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There could potentially be many things you would not want to commit to git. Binary files and generated files come to mind. There could also be transformations o
by xorcist 3y ago
There could potentially be many things you would not want to commit to git. Binary files and generated files come to mind. There could also be transformations of code for performance or portability reasons. Or ones that require huge third party dependencies that are only used to the build script.
There are many potential reasons to publish a release tarball where some of these steps are already done. It could be done in a reproducible way. Look at sqlite for an example of an extremely well maintained open source library that publishes not one but two source code tarballs for various stages of the build.
These calls to change source code distribution just because it was a small part of the attack vector in this particular case seems misguided to me. It may still be a good idea but only as part of a much larger effort for reproducible builds. In itself it would accomplish nothing, apart from a wake of uncertainty that would only make future attacks easier. Especially in this case, where the maintainer could have acted in a number of other ways, and indeed did. The entirety of the backdoor was added in a regular git commit a long time ago.