4 ms·
Telegram's Peer-to-Peer Login system is a risky way to save $5 a month
- Nextgrid 3y agoThe only bit of information this leaks to the recipient is that you're a Telegram user and opted into this feature. Otherwise, it's no different to someone randomly typing your phone number in and texting you? What is the risk exactly? If someone wanted to spam/harass/etc people, he can do that by just mashing 10 random digits in the dialler UI and repeat until he gets a successful call/text through, or lookup their country's number range allocations to narrow down to a specific carrier/etc.
- lxgr 3y agoSomebody could resell some of the received OTP codes (or just get them siphoned off their phone by malware without knowing it) to facilitate account compromises.
- TillE 3y agoThe article focuses on social risks, but isn't this just a gaping MITM hole? If we're talking about text messages, they're not encrypted.
- gosho 3y agoTelegram itself is not encrypted, unless you use the somewhat obscure "secret chat" feature, which few people if any use
- Nextgrid 3y agoThis has nothing to do with Telegram chats, it’s about sending verification SMSes (either for new user number verification or 2FA).
- lxgr 3y agoIt has a lot to do with it: Since Telegram is not encrypted and additionally stores all chat history server-side, a compromised login process has a much higher impact since it also compromises past message content, not just those received after the breach.
- Nextgrid 3y agoIt could be that the login process is two-way, first establish a session and get a token, then a 2FA code is sent which needs to be presented alongside that session secret, thus an attacker merely having a 2FA code (without the associated session token) can’t use it.
- lxgr 3y agoMaybe there is an optional way to enable multifactor auth for Telegram, but in my experience it isn’t the default at least: Receiving and entering the SMS-OTP is everything I need for full account access, including to historic messages.
- Nextgrid 3y agoYes, my point is that internally the client could be first obtaining a session token and then requesting a 2FA code, and then submitting both. This means an MITM that only has the code wouldn’t be able to complete the flow.
- lxgr 3y agoHow is the session token distributed? What prevents the attacker from just requesting one themselves?
- Nextgrid 3y agoThe attacker can of course initiate a new login flow (thus getting a session token), but this is rate-limited, would invalidate the previous flow, might alert the user (if the user is logged in on other devices, they get notifications when someone tries to login) and relies on this MITM being picked to send the 2FA code to the user again (they might only use one sender per receiver to thwart this attack, or use IP/fingerprint heuristics to avoid pairing potential attackers & victims together).
- lxgr 3y ago