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> I also don't go around having intelligent conversations with chairs. It seems like your functional theory of consciousness is "thing that produces plausible
by ForHackernews 3y ago
> I also don't go around having intelligent conversations with chairs.
It seems like your functional theory of consciousness is "thing that produces plausible English output," which is, I might gently suggest, a bit flawed.
Why is ChatGPT "conscious" for you but DALL-E is not? They're both big honking pattern-matching generators trained on lots of data. Why isn't ELIZA conscious, according to your theory? (or is it?)
- naasking 3y ago> It seems like your functional theory of consciousness is "thing that produces plausible English output," which is, I might gently suggest, a bit flawed. My functional theory of consciousness is that it's not at all implausible that any system capable of conversing intelligently might be conscious, which is perfectly reasonable. > Why is ChatGPT "conscious" for you but DALL-E is not? I never claimed DALL-E was not conscious. It very well could be as well, just in a different way than ChatGPT.
- ForHackernews 3y agoThis is like the argument from magic, no? For you, any sufficiently complex system that responds to language might be conscious? Are babies less conscious than ChatGPT to you?