4 ms·

The "copy" becomes the "real" you because it has extended life. Both you and the "copy" consider yourselves to be the "real one" (or maybe you accept the coexis

by dmbass 14y ago

The "copy" becomes the "real" you because it has extended life. Both you and the "copy" consider yourselves to be the "real one" (or maybe you accept the coexistence), but you are going to die and the copies will live forever. You think: "That copy isn't me, ericb!" * dies * Copy thinks: "Great! I, ericb, just got a new lease on life!"

ericb 14y ago
That is great for the copy, but not helpful for me. Death of my consciousness can't inflict a new identity on the copy. The copy is a copy--he's awesome, just like me, but not me because I am dead.
- sofal 14y ago
  What if you wake up as the copy? Are you going to be depressed that you're not you?
  - ericb 14y ago
    It wouldn't be me that woke up as a copy. It would be a copy that feels just like me. However, since he would have my intellect, he would reason that he is not the original, and if it had died, he would feel sad. On the other hand, he might be excited if he were in a machine body as that fate might not befall him for a very, very long time.
    - sofal 14y ago
      It wouldn't be me that woke up as a copy. Here is where you're wrong. You presuppose the "he" and "I" when they are perfectly interchangeable right up until the cloning process. You can't presume that because you're the original now that you will be after the cloning process, because that has a 50% chance of being wrong. Right now, you and the clone are one and the same. Any reasoning you do about "me versus him" before the cloning is shortsighted. You have to reason like this: "If I wake up as the clone, then X. If not, then Y." It's like calling fork() in your code and then writing the code after that to presuppose that you're the parent process without even checking the return code. You don't know that you're the original after the cloning unless you see evidence that you are. Think of it this way: let's say instead of a brain copy it is a full body copy. You walk into a dark room where you can't see anything. They knock you unconscious, and then you wake up lying next to what appears to be you. How do you know if you're the original? Because you were the original before? Sorry, but no.
      - ericb 14y ago
        Each running instance of me is a separate, alive, person. Forget about the memories for the moment. If you kill that person, they are dead. It doesn't matter who is the copy. I could be a clone for all I care. Doesn't matter. If you kill this body--the one I'm IN then my stream of thoughts ends. Other similar streams of thought offer me no comfort.
ajdecon 14y ago
True, but in that case, the motivation for having a copy in the first place gets a lot lower. It isn't immortality. At most it's another version you create so your friends and family don't have to give you up. Which I can see being pretty motivating... but on the other hand, I can see the friends and family being totally unwilling to have a meaningful relationship with a second, slightly-diverged person after the first one died. And then the copy would be lonely. :-(
udp 14y ago
This doubles up as a great explanation of how fork(2) works.

by dmbass 14y ago

ericb 14y ago

That is great for the copy, but not helpful for me. Death of my consciousness can't inflict a new identity on the copy. The copy is a copy--he's awesome, just like me, but not me because I am dead.

sofal 14y ago
What if you wake up as the copy? Are you going to be depressed that you're not you?
- ericb 14y ago
  It wouldn't be me that woke up as a copy. It would be a copy that feels just like me. However, since he would have my intellect, he would reason that he is not the original, and if it had died, he would feel sad. On the other hand, he might be excited if he were in a machine body as that fate might not befall him for a very, very long time.
  - sofal 14y ago
    It wouldn't be me that woke up as a copy. Here is where you're wrong. You presuppose the "he" and "I" when they are perfectly interchangeable right up until the cloning process. You can't presume that because you're the original now that you will be after the cloning process, because that has a 50% chance of being wrong. Right now, you and the clone are one and the same. Any reasoning you do about "me versus him" before the cloning is shortsighted. You have to reason like this: "If I wake up as the clone, then X. If not, then Y." It's like calling fork() in your code and then writing the code after that to presuppose that you're the parent process without even checking the return code. You don't know that you're the original after the cloning unless you see evidence that you are. Think of it this way: let's say instead of a brain copy it is a full body copy. You walk into a dark room where you can't see anything. They knock you unconscious, and then you wake up lying next to what appears to be you. How do you know if you're the original? Because you were the original before? Sorry, but no.
    - ericb 14y ago
      Each running instance of me is a separate, alive, person. Forget about the memories for the moment. If you kill that person, they are dead. It doesn't matter who is the copy. I could be a clone for all I care. Doesn't matter. If you kill this body--the one I'm IN then my stream of thoughts ends. Other similar streams of thought offer me no comfort.

ajdecon 14y ago

True, but in that case, the motivation for having a copy in the first place gets a lot lower. It isn't immortality. At most it's another version you create so your friends and family don't have to give you up. Which I can see being pretty motivating... but on the other hand, I can see the friends and family being totally unwilling to have a meaningful relationship with a second, slightly-diverged person after the first one died. And then the copy would be lonely. :-(

udp 14y ago

This doubles up as a great explanation of how fork(2) works.