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There was a recent discussion right here on HN about "trading trust": https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=39394990 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=3939499

by jgeada 3y ago

There was a recent discussion right here on HN about "trading trust": https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=39394990 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=39394990 Basically, many of these companies took decades to reach these positions where they're trusted. A bunch of managers rightfully figured out this was an asset that could be easily traded away for increased profits and they'd be gone by the time anyone noticed the devastation they left behind.

FooBarBizBazz 3y ago
Also called "brand harvesting". (If you built the brand yourself and did this all intentionally, I think it could also simply be called "the long con".)
- CamperBob2 3y ago
  "Exit scam," just on a longer timeline than usual.
  - galangalalgol 3y ago
    How do companies not have a defense against this? It seems rampant. Is it just more visible for some reason?
    - wpietri 3y ago
      Which companies? The ones who had quality and lost it? There's not a lot of defense against being purchased on the open market, as happened with Boeing. Or Simmons is another good example: https://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/05/business/economy/05simmons.html https://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/05/business/economy/05simmon... The real problem here is the US's dominant business culture, which tends to value short-term cash extraction over long-term value creation. There are a lot of practical incentives for that, but the culture problem itself will have a lot of inertia, so I think we're going to have to look for a generational change.
      - IG_Semmelweiss 3y ago
        Stockholders always want the company to survive, over short term profits. The problem is that stockholder interests are not the same as the custodian interests. Custodians get paid on the basis of inmediate performance. Thats the broken link. Custodians are thus nominating board members that are incentivized by short term decision making. The nomination is based on relationships and based on trust. And then you get in trouble. If board members were elected as a sort of election by ultimate stockholders (which include actual employees, in fact) you would see a different board. Therefore different CEO.
    - jnwatson 3y ago
      It is a variation of the principal-agent problem [1]. It is extraordinarily hard to perfectly align the long term interests of shareholders and employees. It requires a level of oversight that most boards can't manage. 1. https://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/principal-agent-problem.asp https://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/principal-agent-problem...

by jgeada 3y ago

FooBarBizBazz 3y ago

Also called "brand harvesting". (If you built the brand yourself and did this all intentionally, I think it could also simply be called "the long con".)

CamperBob2 3y ago
"Exit scam," just on a longer timeline than usual.
- galangalalgol 3y ago
  How do companies not have a defense against this? It seems rampant. Is it just more visible for some reason?
  - wpietri 3y ago
    Which companies? The ones who had quality and lost it? There's not a lot of defense against being purchased on the open market, as happened with Boeing. Or Simmons is another good example: https://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/05/business/economy/05simmons.html https://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/05/business/economy/05simmon... The real problem here is the US's dominant business culture, which tends to value short-term cash extraction over long-term value creation. There are a lot of practical incentives for that, but the culture problem itself will have a lot of inertia, so I think we're going to have to look for a generational change.
    - IG_Semmelweiss 3y ago
      Stockholders always want the company to survive, over short term profits. The problem is that stockholder interests are not the same as the custodian interests. Custodians get paid on the basis of inmediate performance. Thats the broken link. Custodians are thus nominating board members that are incentivized by short term decision making. The nomination is based on relationships and based on trust. And then you get in trouble. If board members were elected as a sort of election by ultimate stockholders (which include actual employees, in fact) you would see a different board. Therefore different CEO.
  - jnwatson 3y ago
    It is a variation of the principal-agent problem [1]. It is extraordinarily hard to perfectly align the long term interests of shareholders and employees. It requires a level of oversight that most boards can't manage. 1. https://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/principal-agent-problem.asp https://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/principal-agent-problem...