5 ms·

Quite well put, thank you. > And in a universe where unicorns popped into existence at random points in history, the same would apply -- the FC would be causin

by sdht0 3y ago

Quite well put, thank you. > And in a universe where unicorns popped into existence at random points in history, the same would apply -- the FC would be causing such things, but how would we know that it is choosing to do so? So this particular event, if it happened, would actually be in favor of a personal God! For lions, we can trace a history from big bang to earth to life to evolution to lions, everything consistently explained by emergence. Popping into existence would violate conservation laws for example and would make it more likely that a personal God is causing unicorns, not impersonal laws. The second paragraph seems closer to what I have in mind. But I'm not sure what the contradiction is between the two paragraphs. To me, "the FC's role is limited to making this theoretical history an actual history" seems to be a variation of "FC is one set of rules out of infinite logical possibilities, that governs the universe's behavior." Perhaps you can clarify a bit more? The bigger picture: my discussion of logical possibilities and FC as rules is mainly in response to "certain concepts (lions, gravity) are willed into existence, and continue to be so willed here and now; and certain other concepts (anti-gravity, unicorns) are not." or "there is nothing about a lion as such that makes it real." as you wrote a while back. And I am positing that instead of saying "God causes their existence from moment to moment", we can say: the axiomatic rules (physical laws + initial conditions) of our universe causes their existence from moment to moment. And everything else was to try show how axiomatic rules can cause the concept of lions without referring to one particular arrangement of particles or something in human minds. Side note: even if there is a personal God, it seems to still be the case that God chose to create a universe based on a set of rules, because it is consistent with what we observe, right? A personal God can still intervene as He wishes (and presumably did at least once), in the same way that I can arbitrarily intervene at any generation of the Game of Life to change the state without any regard to the rules. But in general, I only need to make sure the computer is running, but otherwise let the rules do their thing. In the same way, we can say God is letting the universe do its thing based on its rules. But of course in this case, He can change the rules anytime, say by bringing unicorns into existence tomorrow even if they are not implied by the rules. > IN BOTH CASES: the ruleset determines everything that will happen subsequently, including the existence of the lion & gravity and the non-existence of the unicorn & anti-gravity. Yes. "Why lions and not unicorns" is explained by axiomatic rules of our universe, and "why these axiomatic rules and not something else" is explained by the First Cause.

geye1234 3y ago
I think the contradiction is as follows: In the first paragraph, the ruleset is distinct from the FC; the FC simply actualizes the ruleset. It makes the theoretical history an actual history. In the second paragraph, the ruleset is the FC. (If I could, I would strike out the part "or chooses one set of rules", since it muddies the issue, and makes the second appear more like the first). So case 1: the FC actualizes the rules, but is distinct from them; in case 2, the FC is identified with the rules. To me that seems a contradiction. > So this particular event, if it happened, would actually be in favor of a personal God! For lions, we can trace a history from big bang to earth to life to evolution to lions, everything consistently explained by emergence. Popping into existence would violate conservation laws for example and would make it more likely that a personal God is causing unicorns, not impersonal laws. I don't know that this follows. Suppose the unicorn popped into existence (let's call this event E). There would be nothing to stop you saying that before time T1, the FC was unable to perform E; but at T1, it was able to do so. And you could say the same thing about conservation of energy, the consistency of emergence, etc etc. So the existence of events such as E would not imply a "willing" FC. You could equally well say that events such as E are, nonetheless, acting according to the FC's necessary actions. Likewise, the fact that things behave in observably regular ways does not, of itself, imply that the FC is bound to act in a certain way. I would be wrong to use this as an argument in favour of the FC's freedom. Like if I were to say "we know God exists because things act in certain ways, and therefore we can see God is constantly willing them to do so", it would obviously be faulty. And similarly, if event E happened, it would be no argument in my favour. So there is no connection between the regularity of the universe, and necessity on the FC's part. So your position cannot arise from empirical considerations; and therefore the following statement, insofar as it claims to be empirical, is faulty: > given the axioms of mathematics, 2+2=4 is true and not even God can change that. In the same way, as a naturalist, I'm saying that given the laws of our universe (whatever they are) and the initial conditions, lions exist and unicorns don't and even God cannot change that. I'll freely agree that the former is from logic and hence necessarily true. But the later is just from empirical observations. There is a further problem, though. Let's grant your position that > the axiomatic rules (physical laws + initial conditions) of our universe causes [lions'] existence from moment to moment. Of all the possible rulesets that could exist, why this one and not another? (Or if multiverses exist, why this ruleset in our universe?) There are infinite (or at least very many) logical possibilities and therefore infinite or very many possible rulesets. Why this one? We agree that there is no logical necessity about the ruleset being what it is. For me, it's easy to say that God willed such a ruleset out of the infinite ones He could have willed. (To will something just is to bring about X instead of Y, where X contradicts Y, but where X and Y are both possibilities prior to the actualisation of one of them.) Since you have no recourse to willing, what is it about the FC that makes it be (or makes it actualise) one set of rules instead another? Why is it X rather than Y? We agree that logic is prior to the existence of the universe, so any answer implying that logic doesn't apply here will not be accepted :-) On that subject, do you think logic precedes the FC? I don't think your position allows logic to be 'downstream', so to speak, of the FC, so I think your argument implies this. But I want to hear your thoughts on this before continuing. I had to write this in a hurry so hopefully I haven't missed something. Again, I haven't forgotten the talk of hydrogen and oxygen, hopefully will have time to return to it at some point :-)

by sdht0 3y ago

geye1234 3y ago

I think the contradiction is as follows: In the first paragraph, the ruleset is distinct from the FC; the FC simply actualizes the ruleset. It makes the theoretical history an actual history. In the second paragraph, the ruleset is the FC. (If I could, I would strike out the part "or chooses one set of rules", since it muddies the issue, and makes the second appear more like the first). So case 1: the FC actualizes the rules, but is distinct from them; in case 2, the FC is identified with the rules. To me that seems a contradiction. > So this particular event, if it happened, would actually be in favor of a personal God! For lions, we can trace a history from big bang to earth to life to evolution to lions, everything consistently explained by emergence. Popping into existence would violate conservation laws for example and would make it more likely that a personal God is causing unicorns, not impersonal laws. I don't know that this follows. Suppose the unicorn popped into existence (let's call this event E). There would be nothing to stop you saying that before time T1, the FC was unable to perform E; but at T1, it was able to do so. And you could say the same thing about conservation of energy, the consistency of emergence, etc etc. So the existence of events such as E would not imply a "willing" FC. You could equally well say that events such as E are, nonetheless, acting according to the FC's necessary actions. Likewise, the fact that things behave in observably regular ways does not, of itself, imply that the FC is bound to act in a certain way. I would be wrong to use this as an argument in favour of the FC's freedom. Like if I were to say "we know God exists because things act in certain ways, and therefore we can see God is constantly willing them to do so", it would obviously be faulty. And similarly, if event E happened, it would be no argument in my favour. So there is no connection between the regularity of the universe, and necessity on the FC's part. So your position cannot arise from empirical considerations; and therefore the following statement, insofar as it claims to be empirical, is faulty: > given the axioms of mathematics, 2+2=4 is true and not even God can change that. In the same way, as a naturalist, I'm saying that given the laws of our universe (whatever they are) and the initial conditions, lions exist and unicorns don't and even God cannot change that. I'll freely agree that the former is from logic and hence necessarily true. But the later is just from empirical observations. There is a further problem, though. Let's grant your position that > the axiomatic rules (physical laws + initial conditions) of our universe causes [lions'] existence from moment to moment. Of all the possible rulesets that could exist, why this one and not another? (Or if multiverses exist, why this ruleset in our universe?) There are infinite (or at least very many) logical possibilities and therefore infinite or very many possible rulesets. Why this one? We agree that there is no logical necessity about the ruleset being what it is. For me, it's easy to say that God willed such a ruleset out of the infinite ones He could have willed. (To will something just is to bring about X instead of Y, where X contradicts Y, but where X and Y are both possibilities prior to the actualisation of one of them.) Since you have no recourse to willing, what is it about the FC that makes it be (or makes it actualise) one set of rules instead another? Why is it X rather than Y? We agree that logic is prior to the existence of the universe, so any answer implying that logic doesn't apply here will not be accepted :-) On that subject, do you think logic precedes the FC? I don't think your position allows logic to be 'downstream', so to speak, of the FC, so I think your argument implies this. But I want to hear your thoughts on this before continuing. I had to write this in a hurry so hopefully I haven't missed something. Again, I haven't forgotten the talk of hydrogen and oxygen, hopefully will have time to return to it at some point :-)