4 ms·

This is basically Cartesian dualism, which posits that the mind can be detached and conceived independently from the body... which I'm not convinced. Without a

This is basically Cartesian dualism, which posits that the mind can be detached and conceived independently from the body... which I'm not convinced. Without any perception or relation to the physical world, and without memory or language, you wouldn't really "exist".

smnplk 3y ago
I'm leaning more towards idealism than dualism. I think that there is no other thing but the mind. All that we call physical is a mental process. At least to me that is the ontology that makes the most sense. But i don't find it too comforting.
- tmnvix 3y ago
  I feel the same way, but I actually take some comfort from it. Not to get too woo woo on you, but personal experience suggests to me that it is possible to be conscious without having an ego or sense of self and that a state of mind where that is largely absent is characterised by a lack of distinction between the vestigal self and everything else. I'm not dismissive of the idea that consciousness doesn't necessarily exist 'in the brain' but is in fact a fundamental part of the universe.
  - smnplk 3y ago
    This is exactly what I experienced once when I passed out. So to me is not hard to imagine being conscious without the presence of ego or any form of relation to anything else. What makes me a bit scared is the big unknown.
- thfuran 3y ago
  >All that we call physical is a mental process Surely you mean that the other way around.
  - smnplk 3y ago
    No. According to analytical idealism, what we perceive as physical, is just an image of some mental process observed across dissociative boundary.
tmnvix 3y ago
I have to agree in a sense. Maybe one thing necessary for having a 'sense of self' is the ability to recognise and reflect on how you relate to other things. The experiment described seems to be implying that having no such relationships but still the ability is enough. I don't think it is. Following on from this, do LLMs have this ability or is it more likely that they simply appear to? Even if some form of AI could recognise and reflect on how it relates to other things, what is there to differentiate how it treats relationships between other things and relationships between itself and other things? Could you not just program it to define 'itself' as some other node in that network of relationships, and wouldn't that just invalidate any argument that it ever really has a sense of self? Obviously I'm just thinking out loud here and assuming that a 'sense of self' is a necessary part of any definition for consciousness.

smnplk 3y ago

I'm leaning more towards idealism than dualism. I think that there is no other thing but the mind. All that we call physical is a mental process. At least to me that is the ontology that makes the most sense. But i don't find it too comforting.

tmnvix 3y ago
I feel the same way, but I actually take some comfort from it. Not to get too woo woo on you, but personal experience suggests to me that it is possible to be conscious without having an ego or sense of self and that a state of mind where that is largely absent is characterised by a lack of distinction between the vestigal self and everything else. I'm not dismissive of the idea that consciousness doesn't necessarily exist 'in the brain' but is in fact a fundamental part of the universe.
- smnplk 3y ago
  This is exactly what I experienced once when I passed out. So to me is not hard to imagine being conscious without the presence of ego or any form of relation to anything else. What makes me a bit scared is the big unknown.
thfuran 3y ago
>All that we call physical is a mental process Surely you mean that the other way around.
- smnplk 3y ago
  No. According to analytical idealism, what we perceive as physical, is just an image of some mental process observed across dissociative boundary.

tmnvix 3y ago

I have to agree in a sense. Maybe one thing necessary for having a 'sense of self' is the ability to recognise and reflect on how you relate to other things. The experiment described seems to be implying that having no such relationships but still the ability is enough. I don't think it is. Following on from this, do LLMs have this ability or is it more likely that they simply appear to? Even if some form of AI could recognise and reflect on how it relates to other things, what is there to differentiate how it treats relationships between other things and relationships between itself and other things? Could you not just program it to define 'itself' as some other node in that network of relationships, and wouldn't that just invalidate any argument that it ever really has a sense of self? Obviously I'm just thinking out loud here and assuming that a 'sense of self' is a necessary part of any definition for consciousness.