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Ukraine is a special case. When the Soviet Union disintegrated, the Ukraine was left with the world’s 3rd largest nuclear weapons arsenal. They gave up every

Ukraine is a special case. When the Soviet Union disintegrated, the Ukraine was left with the world’s 3rd largest nuclear weapons arsenal. They gave up every single one of them in exchange for a promise from the western world to help them defend themselves from aggression. If we don’t live up to that promise, how can we ever hope to limit nuclear weapons proliferation anywhere else?

whimsicalism 3y ago
Ukraine did not have the codes to operate the weapons it gave up - so this was essentially costless. Moreso, most people did not consider Ukraine a true democracy in the 90s thru to Euromaidan Nonetheless I do think the non-proliferation argument is a good one for distinguishing the two cases, thanks.
- Kon-Peki 3y ago
  Had Ukraine kept them they probably would have eventually gained control. And we don’t have a legal obligation to their security, only a promise. But that makes what we are doing even more powerful, IMO
- philipkglass 3y ago
  There were 1,240 Soviet nuclear warheads stationed on Ukrainian territory when it gained independence in 1991 [1]. At the very least, these weapons could have been salvaged for their fissile materials (highly enriched uranium and weapons grade plutonium). Obtaining such fissile materials is about 90% of the effort of building nuclear weapons, and preventing the acquisition of them is about 90% of anti-proliferation efforts. I think that Ukraine could have easily deployed a nuclear deterrent in the 2010s if they had warehoused all those Soviet warheads in the 1990s. [1] https://www.nti.org/countries/ukraine/ https://www.nti.org/countries/ukraine/
- stouset 3y ago
  > Ukraine did not have the codes to operate the weapons it gave up - so this was essentially costless. This analysis seems a little thin. The codes to operate those weapons only really control the detonation sequence. At the end of the day, making new detonators from existing bombs is much less hard than collecting the fissile materials needed and assembling bombs from scratch.

whimsicalism 3y ago

Ukraine did not have the codes to operate the weapons it gave up - so this was essentially costless. Moreso, most people did not consider Ukraine a true democracy in the 90s thru to Euromaidan Nonetheless I do think the non-proliferation argument is a good one for distinguishing the two cases, thanks.

Kon-Peki 3y ago
Had Ukraine kept them they probably would have eventually gained control. And we don’t have a legal obligation to their security, only a promise. But that makes what we are doing even more powerful, IMO
philipkglass 3y ago
There were 1,240 Soviet nuclear warheads stationed on Ukrainian territory when it gained independence in 1991 [1]. At the very least, these weapons could have been salvaged for their fissile materials (highly enriched uranium and weapons grade plutonium). Obtaining such fissile materials is about 90% of the effort of building nuclear weapons, and preventing the acquisition of them is about 90% of anti-proliferation efforts. I think that Ukraine could have easily deployed a nuclear deterrent in the 2010s if they had warehoused all those Soviet warheads in the 1990s. [1] https://www.nti.org/countries/ukraine/ https://www.nti.org/countries/ukraine/
stouset 3y ago
> Ukraine did not have the codes to operate the weapons it gave up - so this was essentially costless. This analysis seems a little thin. The codes to operate those weapons only really control the detonation sequence. At the end of the day, making new detonators from existing bombs is much less hard than collecting the fissile materials needed and assembling bombs from scratch.