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That's sort of outside the threat model though, isn't it? If an attacker can install a root cert, the entire thing is compromised. If you're concerned about th
by jcalvinowens 3y ago
That's sort of outside the threat model though, isn't it? If an attacker can install a root cert, the entire thing is compromised.
If you're concerned about that and want to pin, why have a chain of trust at all? Couldn't you just embed self-signed certs in the binary at that point?
If you mean preventing users from clicking through the SSL warnings in a browser if they're being MITM'd, that makes sense to me.
- toast0 3y ago> If you're concerned about that and want to pin, why have a chain of trust at all? Couldn't you just embed self-signed certs in the binary at that point? Not if you need to serve https traffic to clients and browsers from the same servers / same hostnames. > If you mean preventing users from clicking through the SSL warnings in a browser if they're being MITM'd, that makes sense to me. That comes from HSTS, not from cert pinning. Cert pinning in browsers is only available if you can convince the browser to include it in their static lists, which means you've got to be big... so that is what it is.
- jcalvinowens 3y ago> Not if you need to serve https traffic to clients and browsers from the same servers / same hostnames That's what I was getting at, that makes sense to me. > That comes from HSTS, not from cert pinning. HSTS is a terrible half assed solution that relies on adding domains to magical predistributed lists. I wouldn't trust it if I cared enough about MITM to go to all this trouble.
- toast0 3y ago> HSTS is a terrible half assed solution that relies on adding domains to magical predistributed lists. I wouldn't trust it if I cared enough about MITM to go to all this trouble. Sure, but cert pinning in browsers is done with the same magical redistributed lists; it's just even harder to get them changed.