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Pinning the site cert (or its key) is not great because it makes it very hard to rotate your certificate or key. And you've got to be able to do that, in case
by toast0 3y ago
Pinning the site cert (or its key) is not great because it makes it very hard to rotate your certificate or key.
And you've got to be able to do that, in case your key is disclosed or possibly disclosed.
Pinning intermediates doesn't make a lot of sense; unless you have a deep relationship with the CA, they can and do change intermediates, and may not be able to issue from the old intermediate after the change. But, I've been involved in cert pinning where we had to pin intermediates, because that's the only viable information the client API returned we could use for pinning (and really, it was pinning based on the name of the intermediate --- any system trusted Root CA could have made an intermediate specifically to bypass our pinning, but it was the best we could do on that platform; of course, this was also the platform where we ended up with a wrong pin in our final build (platform owner shut down their app signing CA), which meant some ugly workarounds).
Pinning roots makes sense, but you need to pin more than one. And roots from more than one organization. And you need a succession plan. You can't use a new root on an existing hostname until all of the deployed clients with pins that could use that hostname have become irrelevant. If your all your trusted CAs stop issuing, you're pretty screwed.
You can sometimes use an in-house root, which makes continuity easier, but not if you need to share hostnames with browsers. You can't get an entity cert signed by two issuers, so there's no way to present a cert that is trusted by browsers and also signed by your root. You can present alternate paths for the issuers of your cert (and any intermediates) and if the x.509 libraries do the right thing, any valid path is accepted; but not all libraries do the right thing, and again, that doesn't apply to the entity cert.
- jcalvinowens 3y agoAbsolutely, I agree with everything you said. Pinning is not an effective anti-reverse-engineer technique. It's just annoying obfuscation to anybody who knows what they're doing.
- toast0 3y agoPinning isn't really for anti-revere-engineering. It does discourage some reverse engineers, which is a bonus. But it's main purpose is to protect data integrity between the client and the server --- there's plenty of cases of CAs in system root stores that issued certs that could be used to intercept and manipulate traffic. There's also plenty of cases where something installed on the user's device adds itself to the system root store and intercepts traffic with the intent of passing it through but does not do so correctly and causes hard to diagnose errors. A pinned cert makes it easy to detect these MITMs and refuse to work if they're in place. A dedicated reverse engineer is "just" going to patch out the pin, and go on with their day, no big deal. But ISP MITM or corporate MITM or on device MITM is going to be stopped, and that's worthwhile.
- jcalvinowens 3y agoThat's sort of outside the threat model though, isn't it? If an attacker can install a root cert, the entire thing is compromised. If you're concerned about that and want to pin, why have a chain of trust at all? Couldn't you just embed self-signed certs in the binary at that point? If you mean preventing users from clicking through the SSL warnings in a browser if they're being MITM'd, that makes sense to me.
- toast0 3y ago> If you're concerned about that and want to pin, why have a chain of trust at all? Couldn't you just embed self-signed certs in the binary at that point? Not if you need to serve https traffic to clients and browsers from the same servers / same hostnames. > If you mean preventing users from clicking through the SSL warnings in a browser if they're being MITM'd, that makes sense to me. That comes from HSTS, not from cert pinning. Cert pinning in browsers is only available if you can convince the browser to include it in their static lists, which means you've got to be big... so that is what it is.
- jcalvinowens 3y ago> Not if you need to serve https traffic to clients and browsers from the same servers / same hostnames That's what I was getting at, that makes sense to me. > That comes from HSTS, not from cert pinning. HSTS is a terrible half assed solution that relies on adding domains to magical predistributed lists. I wouldn't trust it if I cared enough about MITM to go to all this trouble.
- toast0 3y ago> HSTS is a terrible half assed solution that relies on adding domains to magical predistributed lists. I wouldn't trust it if I cared enough about MITM to go to all this trouble. Sure, but cert pinning in browsers is done with the same magical redistributed lists; it's just even harder to get them changed.