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A lot of the benefits I see people proposing for blockchain systems - things like "an immutable log of real estate ownership that no-one can ever tamper with" -
by simonw 3y ago
A lot of the benefits I see people proposing for blockchain systems - things like "an immutable log of real estate ownership that no-one can ever tamper with" - look to me like they would be better handled by the certificate transparency log mechanism rather than by a proof-of-work/proof-of-stake blockchain.
- deleted 3y ago[deleted]
- ulrikrasmussen 3y agoI agree. I have been toying with the idea of a system where you have a set of participants who each have responsibilities for maintaining some state that users and other participants rely on. For example, a network of banks including a central bank, but the network could also include merchants who rely on the banks for payments and trusted third parties who keep track of agreements such as loan contracts. Instead of putting everything on a blockchain, make each participant be the sole writer for one or more ledgers (e.g. one ledger per account they maintain) and use a non-repudiable two-phase commit protocol to coordinate multiple transactions performed atomically across ledgers. Using the techniques from certificate transparency, as soon as a participant has published that they have performed a transaction on their ledger, then they cannot take that back again without an auditor finding out. They also cannot branch their ledgers (i.e. double spend) as long as all participants periodically gossip received transactions to the auditors. Or rather, they CAN, but the auditor will detect it eventually and have proof of it. What you get is a sort of multi-party SWIFT-like messaging system which doesn't require banks to change their basic accounting infrastructure and tokenize everything.
- kfreds 3y agoAbsolutely. The vast majority of such use cases are way better served by a transparency log than a blockchain. Imagine an embedded system that only accepts firmware updates that are digitally signed and discoverable in a public append-only log. Such a proof would have to be attached to the firmware update just like the digital signature, with a size constraint on the order of kilobytes. To be fair I haven't kept up-to-date with blockchains, but I find it hard to believe that any existing blockchain could solve this. Transparency logs can. I wonder when businesses that currently use blockchains as immutable logs will realise that there is a more cost-effective solution. One of the reasons it hasn't happened yet is because blockchains have magnitudes more mindshare than transparency logging. In fact, there doesn't seem to be that many people who deeply understand the design parameter space of transparency logs. Shameless plug: My colleagues and I have spent a few years designing one - Sigsum. As Filippo mentions he has contributed to its design as well.
- eudoxus 3y ago> To be fair I haven't kept up-to-date with blockchains, but I find it hard to believe that any existing blockchain could solve this. Transparency logs can. Any insight as to why you think blockchains can't handle this? The only fundemental difference between blockchains and transparency logs is the trust assumptions and censorship resistence. Its fairly easy to reason about a transparency log as a permissioned blockchain. Conversely, a blockchain could be seen as a permissionless transparency log.
- JanisErdmanis 3y ago> blockchain could be seen as a permissionless transparency log This is not the case. The essence of the transparency logs are thin clients which can do monitoring of the append only nature of the ledger. This allows accountability to be distributed more widelly wheras in blockchain one would need to retrieve the full ledger to do such testing. On the other hand the responsability of adding records to the ledger in transparency log lies to a single authorithy whereas in permissionless blockchain it lies to individuals who solve the puzzle. However in practice there is centralisation of the computation power making the record inclusion also centralised. The censorship resistance is somewhat a wicked problem. With transparency logs solve the by counter logging. In cases authorithy does not accepts a record it can be delivered to a counter authorithy. The counter authorithy also keeps records of main authorithy and thus users can eventually switch to it. This is though a manual process, but perhaps one can figure out a protocol to do such thing automatically.
- kfreds 3y agoSort-of. Here's how I think about it. The fundamental value of a transparency log is to provide trivial discoverability. Say an attacker has compromised a code signing key and is using it to sign a malicious software update. Let's also assume that the attacker can distribute this update to a client that will trust it. Such a targeted attack is not trivially discoverable by the software vendor if the client's trust policy only requires a code signing signature by the compromised key. If the client's trust policy were to also require a proof that the signature is included in a trusted transparency log, the software vendor can discover the attack if it monitors the log. Note that transparency logs doesn't directly prevent attacks - it makes them discoverable. Transparency systems based on transparency logs have five components: Log, Submitter, Client, Monitor and Auditor or Witness(es). The Log is a Merkle tree with its current root tree hash signed. In the example above the Client would be the software updating mechanism, which has a given Log in its trust policy. The Client will only trust a software update from the Submitter if the Submitter's signature and the update's hash are included in the Log. The Monitor regularly polls the Log for new entries it cares about, in this case software updates signed by the Submitter's public key. The Auditor is another party that regularly polls the Log, but the Auditor's job is not to discover log entries that constitute an attack. Instead, the Auditor's job is to monitor the Log's consistency - i.e. whether the log has removed any previously added entries. This is called a split-view attack, and it is a concern in all widely deployed transparency logs today. An alternative to Auditors is cosigning Witnesses, which proactively witness a Log's consistency, and whose witness signatures are required by the Client in order for it to trust the Log. This results in a much stronger threat model. See sigsum.org for more details on such a design. Getting back to your comment: - Yes, Clients are "thin", to use blockchain terminology, but they don't monitor the Log in order to detect attacks. The Log is part of their trust policy for making some trust decision, such as trusting a software update. Monitoring the Log for new entries that indicate e.g. key compromise is the Monitor's job. - Regarding accountability: The Client's trust policy in conjunction with the Log and the Monitor increases the Submitter's accountability to the Client. Similarly the Auditors or Witnesses increases the Log's accountability to Clients, Submitter and Monitors. - Regarding inclusion in the Log (or blockchain) I'd use the word "authority" as in who has the power to prevent something from being included. As you point out a transparency log is a central entity which has the sole power to decide what gets included or not. If the log is shut down, or its public key destroyed, nor more inclusions are possible. In this sense a blockchain is far more censorship-resistant than a transparency log. In other words, it is important that Clients trust multiple logs for redundancy. The consensus mechanism of a transparencty log is simply a public-key signature, as opposed to an emergent authority in the form of e.g. a distributed timestamp server based on SHA256. This vast difference in how the database's integrity is defined - the consensus mechanism - is why blockchains work better than transparency logs for censorship-resistant digital currency, whereas transparency logs work better than blockchains for efficient inclusion- and consistency proofs.
- benlivengood 3y agoYep; the only current advantage that blockchains have over current CT logs is trustable global transactions. This is a pretty powerful advantage, but the probabilistic certainty can be shifted from confirmation height to fraction of log inclusion and cost-of-revocation, e.g. transactions can be proposed in one or two logs and then confirmed by a supermajority of acceptable logs (to the transaction) once the ordering of potentially conflicting transactions is established within at least one log. E.g. double-spends are prevented by announcing a transaction with a TTL that is included in at least one log, such that no conflicting transaction appears within any other log before the TTL expires, at which point most/all logs accept the permanent transaction. Inclusion in a supermajority of logs provides the probabilistic likelihood of the transaction being durable (e.g. irreversible), and individual CT logs become invalid if they sign a later conflicting transaction. Economic incentives could be as simple as charging customers for inclusion of their transaction in the log with escrow to refund all customers if the CT log becomes invalid. This can be implemented as its own CT-log transaction because logs have an incentive to cooperate with each other on signing off on the successful completion of a valid CT log (after a year or whatever) so they all keep getting paid.