I find this author's opinions written in bad faith and outright ignorance — if it's deliberate ignorance, that's even worse. > there aren’t many incentives in

I find this author's opinions written in bad faith and outright ignorance — if it's deliberate ignorance, that's even worse. > there aren’t many incentives in this scenario for Microsoft to really improve the security This is wrong, the incentives already exist through financial and legal means, and anyone who works in an enterprise with their sprawling estate can tell you that they are constantly working on security controls and tooling. The key thing to remember is the sprawling estate, more surfaces means more attack vectors, and patches. I hope a cybersecurity professional isn't equating more mitigations with a poor security posture. It's when things are silent that you ought to be terrified. > The FBI and the U.K.’s National Crime Agency, for example, have done a tremendous job of gaining access to things like the Tor hidden services that underpin attacker infrastructure, collecting evidence from them, and then shutting them down. > when Western authorities started “disrupting” ransomware crews Conveniently ignores that a lot of them work directly with MS to take down botnets and ransomware threat actors. No mention whatsoever of MS' role in this. I struggled to take any of this seriously, especially when it came to the pretentious I-am-very-smarter-than-you attitude. > as I looked around the room I couldn’t help wonder if the way to really deal with this problem would be found in a different venue ... perhaps at a capture-the-flag hacking contest being held in a dimly lit casino ballroom in Las Vegas.