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Thanks. I'll wait for your full reply, but very briefly: My position is that the existence/non-existence of regular laws, and the personality/impersonality of

Thanks. I'll wait for your full reply, but very briefly: My position is that the existence/non-existence of regular laws, and the personality/impersonality of the FC, have nothing to do with one another. As I stated earlier, event E would be compatible with the FC's personality/impersonality, and so is the universe we currently observe. I don't believe this is your position (and admit my precis of your views earlier may have been inaccurate). I think your position is that observation of the universe's regularity affects the question of God's personality, hence your insistence that this is an empirical question (which I deny). You said: > ... as a naturalist, I'm saying that given the laws of our universe (whatever they are) and the initial conditions, lions exist and unicorns don't and even God cannot change that. I'll freely agree that the former is from logic and hence necessarily true. But the later is just from empirical observations. And further up the thread : > ...it's all empirical. Yes, tomorrow unicorns could start popping into existence and then we'd have to revise what we think of the universe. But until then (this is crucial, my claims are contingent on observations), apriori natural laws seem to be able to explain everything we see. No personal God needed. And more recently > So this particular event [unicorn popping into existence], if it happened, would actually be in favor of a personal God! and > As a naturalist, my claim is that N is likely because we can explain the world using rules. We don't need a Divine explanation. All these quotes indicate that you think that the empirical observation P (in my prev comment) at least suggests Q (which = N). Or alternatively, that you think that the truth of P undermines the need for M. Again, my position is that P and M vs N have nothing to do with one another. (P and W are different, and we have been using terminology more like P for the past dozen or so comments, hence I discuss P here rather than W.)

sdht0 3y ago
I posted a quite long comment here: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=39795173 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=39795173 > the empirical observation P (in my prev comment) at least suggests Q (which = N). > Again, my position is that P and M vs N have nothing to do with one another. So the question we start with is, why do you think M is correct? You agree that you and the book are asserting Claim1, i.e, W can only be explained by a personal God (= M) with 100% certainty? One answer you've mentioned is: only M can explain why concepts such as lions exist and unicorns don't. My counterpoint then is to bring in P and say: P also explains why concepts exists or doesn't exist. Thus, we don't need M to be true and Claim1 is incorrect. Since P can entirely explain everything we see, the certainty of M is eliminated, thus leading to the possibility of N (= Q). Hence, M or N. Nitpick: P is part of W. W is everything we see. Causes. Parts. And regularity.
- sdht0 3y ago
  Actually, can you explain more why you think P is not implying N? EDIT: I may have been using P incorrectly when I meant FC=rules. See below. --- P = Our universe is regular to a high degree of accuracy. P is a provisional truth. It is true and no one can deny it today. If there is a God, no one deny that He chose to create a universe that is regular. But the fact that it is true today doesn't mean it will remain true tomorrow. Question: what FC is able to cause a universe whose observers see P. There are probably infinite possibilities, but let's focus on the two interesting ones to us: A1: FC=base_rules. P is emergent out of base_rules. N is true. A2: FC=God. He chose to actualize base_rules. P is emergent out of base_rules. M is true. In both cases, FC is a brute-force Truth. The book claims that only and only A2 is possible. I'm claiming that A1 is also possible. If P were not true (unicorns popping in), then it will harder to justify A1, though not impossible as you pointed out. But since P is true as of today, positing A1 is more straightforward. I'm further claiming that as long as P is true, A2 is in fact unnecessary as it is adding one extra thing when it is not needed to explain P, but we don't need to get into that. I'm content just showing that A2 is not the only logical possibility. -- I'm not saying we observe regularity and thus FC=rules. In a sense, I'm saying the opposite. In any universe where FC=rules, its observers will definitely observe P. Thus our observation of P makes FC=rules a good possibility. And I think then it's clear that FC=rules is mindless N. -- The book is making a claim of logical truth: W -> M, that is, if "the observations of our world" then "FC has free will", because only M can explain what we see => N is impossible. But something is shown to be a logical truth only when all other possibilities are eliminated right? Is N, i.e, a FC without will, able to explain everything we see? My answer is yes, since we would definitely observe P in a universe where FC=rules. And if my claim that this is a valid possibility is correct, then W -> M is not true. So a concrete goal for natural theology is to be able to find at least one observation of our world that FC=rules cannot explain, even in principle. Apart from the foundational examples such as resurrection, I think last frontier in this regard is consciousness, but of course here too I think rules is all there is, even though we have a lot way to go in being able to say how. I'd like to hear your thoughts on this point. You have already raised some good questions: "how can we explain lions but not unicorns" or "why these rules and not others". I think I have good answers to these at least to my satisfaction, if not yours. But would be glad if you can raise more pinpointing issues against FC=rules that will reveal a gap in my understanding.

sdht0 3y ago

I posted a quite long comment here: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=39795173 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=39795173 > the empirical observation P (in my prev comment) at least suggests Q (which = N). > Again, my position is that P and M vs N have nothing to do with one another. So the question we start with is, why do you think M is correct? You agree that you and the book are asserting Claim1, i.e, W can only be explained by a personal God (= M) with 100% certainty? One answer you've mentioned is: only M can explain why concepts such as lions exist and unicorns don't. My counterpoint then is to bring in P and say: P also explains why concepts exists or doesn't exist. Thus, we don't need M to be true and Claim1 is incorrect. Since P can entirely explain everything we see, the certainty of M is eliminated, thus leading to the possibility of N (= Q). Hence, M or N. Nitpick: P is part of W. W is everything we see. Causes. Parts. And regularity.

sdht0 3y ago
Actually, can you explain more why you think P is not implying N? EDIT: I may have been using P incorrectly when I meant FC=rules. See below. --- P = Our universe is regular to a high degree of accuracy. P is a provisional truth. It is true and no one can deny it today. If there is a God, no one deny that He chose to create a universe that is regular. But the fact that it is true today doesn't mean it will remain true tomorrow. Question: what FC is able to cause a universe whose observers see P. There are probably infinite possibilities, but let's focus on the two interesting ones to us: A1: FC=base_rules. P is emergent out of base_rules. N is true. A2: FC=God. He chose to actualize base_rules. P is emergent out of base_rules. M is true. In both cases, FC is a brute-force Truth. The book claims that only and only A2 is possible. I'm claiming that A1 is also possible. If P were not true (unicorns popping in), then it will harder to justify A1, though not impossible as you pointed out. But since P is true as of today, positing A1 is more straightforward. I'm further claiming that as long as P is true, A2 is in fact unnecessary as it is adding one extra thing when it is not needed to explain P, but we don't need to get into that. I'm content just showing that A2 is not the only logical possibility. -- I'm not saying we observe regularity and thus FC=rules. In a sense, I'm saying the opposite. In any universe where FC=rules, its observers will definitely observe P. Thus our observation of P makes FC=rules a good possibility. And I think then it's clear that FC=rules is mindless N. -- The book is making a claim of logical truth: W -> M, that is, if "the observations of our world" then "FC has free will", because only M can explain what we see => N is impossible. But something is shown to be a logical truth only when all other possibilities are eliminated right? Is N, i.e, a FC without will, able to explain everything we see? My answer is yes, since we would definitely observe P in a universe where FC=rules. And if my claim that this is a valid possibility is correct, then W -> M is not true. So a concrete goal for natural theology is to be able to find at least one observation of our world that FC=rules cannot explain, even in principle. Apart from the foundational examples such as resurrection, I think last frontier in this regard is consciousness, but of course here too I think rules is all there is, even though we have a lot way to go in being able to say how. I'd like to hear your thoughts on this point. You have already raised some good questions: "how can we explain lions but not unicorns" or "why these rules and not others". I think I have good answers to these at least to my satisfaction, if not yours. But would be glad if you can raise more pinpointing issues against FC=rules that will reveal a gap in my understanding.