3 ms·
As soon as you've lost the db, with low-entropy inputs like these, you should assume that the plaintext has been compromised and should treat it as such, especi
by pxx 3y ago
As soon as you've lost the db, with low-entropy inputs like these, you should assume that the plaintext has been compromised and should treat it as such, especially if your "security" corresponds to under a billion hash computations. It doesn't count as "Defense in depth" when the layer is as thin as tissue paper.
If you actually do care (and you still don't really want to), there is actually a regimented way to do this instead of the ad-hoc nonsense that you propose. Add a service-specific salt embedded in an HSM; this is sometimes known as a "pepper". You still would probably consider resetting everybody even in this case if you lost the DB, though.
- anonym29 3y agoI'm not asserting that what I've proposed is all that should be done, and my post was not meant to be exhaustive, just offering some extra DiD tips when it comes to hashing, salting. My suggestions are to mitigate the impact of precomputed lookup tables, forcing adversaries to crack the hashes themselves, and offering defenders a slight information advantage in circumstances where an adversary gets access to a database, but not source code, which really isn't that obscure or unusual of a situation.