which created the "computer" as a general purpose computing device. The Antikythera mechanism is essentially irrelevant to the point the author makes.

YeGoblynQueenne 3y ago
I understand the point they're making but it's wrong: a computer doesn't have to be universal, to be a computer, neither does having a fixed program, like the Antikythera mechanism, disqualify a device from being a computer. In the same sense, Turing Machines are not necessarily universal; Universal Turing Machines are. But there's no official or formal definition of what a "computer" is and the category is less crisp than the author is trying to make it. In the same way drawing a line between programmable and fixed-program computer is arbitrary and in fact the author spends much of the article dismissing Babbage's Analytical engine, which was a programmable computer, on the grounds it wasn't actually built; which is, of course, irrelevant, because a physical machine is not necessary for complete computation, as demonstrated by Ada Lovelace. In any case, the early days of modern computing (1930's- 1940's) were replete with a plethora of computing machinery of various architectures many of which were called "computers", without them being necessarily programmable computers; for example, the "Atanassoff-Berry Computer" [1]. __________________ [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Atanasoff%E2%80%93Berry_computer https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Atanasoff%E2%80%93Berry_comput...
- constantcrying 3y ago
  Did you read the article? Universality is explicitly rejected as a criterion. The point is there is a fundamental difference between a computing device which performs a single algorithm and a computer which can perform programmed algorithms.
  - YeGoblynQueenne 3y ago
    How about a device that can perform more than one computation then? e.g. the Antikythera mechanism could calculate the motion of the planets, and, separately, eclipses. Universality is the only characteristic that makes a difference, but I think the author avoids this because they don't want to be caught up in debates about whether modern computers are truly universal. The article is trying to make the distinction between what is, and isn't a "computer" sound crisp and exact, when it's arbitrary and ad-hoc.
    - benterix 3y ago
      Yes, more or less. To quote another commenter in another thread, " an open definition of what a computer is, is too inclusive and uninteresting if you want to talk about the history of actual computers".

YeGoblynQueenne 3y ago

I understand the point they're making but it's wrong: a computer doesn't have to be universal, to be a computer, neither does having a fixed program, like the Antikythera mechanism, disqualify a device from being a computer. In the same sense, Turing Machines are not necessarily universal; Universal Turing Machines are. But there's no official or formal definition of what a "computer" is and the category is less crisp than the author is trying to make it. In the same way drawing a line between programmable and fixed-program computer is arbitrary and in fact the author spends much of the article dismissing Babbage's Analytical engine, which was a programmable computer, on the grounds it wasn't actually built; which is, of course, irrelevant, because a physical machine is not necessary for complete computation, as demonstrated by Ada Lovelace. In any case, the early days of modern computing (1930's- 1940's) were replete with a plethora of computing machinery of various architectures many of which were called "computers", without them being necessarily programmable computers; for example, the "Atanassoff-Berry Computer" [1]. __________________ [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Atanasoff%E2%80%93Berry_computer https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Atanasoff%E2%80%93Berry_comput...

constantcrying 3y ago
Did you read the article? Universality is explicitly rejected as a criterion. The point is there is a fundamental difference between a computing device which performs a single algorithm and a computer which can perform programmed algorithms.
- YeGoblynQueenne 3y ago
  How about a device that can perform more than one computation then? e.g. the Antikythera mechanism could calculate the motion of the planets, and, separately, eclipses. Universality is the only characteristic that makes a difference, but I think the author avoids this because they don't want to be caught up in debates about whether modern computers are truly universal. The article is trying to make the distinction between what is, and isn't a "computer" sound crisp and exact, when it's arbitrary and ad-hoc.
  - benterix 3y ago
    Yes, more or less. To quote another commenter in another thread, " an open definition of what a computer is, is too inclusive and uninteresting if you want to talk about the history of actual computers".