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There is a lot of the classical discussion on personal identity here. The argument about a copy being "identical to me but it's not me" is a very natural and i
by nova 14y ago
There is a lot of the classical discussion on personal identity here.
The argument about a copy being "identical to me but it's not me" is a very natural and intuitive reaction, but it's probably wrong. A very illuminating explanation is http://lesswrong.com/lw/pm/identity_isnt_in_specific_atoms http://lesswrong.com/lw/pm/identity_isnt_in_specific_atoms and related posts.
I'll try a personal approach: imagine a country with no computers, no photocopiers, no presses, and a very strict law that forbids making copies of books which is indoctrinated from birth. There is only one copy of each literary creation, guarded in the National Library.
We can imagine that the people of that country have a very hard time to distinguish between "The Lord of the Rings" in an abstract sense and material object #1434 stored in the second floor, section Fantasy. For them LOTR is just that set of paper and ink. Even if someone secretly made a copy, letter by letter, it will be "just a copy", not the "true" LOTR. That's quite obvious to them.
And in a sense that's a bit our current situation with people (not exactly, because books are static and people aren't). We can't scan people-as-information out of people-as-protein-body and store them as people-as-silicon-body, so we mix the concepts. But it's just confusion due to technological limitations.
So in a sense we DO have souls, but it's a mathematical or information-theoretical soul, not a metaphysical one. It's always bound to a material instantation, but that concrete physical manifestation is not the same as the dynamic, interactive information process a person is.
So if technology advances enough we'll be able to copy a person, and it'll make no sense to ask which of them is really "you". Both are.
- jterce 14y agoYes, of course both are. But still, you're only ever going to be conscious from the perspective contained within the original you. The copy may be mathematically identical, but it does not make sense that there would be any kind of a magical transition of consciousness from one to the other. The other "you" would have its own consciousness entirely separate from yours. I.e., if you copy yourself and kill the original, you will lose consciousness. You will not wake up.
- nova 14y agoWords fail me. Imagine I have a magical device with which I can "stop time", or more precisely, stop movement of all particles except mine. In the beginning I am at our right. I stop time, move leisurely to your left and resume time. What you see is me teleporting from your right to your left. You don't feel "trapped in a body who can't move", because your neurons are also magically frozen. Your consciousness feel continuous, even is you have been "suspended" for a while, because your memories are properly structured. Consciousness is not "something else", it is a property of your memories. (The blog post on lesswrong.com about timeless physics is important to see this point of view, I think, even if you don't buy the theory). So if my copy is mathematically identical then there is nothing else left. There is no extra consciousness stuff that the "original" has and the "copy" does not. Sorry, I really can't explain myself better. I'd suggest reading the link provided.
- koide 14y agoI will read what you suggest, but perhaps you can illustrate how would the sensation of identity will transfer from the physical body to the digital body? Because your example does not explain it.
- sofal 14y agoWhat is this "sensation of identity" and what makes you think that it is something that can't be duplicated, and instead has to be transferred?
- koide 14y agoIt could be duplicated, but then it would be a copy and not the one you currently have. I expect you can easily imagine this by picturing your copy uploaded to the simulator while you live and then running the simulation. Whatever the copy does after that you won't experience and it won't be part of your memories. If you say that's not the case and that you will experience and be aware of what the copy is doing, then you are proposing some sort of metaphysical connection between the two beings, which I find hard to swallow. I like this definition of identity: "A person's identity is defined as the totality of one's self-construal, in which how one construes oneself in the present expresses the continuity between how one construes oneself as one was in the past and how one construes oneself as one aspires to be in the future" http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Personal_identity_%28philosophy%29 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Personal_identity_%28philosophy... http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Identity_%28social_science%29 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Identity_%28social_science%29 http://www.psych-it.com.au/Psychlopedia/article.asp?id=76 http://www.psych-it.com.au/Psychlopedia/article.asp?id=76
- blake8086 14y agoIf you copy yourself, you will be creating two originals. They will both "wake up" and be "you".
- gmaslov 14y agoWell, I believe this line of thinking leads to the inescapable conclusion that consciousness is only an illusion.
- nova 14y agoConsciousness means different things. If by consciousness you mean introspection or self-modeling or something like that then consciousness is definitely real. But it's just a property that some minds have, and that someday will probably be analyzed and replicated in silico. But if you mean some kind of special conserved "essence" that makes you "you" in addition of your memories... then yes, it's probably just an illusion. Which is a disturbing thought, I admit.
- notJim 14y agoI think I might understand what you're saying. Let's say we can copy me. As in, we make another me (let's call him me* ) that is physically identical to me in every possible way. I believe your argument is that I will continue to be me, and me* will essentially be a different person. If I die, that's it. me* lives on, but I am not me* , I am me. The interesting question, which your parent (in the thread) posits an answer to, is what is the actual difference between me and me* ? If you believe that humans exist entirely within the physical world (as in, there's no mystical/religious/spiritual element to our existence--we're just matter and energy), then me and me* are no different. Suppose we go back to your idea, that we kill me after creating me* . Since I am purely a physical being, I have no way of distinguishing between me and me* . In particular, if you never told me that I am me* , I would have absolutely no way of distinguishing the difference between me and me* .
- olalonde 14y agoWouldn't me and me's consciousness diverge after a few hours experiencing different things in different places? If so, would me agree to suicide knowing that me is still alive?