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> Unless you're trying to use them to enforce hardware DRM for you Oh FFS ! Not everything has to bubble down to the same old FLOSS claptrap you know ! > Lac

> Unless you're trying to use them to enforce hardware DRM for you Oh FFS ! Not everything has to bubble down to the same old FLOSS claptrap you know ! > Lack of attestation is a good thing. Had you read a few of the comments before posting, you would have learnt that regulated environments and sensitive use cases are two of many concepts that you would do well to think about before jumping on your "stick it to the man, no DRM !" bandwagon. The Financial Sector is a low-hanging fruit example. If I'm trusting you to put on million-dollar trades, then I damn well want to know its you at the computer and not some Russian hacker who has has inevitably exfiltrated your credentials which were stored in software with Passkeys. If I give you a Yubikey: - I can force you to enter a password to "arm" it for use every time, no caching - I can force you to physically touch it to execute the transaction - Through hardware attestation I can know it is your Yubikey that I gave you - I can force it to lock the key if the wrong password is entered too many times - If you loose your Yubikey, I can kill access - Many other things... Time and time again software has shown us that you cannot trust it with secrets. That's why HSMs exist, that's why Yubikeys exist. The modern world is a scary place in terms of security, hardware attestation is a CRITICAL part of the security onion.

josephcsible 3y ago
> I'm trusting you to put on million-dollar trades, then I damn well want to know its you at the computer and not some Russian hacker who has has inevitably exfiltrated your credentials which were stored in software with Passkeys. In such a high-value environment, you could buy the YubiKey, provision an account for me registered to it, then give it to me. That would give you the assurance you want without needing remote attestation. Also, if Russian hackers had enough access to my computer to steal my software passkeys, couldn't they just wait for me to start a valid session with my YubiKey and then use that session to do whatever they wanted? > - I can force you to enter a password to "arm" it for use every time, no caching > - I can force you to physically touch it to execute the transaction > - Through hardware attestation I can know it is your Yubikey that I gave you > - I can force it to lock the key if the wrong password is entered too many times > - If you loose your Yubikey, I can kill access > - Many other things... Those are downsides, not upsides, because of the mixing of "I" and "you". I should be able to decide my own risk tolerance levels for access to my own accounts. You shouldn't get to decide them for me. > Time and time again software has shown us that you cannot trust it with secrets. That's why HSMs exist, that's why Yubikeys exist. Sure, that's a good argument for hardware secret storage. But not for attestation. It's a good thing that I have the ability to use HSMs and YubiKeys for access to my accounts, but if I don't want to, other people shouldn't be able to force me to.

josephcsible 3y ago

> I'm trusting you to put on million-dollar trades, then I damn well want to know its you at the computer and not some Russian hacker who has has inevitably exfiltrated your credentials which were stored in software with Passkeys. In such a high-value environment, you could buy the YubiKey, provision an account for me registered to it, then give it to me. That would give you the assurance you want without needing remote attestation. Also, if Russian hackers had enough access to my computer to steal my software passkeys, couldn't they just wait for me to start a valid session with my YubiKey and then use that session to do whatever they wanted? > - I can force you to enter a password to "arm" it for use every time, no caching > - I can force you to physically touch it to execute the transaction > - Through hardware attestation I can know it is your Yubikey that I gave you > - I can force it to lock the key if the wrong password is entered too many times > - If you loose your Yubikey, I can kill access > - Many other things... Those are downsides, not upsides, because of the mixing of "I" and "you". I should be able to decide my own risk tolerance levels for access to my own accounts. You shouldn't get to decide them for me. > Time and time again software has shown us that you cannot trust it with secrets. That's why HSMs exist, that's why Yubikeys exist. Sure, that's a good argument for hardware secret storage. But not for attestation. It's a good thing that I have the ability to use HSMs and YubiKeys for access to my accounts, but if I don't want to, other people shouldn't be able to force me to.