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These lessons aren't forgotten, Japan is as aware of its geography as the Netherlands are of theirs. Instead tradeoffs are made. The same way people near fore

These lessons aren't forgotten, Japan is as aware of its geography as the Netherlands are of theirs. Instead tradeoffs are made. The same way people near forests get their house burned down but rebuild at the same place because they can afford it. Or we deplete underground water because stopping it would be an uphill political battle etc. I can't imagine any recent catastrophe where the core cause of it would be sheer ignorance of the potential for risk.

deleted 3y ago
[deleted]
thih9 3y ago
About “I can't imagine any recent catastrophe where the core cause of it would be sheer ignorance of the potential for risk.”, there are a lot of recent examples. E.g.: https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Surfside_condominium_collapse https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Surfside_condominium_collaps... > The problems had been reported in 2018 and noted as "much worse" in April 2021. https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flint_water_crisis https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flint_water_crisis > Prior to August 2014, additional chlorine had been added to eliminate bacteria from the Flint River. (...) Following this test, the MDEQ placed Flint on violation notice but did not reveal the information to residents until January 2015. https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Grenfell_Tower_fire https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Grenfell_Tower_fire > Both the aluminium-polyethylene cladding and the PIR insulation plates failed fire safety tests conducted after the fire, according to the police. https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/2020_Beirut_explosion https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/2020_Beirut_explosion > A cargo of 2,750 tonnes of [ammonium nitrate] (equivalent to around 1.1 kilotons of TNT) had been stored in a warehouse without proper safety measures for the previous six years after having been confiscated by Lebanese authorities from the abandoned ship MV Rhosus.
pintxo 3y ago
Are they? The Fukushima nuclear power plant should never have been build at that location OR at least should have received a more proper protection against tsunamis. They clearly forgot/ignored the historical knowledge of much higher tsunamis.
- makeitdouble 3y ago
  There's two things going on for nuclear plants in Japan: - they need water, tons and tons of water, and there's only mountains inland. So any nuclear plant will be on the shore, where tsunamis will hit first. - there is no safe place from natural disaster. Even building a miracle plant on a mountain top would still leave it vulnerable to seisms, typhoons and land slides. All things considered, the main issue is how much the nuclear plant is suppose to be resistant to tsunamis and earthquakes, and the higher the threshold the crazier the expenses become. For Fukushima, it was a classic example of design failure (failsafes were supposed to work except they were badly designed, and there was too few of them), and no proper reaction to earlier warnings of the system in place being too weak. In a way, all the blame is clearly on TEPCO however we put it: https://www.e-education.psu.edu/earth107/node/1426 https://www.e-education.psu.edu/earth107/node/1426
  - pintxo 3y ago
    > https://www.e-education.psu.edu/earth107/node/1426 https://www.e-education.psu.edu/earth107/node/1426 Given the learning checkpoint below that page alone, I have to question the quality of the information presented there. How can "It is hard to assess how much money to spend on those policies; it might depend on the budget, priorities, politics, etc." be the correct/useful answer to "How should governments address low-probability hazard events with potentially devastating consequences? How would you assess how much money is too much money to spend to reduce the likelihood of a highly unlikely event? Please select the correct answer." I mean, it's such a generic answer, it feels like it's been LLM generated.
  - pintxo 3y ago
    > For Fukushima, it was a classic example of design failure (failsafes were supposed to work except they were badly designed, and there was too few of them), and no proper reaction to earlier warnings of the system in place being too weak. In a way, all the blame is clearly on TEPCO however we put it: There's always at least two parties in a regulated environment like nuclear power. The government setting the baseline requirements and the operator adhering to them. I have not enough inside to say who to blame. On the other hand TEPCO is state owned, right, so maybe you should never set your own requirements when it comes to nuclear safety?

deleted 3y ago

[deleted]

thih9 3y ago

About “I can't imagine any recent catastrophe where the core cause of it would be sheer ignorance of the potential for risk.”, there are a lot of recent examples. E.g.: https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Surfside_condominium_collapse https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Surfside_condominium_collaps... > The problems had been reported in 2018 and noted as "much worse" in April 2021. https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flint_water_crisis https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flint_water_crisis > Prior to August 2014, additional chlorine had been added to eliminate bacteria from the Flint River. (...) Following this test, the MDEQ placed Flint on violation notice but did not reveal the information to residents until January 2015. https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Grenfell_Tower_fire https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Grenfell_Tower_fire > Both the aluminium-polyethylene cladding and the PIR insulation plates failed fire safety tests conducted after the fire, according to the police. https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/2020_Beirut_explosion https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/2020_Beirut_explosion > A cargo of 2,750 tonnes of [ammonium nitrate] (equivalent to around 1.1 kilotons of TNT) had been stored in a warehouse without proper safety measures for the previous six years after having been confiscated by Lebanese authorities from the abandoned ship MV Rhosus.

pintxo 3y ago

Are they? The Fukushima nuclear power plant should never have been build at that location OR at least should have received a more proper protection against tsunamis. They clearly forgot/ignored the historical knowledge of much higher tsunamis.

makeitdouble 3y ago
There's two things going on for nuclear plants in Japan: - they need water, tons and tons of water, and there's only mountains inland. So any nuclear plant will be on the shore, where tsunamis will hit first. - there is no safe place from natural disaster. Even building a miracle plant on a mountain top would still leave it vulnerable to seisms, typhoons and land slides. All things considered, the main issue is how much the nuclear plant is suppose to be resistant to tsunamis and earthquakes, and the higher the threshold the crazier the expenses become. For Fukushima, it was a classic example of design failure (failsafes were supposed to work except they were badly designed, and there was too few of them), and no proper reaction to earlier warnings of the system in place being too weak. In a way, all the blame is clearly on TEPCO however we put it: https://www.e-education.psu.edu/earth107/node/1426 https://www.e-education.psu.edu/earth107/node/1426
- pintxo 3y ago
  > https://www.e-education.psu.edu/earth107/node/1426 https://www.e-education.psu.edu/earth107/node/1426 Given the learning checkpoint below that page alone, I have to question the quality of the information presented there. How can "It is hard to assess how much money to spend on those policies; it might depend on the budget, priorities, politics, etc." be the correct/useful answer to "How should governments address low-probability hazard events with potentially devastating consequences? How would you assess how much money is too much money to spend to reduce the likelihood of a highly unlikely event? Please select the correct answer." I mean, it's such a generic answer, it feels like it's been LLM generated.
- pintxo 3y ago
  > For Fukushima, it was a classic example of design failure (failsafes were supposed to work except they were badly designed, and there was too few of them), and no proper reaction to earlier warnings of the system in place being too weak. In a way, all the blame is clearly on TEPCO however we put it: There's always at least two parties in a regulated environment like nuclear power. The government setting the baseline requirements and the operator adhering to them. I have not enough inside to say who to blame. On the other hand TEPCO is state owned, right, so maybe you should never set your own requirements when it comes to nuclear safety?