3 ms·

Thinking about this, I observe that the problem of the factors of security is in fact tied to the problem of identifying someone : If you can prove that "someon

by d-lisp 3y ago

Thinking about this, I observe that the problem of the factors of security is in fact tied to the problem of identifying someone : If you can prove that "someone/something" is "you", then you are giving "someone/something" the permissions to act as "you". There are lots of tricks we invented to evade the problem; I am pretty sure our common knowledge (yours and mine) of these tricks includes the one about "knocking three time on the door in a specific rythm" or the one about "You will ask this specific question and I will answer with that exact sentence". I would like to enquire about the problems of security and identification; cannot we do better than what we're currently doing, and why is it that any effort we do aiming for better resembles these tricks I talked about ? What's funny about this problems is the fact that in the context of everyday life, you sometimes prove that you are you by showing e.g. an ID card to a police officer. If I had a twin, that twin could do a lot of things as me, he could do nice things, but he could also do bad things. What would stop my twin from being identified as me by others would be the fact e.g. he doesn't possess my ID card; but a card can be stolen (OTP). My evil twin could also be suspected of not being me if for example, he didn't know something people know I know; it could also be mistaken for silliness, but okay. He could learn everything I know, or be spying on me enough so that he knows what I know (Password). When no one doubts about you being you, it means that everyone agrees with the fact that you are yourself, i.e. every "party" identify you as yourself, and the fact that every other party is identifying you as yourself makes individual parties even more sure that you are yourself. But on what evidences rely the third parties confidence in you being you ? How can you trust that third parties aren't corrupted or mistaken ? Take the most extreme case : you must tell if someone is lying or not about its identity AND if you're wrong, you die. I could trust third parties only if they brang some crucial facts; passwords and possession are unsignificant evidences in that context. But if the quantity of third party is enough, and if each third party knows a different passord AND if you know a different password AND the person to identify gave the correct answer for each and everyone of them, it is becoming more and more unprobable that the person is not the one they claimed to be. But I am not satisfied with this, there must be some more elegant and trustful way of identifying people. Now that we're able to imitate the voice, fingerprints, and etc... what other trick can we find that is not a trick ?

LegionMammal978 3y ago
One issue is that for asserting ownership of assets, society traditionally prefers a kind of identity broader than a physical individual: if "you" die, then an executor should be authorized to access all "your" assets to distribute them. (Imagine having to unlock a bank account with the thumbprint of a corpse!) The security model is that everyone expecting a share claims it, and if they disagree, then they duke it out in the courts with what evidence they have. And you must hope that no one can compellingly fake your death prematurely. But there's no first-principles solution for absolute security, short of an infallible death register and next-of-kin register.
- d-lisp 3y ago
  There must be an historical case where someone had to prove that they are not dead, no ?
  - LegionMammal978 3y ago
    Sure, but false positives and false negatives are inevitable, since there's no indicator of death that can't be spoofed or missing. The best you can do is to reduce false positives by requiring very strong evidence of death (and very weak evidence of being alive), or a very long interval of presumed death. In a perfect world, perhaps you could tack on a public insurance fund for wrongfully being considered dead. But in those cases, you get back to the issue of proving identity, since if you've been in a situation where you're presumed dead, you might not have anything left but your body. Also, such situations are rare enough that they'd be dwarfed by more mundane cases of others trying to claim the identities of the dead, so there would be net pressure to make proof-of-liveness more stringent.

by d-lisp 3y ago

LegionMammal978 3y ago

One issue is that for asserting ownership of assets, society traditionally prefers a kind of identity broader than a physical individual: if "you" die, then an executor should be authorized to access all "your" assets to distribute them. (Imagine having to unlock a bank account with the thumbprint of a corpse!) The security model is that everyone expecting a share claims it, and if they disagree, then they duke it out in the courts with what evidence they have. And you must hope that no one can compellingly fake your death prematurely. But there's no first-principles solution for absolute security, short of an infallible death register and next-of-kin register.

d-lisp 3y ago
There must be an historical case where someone had to prove that they are not dead, no ?
- LegionMammal978 3y ago
  Sure, but false positives and false negatives are inevitable, since there's no indicator of death that can't be spoofed or missing. The best you can do is to reduce false positives by requiring very strong evidence of death (and very weak evidence of being alive), or a very long interval of presumed death. In a perfect world, perhaps you could tack on a public insurance fund for wrongfully being considered dead. But in those cases, you get back to the issue of proving identity, since if you've been in a situation where you're presumed dead, you might not have anything left but your body. Also, such situations are rare enough that they'd be dwarfed by more mundane cases of others trying to claim the identities of the dead, so there would be net pressure to make proof-of-liveness more stringent.