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Right. It's not like the ship owners (or, more saliently, their insurers) want things like this to happen. Second-guessing the marine engineers in this case is

Right. It's not like the ship owners (or, more saliently, their insurers) want things like this to happen. Second-guessing the marine engineers in this case is like the people post-9/11 who argued that future buildings should be designed to withstand the impact of a wide-body jetliner fully loaded with fuel. It's basically not a serious argument.

vkou 3y ago
Neither the insurers nor the owners of the ship will be on the hook for the full set of damages this inflicted. Thanks to that, they aren't performing an accurate cost/benefit analysis.
jordanb 3y ago
Really recommend you read Tankership Tromedy which was written by a marine engineer. You don't even have to find a copy, the author put a PDF on the internet: http://martrans.org/documents/2006/safety/The%20_tankership_tromedy.pdf http://martrans.org/documents/2006/safety/The%20_tankership_...
- Turing_Machine 3y ago
  This was written in 2006, so it clearly does not take any data from this incident into account. Even if it were written today, it would not be based on any real data -- it's far too soon for that. The bridge has been there for nearly 50 years, in a port that handles around 50 million tons of cargo every year. It seems pretty clear that whatever the cause, it was an extremely rare incident.
  - rramadass 3y ago
    You should have browsed the book. See https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=39836079 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=39836079
    - Turing_Machine 3y ago
      I don't need to browse the book to understand that a book from 2006 can't possibly have any data from an incident that happened yesterday, and that no conclusions can possibly be rendered at this time about the causes of this specific accident.
      - myself248 3y ago
        People are telling you to read the book because, yes, it has a ton of perspective on the long-standing market and regulatory forces that shape the environment that almost certainly led to this specific incident. Understanding how loss-of-power incidents happen, why ships are built the way they are, how flags-of-convenience affect the standards to which ships are maintained and inspected, how ship builders, owners, lessees, operators, crews, and regulators interact, YES, all of those things are extremely relevant to understanding the present situation. If someone made a landscape painting today using the wet-on-wet technique, would you argue that a Bob Ross episode from years ago couldn't possibly tell us anything about it? That's silly. It's precisely applicable. Mr. Ross himself might not describe the specific location of today's trees or clouds, but he can darn sure tell you how the brush strokes add up to make a tree. Actually he's probably one of the world experts on precisely that. Proclaiming your ignorance of extremely-well-researched expert sources is not a good look.
      - rramadass 3y ago
        Don't be so mule-headed. While it is true that the investigation into the causes of the disaster is just starting and we don't yet have a definite conclusion, user "jordanb" has done a great service in pointing us to a book written by a domain expert which had pointed out fundamental design flaws in the design of Tankers long ago. Design Flaws have no expiry date until they are acknowledged and fixed properly. In an era of disinformation/misinformation and focusing solely on profits it is important that people be shown some factual data by actual engineers/experts who were very much concerned with safety and how all concerns were flouted by concerned companies/authorities. Just like the Boeing disasters have shone the spotlight on Civilian Aeroplane Safety, this disaster shines a spotlight on Tanker Safety, arguably a far far more important topic since almost all the world trade of goods and oil is dependent on them exclusively.
  - Eisenstein 3y ago
    > It seems pretty clear that whatever the cause, it was an extremely rare incident. It may be rare in the lifetime of the bridge, but if there is a variable which has change (or is moving) then that isn't so important a consideration. For example, if container ships have recently become much larger in relation to the design requirements in place at the time of the bridge's construction.
- rramadass 3y ago
  Great resource which allows one to get an idea of the issues involved in Tanker safety. Thank You for posting the link. Just browsed the book and immediately found "the smoking gun" in the preface itself! Mandate twin screw in the form of two fully independent engine rooms. Under the current system, 99.5% of all tankers, however large, are single screw. These ships are always a single failure away from being helplessly adrift. The book presents evidence, never before public, that there are at least ten total loss of power incidents on tankers every day. Twin screw, properly implemented, would reduce this failure rate by more than a factor of one thousand. Twin screw would also drastically improve tanker low speed maneuverability which is implicated in a number of big spills including the Aegean Sea shown on the cover.

vkou 3y ago

Neither the insurers nor the owners of the ship will be on the hook for the full set of damages this inflicted. Thanks to that, they aren't performing an accurate cost/benefit analysis.

jordanb 3y ago

Really recommend you read Tankership Tromedy which was written by a marine engineer. You don't even have to find a copy, the author put a PDF on the internet: http://martrans.org/documents/2006/safety/The%20_tankership_tromedy.pdf http://martrans.org/documents/2006/safety/The%20_tankership_...

Turing_Machine 3y ago
This was written in 2006, so it clearly does not take any data from this incident into account. Even if it were written today, it would not be based on any real data -- it's far too soon for that. The bridge has been there for nearly 50 years, in a port that handles around 50 million tons of cargo every year. It seems pretty clear that whatever the cause, it was an extremely rare incident.
- rramadass 3y ago
  You should have browsed the book. See https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=39836079 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=39836079
  - Turing_Machine 3y ago
    I don't need to browse the book to understand that a book from 2006 can't possibly have any data from an incident that happened yesterday, and that no conclusions can possibly be rendered at this time about the causes of this specific accident.
    - myself248 3y ago
      People are telling you to read the book because, yes, it has a ton of perspective on the long-standing market and regulatory forces that shape the environment that almost certainly led to this specific incident. Understanding how loss-of-power incidents happen, why ships are built the way they are, how flags-of-convenience affect the standards to which ships are maintained and inspected, how ship builders, owners, lessees, operators, crews, and regulators interact, YES, all of those things are extremely relevant to understanding the present situation. If someone made a landscape painting today using the wet-on-wet technique, would you argue that a Bob Ross episode from years ago couldn't possibly tell us anything about it? That's silly. It's precisely applicable. Mr. Ross himself might not describe the specific location of today's trees or clouds, but he can darn sure tell you how the brush strokes add up to make a tree. Actually he's probably one of the world experts on precisely that. Proclaiming your ignorance of extremely-well-researched expert sources is not a good look.
    - rramadass 3y ago
      Don't be so mule-headed. While it is true that the investigation into the causes of the disaster is just starting and we don't yet have a definite conclusion, user "jordanb" has done a great service in pointing us to a book written by a domain expert which had pointed out fundamental design flaws in the design of Tankers long ago. Design Flaws have no expiry date until they are acknowledged and fixed properly. In an era of disinformation/misinformation and focusing solely on profits it is important that people be shown some factual data by actual engineers/experts who were very much concerned with safety and how all concerns were flouted by concerned companies/authorities. Just like the Boeing disasters have shone the spotlight on Civilian Aeroplane Safety, this disaster shines a spotlight on Tanker Safety, arguably a far far more important topic since almost all the world trade of goods and oil is dependent on them exclusively.
- Eisenstein 3y ago
  > It seems pretty clear that whatever the cause, it was an extremely rare incident. It may be rare in the lifetime of the bridge, but if there is a variable which has change (or is moving) then that isn't so important a consideration. For example, if container ships have recently become much larger in relation to the design requirements in place at the time of the bridge's construction.
rramadass 3y ago
Great resource which allows one to get an idea of the issues involved in Tanker safety. Thank You for posting the link. Just browsed the book and immediately found "the smoking gun" in the preface itself! Mandate twin screw in the form of two fully independent engine rooms. Under the current system, 99.5% of all tankers, however large, are single screw. These ships are always a single failure away from being helplessly adrift. The book presents evidence, never before public, that there are at least ten total loss of power incidents on tankers every day. Twin screw, properly implemented, would reduce this failure rate by more than a factor of one thousand. Twin screw would also drastically improve tanker low speed maneuverability which is implicated in a number of big spills including the Aegean Sea shown on the cover.