3 ms·

Well, I just meant that Spinoza was a Jewish heretic, not a Christian heretic (at least, no more than say, Mohammad), since the discussion was about Christian h

Well, I just meant that Spinoza was a Jewish heretic, not a Christian heretic (at least, no more than say, Mohammad), since the discussion was about Christian heresies specifically. The encyclical only discusses pantheism rather than Spinoza---I don't know that pantheism is specifically Spinoza's invention. Of course, no doubt that Spinoza wouldn't be considered a conforming Christian by any Christian church, but not just because he wrote "Deus sive Natura" (the extent to which Spinoza's thought on the relationship between God and creation is incompatible with classical theism is up for debate, it seems to me. See the interesting comments by /u/wokeupabug here - https://old.reddit.com/r/askphilosophy/comments/nar433/how_did_spinozas_ideas_about_god_challenge_the/ https://old.reddit.com/r/askphilosophy/comments/nar433/how_d...).

082349872349872 3y ago
Thanks for the wokeupabug comments; very interesting! Now I am mediating on the contrast between "God created the best possible Creation" and "God creates all possible Creations" (Spinoza opting for the latter on omnipotence grounds; being limited to creating an element of the lattice is less potent than creating an ideal of the lattice). This seems to imply an infinite lattice* of Creations, for in a finite lattice, we could always identify the possible Creations with their principal Creation? * yes, I haven't defined either meet or join of Creations; please bear with me on this point... EDIT: forgot "panentheism"; IIUC: theism: God & Creation = ∅ panentheism: God & Creation = Creation pantheism: God = Creation I don't know if theologians have a word for it, but the most general situation would be that both (God & Creation) and (God ^ Creation) may take on values other than God, Creation, and ∅.
- knightoffaith 3y ago
  Right - but "God creates all possible Creations" is true for Spinoza but only in the sense that for Spinoza there is only one possible creation, the one that we are living in now, so God creates the only possible creation. As in, there are no possible potential realities for Spinoza---the only possible world is the one that we're living in. And so for Spinoza, God's omnipotence is expressed through his actualization of creation---that is, roughly speaking, it's not just that God could do anything that is possible, it's that God is willing everything that is possible right now, because the only possible way for things to be is the way things are (this is what wokeupabug means when he talks about Spinoza's conflation of God's power and will). This is, to be sure, something that classical theists would quarrel with. --------- For your edit: I don't know about "God & Creation = empty set", it depends on what exactly you mean by that. Classical theists say that all things don't exist independently, but exist in/through/from God (the prepositions vary). What exactly does that mean? Well, a lot of ink has been spilled fleshing out what the relationship between God and creation is, and people have had various ideas on what it is. It seems to me to be an oversimplification to categorize things neatly into theism/pantheism/panentheism without further clarification; these things are complicated. It's been said of Aquinas (certainly a little-o orthodox theologian), apparently, that he's the closest you can be to being a pantheist without being a pantheist.
  - 082349872349872 3y ago
    OK, how about this model: God (being a Proper god) could create inconsistent worlds, but will not (and the only consistent world is our own). Would this model be true for both Spinoza and for classical theists? ---- for my edit; the formalisations were attempts to convey (although I agree they're probably oversimplifications) the following general ideas: God & Creation = ∅ (the Creator and the Creation are distinct; nothing is part of both) God & Creation = Creation is equivalent to God ⊇ Creation (the Creation is part of the Creator) God = Creation is equivalent to (God ⊇ Creation ∧ Creation ⊇ God) (the Creation and the Creator equivale: they may be freely substituted in a proof)
    - knightoffaith 3y ago
      In general, Spinoza and classical theists do not think God's omnipotence means he can create inconsistent worlds (e.g. he cannot create square circles); omnipotence (for them) means that God can do anything that is logically possible. For Spinoza, he thinks this means that only our current world is logically possible, because if there were other worlds that God didn't actualize, Spinoza thinks this would imply God's lack of omnipotence. For Aquinas, a classical theist, see Article 5 in this section of the Summa [0]. For Leibniz (not a classical theist, but having heavy disagreements with Spinoza), God could create other worlds like Aquinas, but unlike Aquinas, thinks this means that this world is the best of all possible worlds, which is why God actualizes this world as opposed to other possible worlds (Aquinas thinks otherwise - see article 6 of [0]). For your edit, it's not clear exactly what "nothing is part of both" means in the context of God and his creation. I know it seems like I'm being needlessly difficult and pedantic, but the issue is that God is a being unlike any other. So much so that Aquinas would say that my latter statement is technically false - God is not a being, rather, he is the sheer act of "to be" itself. And so spelling out the relationship between God and beings is tricky---what exactly does it mean for a being to be part of/have being through/exist in/have being from something that isn't strictly speaking a being? Those prepositional phrases, when used in relation to God, clearly have a very different meaning than when we use them to characterize the relation of two beings, e.g. a leaf and a tree. That is all to say: classical theists may not disagree with "creation is a part of God" depending on how they interpret "part of"---if this means "creation has its being in God", then this is something perfectly agreeable to them. [0]: https://www.newadvent.org/summa/1025.htm https://www.newadvent.org/summa/1025.htm

082349872349872 3y ago

Thanks for the wokeupabug comments; very interesting! Now I am mediating on the contrast between "God created the best possible Creation" and "God creates all possible Creations" (Spinoza opting for the latter on omnipotence grounds; being limited to creating an element of the lattice is less potent than creating an ideal of the lattice). This seems to imply an infinite lattice* of Creations, for in a finite lattice, we could always identify the possible Creations with their principal Creation? * yes, I haven't defined either meet or join of Creations; please bear with me on this point... EDIT: forgot "panentheism"; IIUC: theism: God & Creation = ∅ panentheism: God & Creation = Creation pantheism: God = Creation I don't know if theologians have a word for it, but the most general situation would be that both (God & Creation) and (God ^ Creation) may take on values other than God, Creation, and ∅.

knightoffaith 3y ago
Right - but "God creates all possible Creations" is true for Spinoza but only in the sense that for Spinoza there is only one possible creation, the one that we are living in now, so God creates the only possible creation. As in, there are no possible potential realities for Spinoza---the only possible world is the one that we're living in. And so for Spinoza, God's omnipotence is expressed through his actualization of creation---that is, roughly speaking, it's not just that God could do anything that is possible, it's that God is willing everything that is possible right now, because the only possible way for things to be is the way things are (this is what wokeupabug means when he talks about Spinoza's conflation of God's power and will). This is, to be sure, something that classical theists would quarrel with. --------- For your edit: I don't know about "God & Creation = empty set", it depends on what exactly you mean by that. Classical theists say that all things don't exist independently, but exist in/through/from God (the prepositions vary). What exactly does that mean? Well, a lot of ink has been spilled fleshing out what the relationship between God and creation is, and people have had various ideas on what it is. It seems to me to be an oversimplification to categorize things neatly into theism/pantheism/panentheism without further clarification; these things are complicated. It's been said of Aquinas (certainly a little-o orthodox theologian), apparently, that he's the closest you can be to being a pantheist without being a pantheist.
- 082349872349872 3y ago
  OK, how about this model: God (being a Proper god) could create inconsistent worlds, but will not (and the only consistent world is our own). Would this model be true for both Spinoza and for classical theists? ---- for my edit; the formalisations were attempts to convey (although I agree they're probably oversimplifications) the following general ideas: God & Creation = ∅ (the Creator and the Creation are distinct; nothing is part of both) God & Creation = Creation is equivalent to God ⊇ Creation (the Creation is part of the Creator) God = Creation is equivalent to (God ⊇ Creation ∧ Creation ⊇ God) (the Creation and the Creator equivale: they may be freely substituted in a proof)
  - knightoffaith 3y ago
    In general, Spinoza and classical theists do not think God's omnipotence means he can create inconsistent worlds (e.g. he cannot create square circles); omnipotence (for them) means that God can do anything that is logically possible. For Spinoza, he thinks this means that only our current world is logically possible, because if there were other worlds that God didn't actualize, Spinoza thinks this would imply God's lack of omnipotence. For Aquinas, a classical theist, see Article 5 in this section of the Summa [0]. For Leibniz (not a classical theist, but having heavy disagreements with Spinoza), God could create other worlds like Aquinas, but unlike Aquinas, thinks this means that this world is the best of all possible worlds, which is why God actualizes this world as opposed to other possible worlds (Aquinas thinks otherwise - see article 6 of [0]). For your edit, it's not clear exactly what "nothing is part of both" means in the context of God and his creation. I know it seems like I'm being needlessly difficult and pedantic, but the issue is that God is a being unlike any other. So much so that Aquinas would say that my latter statement is technically false - God is not a being, rather, he is the sheer act of "to be" itself. And so spelling out the relationship between God and beings is tricky---what exactly does it mean for a being to be part of/have being through/exist in/have being from something that isn't strictly speaking a being? Those prepositional phrases, when used in relation to God, clearly have a very different meaning than when we use them to characterize the relation of two beings, e.g. a leaf and a tree. That is all to say: classical theists may not disagree with "creation is a part of God" depending on how they interpret "part of"---if this means "creation has its being in God", then this is something perfectly agreeable to them. [0]: https://www.newadvent.org/summa/1025.htm https://www.newadvent.org/summa/1025.htm